Spring 1972
Volume 18 no 2 (83)
75 p $2.00

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Toronto Board of Education
SEP 21 1972
EDUCATION CENTRE LIBRARY

The Trial of Vladimir Bukovsky

Samizdat

Africa

Ali A. Mazrui

P. J. Vatikiotis

Marxism

Mihajlo Mihajlov

Philip J. Jaffe

Solzhenitsyn

Michael Glenny

Per Egil Hegge

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor: Leopold Labedz

International Advisory Board

Enzo Bettiza ..... *Corriere della Sera, Milan*
François Bourricaud ..... *University of Paris*
Zbigniew Brzezinski ..... *Columbia University*
Luciano Cafagna ..... *University of Pisa*
Melvin Croan ..... *University of Wisconsin*
Colin Crouch ..... *University of Oxford*
François Duchêne ..... *Institute for Strategic Studies, London*
Giorgio Galli ..... *Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, Turin*
Pierre Hassner ... *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris*
Masamichi Inoki ..... *Kyoto University*
Karl Kaiser ..... *University of the Saarland*
Ivo Lederer ..... *Stanford University*
John Wilson Lewis ..... *Stanford University*
Richard Lowenthal ..... *Free University of Berlin*
Alasdair MacIntyre ..... *Brandeis University*
Mark Mancall ..... *Stanford University*
Ali Mazrui ..... *Makerere University, Kampala*
Leonard Schapiro ..... *London School of Economics*
Soedjatmoko ..... *Indonesia*
Theo Sommer ..... *Die Zeit, Hamburg*

Editorial Assistants

Lesley Thornton Nicola D'Arblay

Editorial Office

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01–734–0592)

Subscription Office

Oxford University Press, Subscription Department, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 (Tel. 01–450–8080)

Subscription Rates

£3 or US $8.00. Student Rates £1·50 or US $4.00. Single copies 75p or US $2.00. Special arrangements for airmail.

Manuscripts

Articles should be submitted in duplicate to the editorial office. They should be typed in double-spacing and, preferably, conform to the house-style of *Survey*.

Copyright © *Survey* 1972

Survey is published under the auspices of the International Association for Cultural Freedom and Stanford University by

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spring 1972
Volume 18
no 2 (83)

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Marxism

Djilas versus Marx ... ... *Mihajlo Mihajlov* 1

The Rise and Fall of Earl Browder ... ... *Philip J. Jaffe* 14

Africa

Africa in the 1970s ... ... *Ali A. Mazrui* 66

Egypt's Politics of Conspiracy ... ... *P. J. Vatikiotis* 83

Solzhenitsyn

Solzhenitsyn and the Nobel Prize ... ... *Per Egil Hegge* 100

Solzhenitsyn's 'August 1914' ... ... *Michael Glenny* 112

Documents: Soviet Union

The Case of Vladimir Bukovsky 123

An Open Letter by Grigori Svirsky 161

Documents: Poland and Czechoslovakia

Two Declarations 168

Farewell to an Incorrigible Girl ... *Tadeusz Nowakowski* 172

Merle Fainsod ... ... *Paul Cocks* 176

Letters to the Editor 178

Our Contributors 179

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minerva

A REVIEW of SCIENCE, LEARNING & POLICY

Editor: Edward Shils

VOL. X, NUMBER 2 **APRIL 1972**

COMMENT

Four Comments on the Rothschild Report
Eric Ashby, Harold Orlans, John Ziman, V. C. Wynne-Edwards

ARTICLES

Science and Trans-Science
Alvin M. Weinberg

Authoritarian Government and Academic Subservience: The University of Singapore
Roland Puccetti

The Dilution of Academic Power in Canada: The University of Toronto Act
Murray G. Ross

University Values and University Organisation
Bruce R. Williams

DISCUSSION

Can Investigations Improve Scientific Advice? The Case of the ABM
Paul Doty

REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Oxford Discussions on Higher Education
Universities in Danger: The United States Office for Civil Rights *contra* Columbia University

CORRESPONDENCE

Harvey Brooks, J. C. Polkinghorne

BOOK REVIEWS

William Mansfield Cooper, June Goodfield-Toulmin
H. C. Pereira, Peter Mathias

Annual subscription: £3·50/$10.50 Single copy: £1·00/$3.00

MINERVA, 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Djilas versus Marx

The Theory of Alienation

Mihajlo Mihajlov

IN May 1971 Milovan Djilas published an article in *Encounter* which in the Serbo-Croat original bears the title 'Alienation as Humanism' (*Otudjenje kao ljudskost*), and which is directed against Karl Marx's Theory of Alienation. Bearing in mind that Stalin and Stalinism can be criticized quite openly in Yugoslavia but that it is unfortunately still not possible to express one's opinions about Lenin or Marx freely, nor to point out that Stalinism is not a deviation from Leninism and Marxism, but rather the logical outcome of Marxist teaching, and remembering also that Djilas is still not allowed to publish in his own country, it is obvious that to enter into polemics with him is a very delicate business. It is impossible for political reasons to criticize or to comment on his books and articles inside Yugoslavia, whereas any criticism from the democratic world could well be made use of by Yugoslav officialdom in order to undermine Djilas' reputation amongst Yugoslavs at home by means of the argument: 'You see, they don't think much of Djilas in the West either.'

I believe that because of a coincidence of circumstances I am perhaps the one person at the present time who can polemicize with Djilas on an equal footing without the implication of any political unpleasantness. Some years ago I openly came out in favour of Djilas in my articles, and, like him, I am denied the right to publish in my own country.

Djilas' achievements in his exposure and his analysis of communist totalitarianism can never be valued too highly and his *The New Class* will undoubtedly remain one of the fundamental works about communism and Stalinism. But whereas in *The New Class* Djilas still in many respects remains a communist and a Marxist, i.e. that new society in whose creation he had himself actively participated is criticized from a Marxist position at the centre of which is to be found the ideal of 'the perfect society', of equality and of complete classlessness, in his second theoretical book, *The Unperfect Society*, he sets out to criticize the very idea of the classless society. And in the article 'Alienation as Humanism' he seeks to strike a blow right at the heart of Marxism, at Marx's Theory of Alienation.

This time the blow is not aimed at Stalinism, or even against Leninism, but against all the contemporary currents of neo-Marxism and in particular against the New Left, in which Djilas rightly sees the ideological vestiges of unexhausted totalitarianism.

Criticism of Marxism can be advanced from several points of view. It can be demonstrated that the 'alienation' of man is not conditioned

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by exclusively social factors so that the changing of these factors alone cannot solve the social problem; it is possible to show that the abolition of private ownership does not at all do away with the division of labour, nor with the class system itself; it is possible to dispute the idea that it is the class struggle which has set in motion the whole process of human development; it can be denied that the introduction of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' leads to the withering away of the state and towards the establishment of the kingdom of freedom etc., etc.

However, Djilas' originality lies not so much in his refutation of Marx for the way in which he advocates the liberation of man and the elimination of human 'alienation', as in his assertion that 'alienation' is in no way evil and even that it is nothing less than humanism. In other words, Djilas does not criticize Marxism from one of the usual standpoints, viz: that the very manner by which the 'kingdom on earth' is brought into being leads not to freedom but to enslavement; that the realization of the classless society and of communism is quite simply not possible; that the realization of the classless society and of communism is eminently possible, but that such a society would bear no relation to human freedom and would mean the spiritual and later the physical death of humanity, and hence the search for a means of creating a bearable way of life should be carried on in a completely different direction.

No, Djilas' point of departure for his criticism of the realization of the 'earthly paradise' is not one of these three basic propositions. With his characteristic determination and courage he starts off with the statement that no alienation of man exists and that what Marx and all other Marxists since have considered evil and qualified as 'alienation' is in fact something extremely good and represents nothing more nor less than humanism, and that, because of this, no liberation or 'earthly paradise' is needed.

It is this basic idea which obliges me to appear in the strange rôle of the defender of Marx against Djilas, with whom I am otherwise in the main in agreement, and this is all the stranger since I am not a Marxist; but I hope to prove that Djilas, even though apparently such a radical opponent of some of the basic ideas of Marxism, is nevertheless still a Marxist, even in his criticism. In other words, I, who am not a Marxist, will try to defend something in Marx which I consider correct and which Djilas attacks from a position, which I, in line with Marx's own reasoning, consider incorrect. I believe that it is highly instructive to analyse Djilas' original idea, because that idea provides an excellent illustration that it is impossible to criticize Marx by remaining on the same spiritual plane of European rationalism from which Marx himself evolved.

ALTHOUGH the Theory of Alienation, as Djilas correctly indicates, is the least clear section of Marx's teaching, it nevertheless contains the basic starting point, or perhaps even the fundamental motivating principle of the whole communist doctrine, and the concept of 'aliena-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion' is implicitly present in the works of Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung despite the fact that they do not explicitly mention it. Stated simply it is as follows: the world is ailing (the Theory of Alienation), it must be cured (the Theory and Practice of Communism). As I have already pointed out, criticisms of Marxism are usually made up of refusals to accept the diagnosis of the ailment (i.e. its cause), or the manner of its treatment. Djilas claims that no ailment exists so that treatment is unnecessary. The premise is highly original, but in order not to fall into an exclusively terminological error, it is as well to compare briefly what Marx understood by 'alienation' and what Djilas understands by the term.

It must be clearly stated at once that for Marx the essence of human alienation was the absence of freedom, the enslavement of man, which he saw in the main in the social system of private ownership and commodity production. There is no need to enter into an analysis of Marx's concept of 'commodity fetishism', etc. since such analyses illustrate only what Marx sees as the reasons for man's lack of freedom; for Marx the least free man of all was the capitalist hired worker. It is important that Marx sees alienation both in the result and in the act of production. He writes: 'Labour is external to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his essential being; . . . in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself . . . does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside the work, and in his work feels outside himself. . . . His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is *forced labour*. . . .'[1] Without going into the question of Marx's theories on the causes of man's lack of freedom—coercion, forced labour, etc.—this is what is of prime importance. And this absence of freedom renders free development of the creative forces impossible for the majority of mankind. It is with this meaning and this meaning only that Marx uses the concept of alienation; so indeed in the Marxian sense it could be said that the German or Soviet forced labour camps, in which man's freedom was reduced to a minimum, were harsh examples of the alienation of man. Djilas correctly points out that for Marx alienation is just another expression for the exploitation of labour, and that the symptoms of alienation in an individual, alienated, unfree man show a close similarity to the symptoms of medical neurosis. Marx is correct in stating that the greater the degree of non-freedom to which man is exposed, the more frequent does the appearance of true clinical neurosis become. The important thing, here, however, is to re-emphasize that for Marx 'alienation' is identical with absence of freedom.

What, then, is 'alienation' according to Djilas? 'There can be no doubt whatever', he writes, 'that man when he discovers a truth, or when he creates a work of art, or when he improves a skill, puts into his

[1] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Rani radovi* (Early Works) (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1967), pp. 246–49.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

creations, i.e. " alienates " to them, his power, his feeling, his intellect. . . . Man is man in so far as by his actions he moves away—" alienates " himself—from the conditions of life which nature has given him. . . . Therefore, it is not because this or that method of production (his social condition) has this or that characteristic, that man " alienates " himself from it, but because (and because only then) he cannot exist in such circumstances any longer. The process of alienation is a way of human existence. The ever-greater division of labour does increase alienation, and it makes it more complex; but this does not alter the fact that even primitive man alienated himself in the very act of " starting " to think, and act, differently from animals. . . .'

And Djilas elaborates his concept of ' alienation ' further:

> Every time that man, by whatever action, achieves something fundamentally or radically new, he alienates himself. It must be that he estranges himself from the conditions and circumstances in which he has hitherto lived. In other words, whenever he creates, and in so far as he creates, he alienates himself. . . . In reality, geniuses create new forms by moving away from the forms they have found. . . . For such an alienation to come about, more is needed than talent: an inner, intellectual and emotive effort which no outside obstacle, social or material, is able to stop. . . . Every human action which creates something new is, at the same time, an alienation from the old, from the existing. . . . Alienation from nature is obvious as a long-term process, and is nothing else but man altering, through technical and other improvements, the circumstances of his existence. . . . In the process of such alienation, man does not stop being what he is, but becomes more independent, more alienated from nature. Man becomes man by alienating himself. . . . There is no end to this alienation from nature, and to that ' purely ' spiritual alienation, in the same way as there is no end to the universe of which we are part, and in which we exist. . . . The change, the alienation of which I speak here, is personal and free. . . . The human being thus manifests himself to us as creative, hence infinite in his creativeness and existence. Alienated, creative man is one of the aspects of mankind . . . he aspires to complete alienation—the absolute dominion over nature. For it is only an aspiration, part of the ceaseless movement into new circumstances and new possibilities.

It is quite understandable that Djilas at the height of his eulogy to ' alienation ' should exclaim: ' I alienate myself ' means: " I am man." '

It seems unnecessary to go into Djilas' division of ' alienation ' into three different kinds: alienation from society, from nature and from oneself, any further; the more so, since of the third type Djilas himself writes: ' to me this is its most mysterious aspect . . . '. Nevertheless, something else is quite clear, and that is that the ' alienation ' which Djilas so exalts has nothing whatsoever to do with the alienation which Marx speaks of. I even believe Marx could have signed his name under

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Djilas' text on 'alienation' with a clear conscience, given one small terminological alteration, that the term 'alienation' as Djilas uses it be replaced by the more usual terms for the manifestations he describes, namely: progress, creativity, evolution, revolution; or stated as briefly and precisely as possible: *what Djilas calls 'alienation', Marx called 'praxis'*. Djilas' description of 'alienation' is an excellent illustration of Marx's thesis on Feuerbach which concerns the 'change of the existing'. Djilas' criticism of Marx is evidently criticism only in appearance. Djilas' 'alienation' changes towards better, more human conditions of life, of the state of existence; for Marx alienation is the state of existence which must be changed, as Djilas would say, 'alienated'. The contradiction is only apparent and, quite the reverse of wanting to strike a blow at Marxism, Djilas' work on 'alienation' remains well within the framework of Marxist thought. It is sufficient to change the terms and there is then no real difference between Marx and Djilas. Marx says that the world has to be changed, Djilas says it must be 'alienated', but what they both understand by these terms is virtually the same thing.

It is strange that Djilas has not noticed that he is repeating in detail what Hegel and Marx say about 'alienation', except that they call the process 'the elimination of alienation'. Djilas himself writes that for Hegel 'progressive cognizance, which is apprehension of the world, is the overcoming of alienation', but for Djilas 'alienation . . . is nothing else but man altering, through technical and other improvements, the circumstances of his existence . . . alienation, i.e. the improvement of technique and of production . . . alienized and creative man aspires to complete alienation—the absolute dominion over nature . . .'. Whereas for Marx the aim of the communist movement is the creation of a society in which 'unalienated man may freely develop all his powers', that is, create; for Djilas 'alienated man is creative man'.

It is even stranger when Djilas writes that 'there is no alienation in the sense intended by Marx', since 'alienation is a state of man while exploitation is a social relationship' and they are therefore not identical. However, for Marx also, alienation is only a result of exploitation, that is, a condition brought about by social relationship. So even Djilas himself cannot avoid using the concept of alienation in Marx's rather than in his own sense; he writes of the neo-Marxists: 'Is not the contemporary flight into the theory of alienation itself a symptom of alienation from reality and from one's own reason? Is it not, again, tantamount to the handing over of one's being to other forces?' In the same way and completely in the spirit of classical Marxism Djilas writes that 'The industrial revolution which signified an unprecedented scientific take-off . . . was accompanied by intense exploitation and unbridled brutality over workers and peasants', whereas he reproaches the 'socialist' societies that they have not set man free. From this the reasonable conclusion would be that so-called 'socialism' does not free, but not that freedom is not necessary, as it is possible to understand Djilas, if we do

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not become bogged down, that is, in the terminological complexities brought upon us by the unusual use and definition of the concept of 'alienation'.

This, therefore, is what Djilas writes: 'The alienation of man in nature (Hegel) or in God (Feuerbach) is resolved by Marx by the proposition that the real world must be changed'. This is what Djilas believes too, except that for 'changed' he substitutes 'alienated'. In this fashion we might expect praise of all revolutions, including the communist one, as examples of 'alienation' (according to Djilas); so the question which immediately comes to mind is—what exactly is Djilas striving for, is not his praise of 'alienation' simply an expression of his spiritual shortsightedness?

But in fact this is not the case, and we can only regret that Djilas did not keep to Marx's sense of the term 'alienation', in which case his ideas would have been much clearer and our argument made easier.

THE substance of the real, rather than the purely terminological conflict with Marx, comes to light in its entirety in one of Djilas' statements: 'Man cannot return to his own essence, for he has never departed from it.' This is the basic conflict.

Although the whole Marxist perspective is rooted in history, and is projected in it, there is also to be found within it a religious-metaphysical kernel which both motivates it, and constantly comes into contradiction with the Marxist (and indeed not only the Marxist) idea of historical progress. This is what gives rise to all the other inconsistencies: 'the kingdom of freedom' is brought into being by means of a dictatorship, technical development leads, supposedly, to the elimination of the division of labour, etc., etc. This motivating, and at the same time religious-metaphysical innermost core of Marxism is given its most explicit expression in Marx's theory of alienation. Djilas quite correctly observes that the concept of 'alienation' (in Marx's sense) is of a concealed religious nature. He could well have quoted the Apostle Paul, who speaks of the alienation and enslavement not only of man, but of every living thing subject to the 'law of mortality' and which 'groans in torment, awaiting its deliverer'. And if, in purely religious terms, man is alienated from God, that is, from freedom, and subject to natural laws rather than master over them, as was the case according to the 'Great Myth' at the moment of creation, then according to Marx, who did not believe in the 'Great Myth' any more, man is alienated from his 'generic being' in which he supposedly ought to be free, and will return to his generic being in the future 'kingdom of freedom', which is materializing in history.

So according to both the Bible and to Marx, man is alienated from freedom. This is where mankind's ailment lies, and the Bible and Marx differ only in their view of the causes of this ailment and the method of treating it. However, neither the Bible's nor Marx's basic essence of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man, freedom, is an historical category, and whereas the Bible consistently refrains from erecting the 'kingdom of freedom' within the framework of history, Marx, who believes only in history and rejects all aspects of transcendentality, places the 'kingdom of freedom' inside the historical perspectives of this world. But if we were to remain consistently within the framework of the ideal of historical progress as Marx would have wished, then we should be obliged to assert in agreement with Djilas: 'Man cannot return to his own essence, for he has never departed from it'; if this is so, then alienation can only take place from the existing state and there thus exists a more comprehensible psychological reason for Djilas' change of the concept of alienation. At the beginning of history there was no freedom, either in the Biblical or in the Marxian sense of the word, but historical progress, especially scientific-technical progress, leads man with every step nearer to an ever freer life; such development has no limits—as everyone knows and as Djilas mentions, the crew of Apollo walked on the Moon! From the point of view of historical development we might well conclude that Djilas is a more consistent Marxist than Marx.

It is unfortunate only, that the idea of historical progress demands an answer to the question of what direction that progress will take, and of the possibilities of man's influencing that direction. According to Djilas it would seem that progress, or as he calls it 'alienation', automatically leads to the greater humanizing of man, mastery over nature, etc., 'because man is—man'. In this way historical progress is only the natural development of man, just as is, for example, a plant's growth. To the question: what should man do if he finds himself in the shoes of a hired worker at the time of the initial accumulation of capital, or those of an inmate of a Soviet camp, or of an American negro or even of a man who is dying of an incurable disease or who has been crippled in a road accident?—Djilas answers: 'First and foremost, no man who is mentally sound feels himself alienated [in Marx's sense—M. M.] because nature is different from him or because he cannot understand the process of the production of his own hands: he simply feels inadequately taught or unjustly rewarded.' As we can see, this is avoiding the issue, since either the historical life of man is based upon certain laws which he cannot in any way influence—Djilas would not agree with this; we have only to recall his praise of 'alienation' as the freely created product of human genius—or progress depends on man, and in that case the basic question concerns the end and direction towards which progress is moving.

But if the possibility of choosing the end and direction of historical development exists, this means that man is only partially dependent on the laws of nature, i.e. that he carries within himself a fragment of something which is not to be found in the rest of nature, and which in that sense is unnatural, or supra-natural, and that is—freedom, free will. If Marx had not been blinded by the 'scientifism' of the nineteenth century,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he would have rejected the historico-economic determinism of social development, and would have proclaimed that although historical progress does not lead to communism, it is possible to create the 'kingdom of freedom' by fighting for it, just as in practice was happening. But in that case, Marx would have had to acknowledge the effective dualism of man, for no free will, what religion calls spirit, is to be found in the historico-natural world, whereas all of Marx's efforts were directed towards containing human thought within the framework of natural history. For Djilas this problem does not arise, since he moves effortlessly on an exclusively historical plane: 'Does any creative religious thinker in our age proceed from the traditional aprioristic dichotomy of man?' Nevertheless this dichotomy is that other dimension which separates man from exclusively empirico-historical reality, and which remains outside the perception both of Djilas, and of his ideological opponent Herbert Marcuse, who in spite of his 'revolutionariness' remains a man of one dimension, i.e. the historical one. The reason why Marx completely rejected the dichotomy of man, and Lenin foamed at the mouth with rage at the slightest mention of 'religious mysticism', was that in order to achieve the end in which they believed, they had to convince people that alienation, i.e. lack of freedom, was caused by exclusively historico-social conditions, and that it would be eliminated by a radical change in those conditions. Let us see in what religious terms Marx describes the 'kingdom of freedom': 'Communism . . . is the true resolution of the conflict between man and nature, between man and man . . . between freedom and need, between individual and race. It is the solution of the enigma of history and it knows itself to be that solution.'[2] If Marx had not lived in the nineteenth century he would undoubtedly have written in the Communist Manifesto, that everyone who perished on the barricades in the struggle for communism, would have eternal life in the future 'kingdom of freedom'. But what of this life when the 'kingdom' is historical? Those thinkers who negate the absolute are compelled to absolutize the relative. The absolutization of history and demonstrable proof of socio-economic determinism which rules out freedom of choice over the future, were necessary for Marx to be able to attract people towards his choice of the future, for it is quite clear that the tragedy of human life on earth does not exclusively consist of a socio-economic system which enslaves, nor can this itself be solved by social revolutions. Djilas is quite correct in pointing this out, and particularly so when he attacks Marx's statement that the root of alienation is in the division of labour; it is evident that a high degree of technological development merely accentuates the division of labour.

But Djilas is not correct when he says that 'No man who is mentally sound feels alienated, only . . . inadequately taught and unjustly rewarded.' The world is still ailing and unfree even if we accept that one manifestation

[2] K. Marx, Kapital (Capital), Vol. 1 (Belgrade: Kultura, 1947), p. 275.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the ailment is the appearance of totalitarianism of the communist type, against which Djilas' intellectual efforts are directed.

ONE of the arguments against Marxism which seems of particular importance to Djilas is the claim that Marxism is not scientific or rather that the point of departure for Marx's prognosis does not agree with scientifically established facts.

Moreover, historical development has shown that the working class does not get poorer as a result of the pressures of capitalism but in fact richer; the socialist revolution has been victorious in backward rather than, as Marx held, in the most advanced countries; that the abolition of private ownership brought into being a new party-bureaucratic class, and did not establish the foundations of a classless society, etc., etc.

All this is absolutely correct, and all these are arguments which could indeed be used against Djilas. It is strange that Djilas does not notice that his statement that Marxism is not a science but a faith, and that Marx himself first believed in communism and later sought ways of proving his faith, makes it apparent that we are dealing here with two different realities: faith in the possibility of realizing the 'earthly paradise' within the framework of history, and science as a neutral agent which can serve any end. The book *The Unperfect Society* clearly shows that Djilas himself first stopped believing in communism, and only later found 'scientific' evidence for no longer believing.

In itself, science says nothing either for or against communist teaching and, further, science neither gives nor proposes any human ends, but is itself conditioned by already determined ends. From the scientifically established fact that workers are exploited, or that intellectuals do not have freedom of speech, it in no way follows that workers should not be exploited, or that freedom of speech should exist. From the scientific fact that the splitting of the atom releases enormous energy, it in no way follows of its own accord that an atomic bomb should be produced, or even an atomic electric power station built, or that all atomic research should be permanently banned. Science gives an answer to the question of what should be done and in what way, in order to achieve a certain end, but science does not give the end itself, even when scientific knowledge is its own end, for in this case the end is a prerequisite and not a result of science. Science says nothing of the need for a just society, just as medical pathology says nothing of the need for man to be healthy. The need for a just society is a prerequisite of sociology, just as is the need for a healthy body for medicine, even though scientific research in these fields can be carried out with a quite opposite end in view, as recent history has shown.

The basic belief of communism is that 'the kingdom of freedom' can be brought into being within the framework of history and socio-economic progress by means of 'the midwife of history'—violence. Faced with this fundamental basis of communism any scientific facts

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whatsoever are irrelevant, or at best of secondary importance. The best example of this is the October Revolution and Lenin, which is exactly what Djilas cites in his attack on the communist ideal. It is true that Lenin stood all Marx's teaching about 'the base conditioning the superstructure' on its head, by his conviction that the Socialist Revolution could be brought about in a country where capitalism was undeveloped, and with a working class whose numbers were so small as to be negligible, and that in fact such countries represented 'the weakest links in the chain of capitalism'. For Marx the weakest links were those countries where capitalism is most developed and where the proletariat is the most numerous class. Even so, Djilas has every right to state that Lenin is a Marxist. The same applies to Stalin's 'socialism in one country'. Stalin too is a Marxist and here too Djilas is correct, but would any important change in the picture of communist dictatorship have been seen if today's avant garde of the 'alienated'—coloured people, students, etc. had seized the monopoly of power in their own hands, as those of the New Left would have wished, instead of the avant garde of the working class which today lives too well to start a revolution? I do not think so. But is it then in that case of any importance at all that Marx's prophecies of historical development have not proved to be accurate? The spirit of communism, the building of the 'kingdom of freedom' by means of the earthly power of violence is still just as alive as it was in Marx's day, and indeed much more so, and no 'scientific facts' can serve as an argument against it. It can even be paradoxically stated that Marxism has always existed, but that it is only in the twentieth century that it has achieved such an unheard-of expansion.

Despite the fact that Marxism is not scientific, faith in science and Marxist faith are as alike as sisters, since both have as their basis the progressive domination of the world and nature, and of human nature adopting the *a priori* standpoint that power gives freedom. Such domination, as we have shown, Djilas calls 'alienation'. It must be emphasized, however, that faith in science and science itself are not identical.

IN my opinion Djilas is right in considering the present-day Marxist or rather neo-Marxist philosophers second-rate thinkers, but it seems to me that his belief that Marx's 'doctrine is kept alive mainly because it has evolved into the preservative of bureaucratic socialist structures' is erroneous. Does the power of the state really support the New Left? Is neo-Marxism really institutionalized? I personally still do not see an all-embracing ideal which could be set against Marxism, not, unfortunately, even in Djilas. The danger of recidivist totalitarianism from the New Left is not to be found in the justified claim that people of our time are 'alienated' (in the Marxian sense) and unfree, but rather in the belief that dictatorship and violence can set man free. Any violence directed towards 'the better organization of human life' is closely linked

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with spiritual blindness and the conviction that there exists only a single dimension of life, the historical one. And while we remain in this single dimension, we cannot avoid violence, even though the violence of technocracy, which is scientifically based, has been substituted for the violence of partocracy. But since man is nevertheless, speaking in old-fashioned terms, a bridge between two worlds, the spiritual and the natural, then as a result of the spiritual blindness brought about by the spread of rationalism and belief in science, true aspiration towards the absolute is projected into the historico-social sphere, which is relative to the life of man, and in which only relative freedom is possible; even this is not an immanent historical sphere, but is dependent in its entirety on the extra-historical dimension of the spirit. Freedom is not the result but the cause of the historical process! It is not possible to refute Marx or the New Left by remaining on the same natural-historical plane. It is only possible by spiritually overcoming Marxism, and that means overcoming faith in the historical unidimensionality of life.

Such is the criticism of atheism, a prerequisite of any criticism of modern barbarity—to paraphrase Marx, since the belief is in unidimensionality, in being alienated from the sphere of the spirit, that is, from freedom.

BY all accounts, the breakthrough into the other dimensions of life seems to necessitate some spiritual process initiated by a breakdown of the belief in communism, and that without that faith and its breakdown, such a breakthrough is extremely rare. It can be freely stated that in the first decade of this century it was initially made by those Russian thinkers, who at the end of the penultimate decade of the last century had introduced Marxism into Russia, and who participated in the so-called 'first Marxist front'; it was they who had the opportunity of observing the first Russian Revolution of 1905; Berdyaev, Struve, Bulgakov, Frank and their journal *Vekhi* of 1909 have remained even to the present day the inevitable signposts in all efforts to vanquish Marxist faith in violence. Some distance apart from them, but on the same road, stands the solitary but perhaps greatest of all figure of Lev Shestov.

It is interesting to follow the parallel courses in the process of spiritual emancipation from Marxism taken by Djilas and by another former Marxist, Berdyaev. As early as the end of the third decade of this century, Berdyaev gave a definition and a short characterization, and indeed the very concept of the new class, which Djilas a quarter of a century later was to take as the basis of his well-known book. The same thing was to be repeated with the idea and concept of *The Unperfect Society*, which Nikolai Berdyaev described several decades earlier in his book *The Fate of Man*. I know for a fact that Djilas did not know the Russian philosopher's book. This parallel process gives hope that all

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those who outgrow the communist faith in spirit and in life will proceed along the same road.

As distinct from Berdyaev, however, Djilas has not yet reached the final stage of overcoming the unidimensionality of the historical process; this is apparent in the work which we have analysed.

Yet another former communist, Ignazio Silone, writes in his latest book [3] that the greatest event in the lives of many people of his generation has been the renewed discovery of Christianity during the last 10 years. There can be no doubt that in such cases we are indeed dealing with a revelation, and not with 'scientific knowledge', since it is the discovery of another dimension which gives man the strength to oppose the force of the historical violence of any totalitarian system and organization, including that of the historical Church. Because a part of man does not belong to the natural-historical world, it will not die with that part of man which does belong to this world; hence the power of this world is not absolute. And this is not because the immortality of the soul (the deepest 'I' in each one of us, the kernel of freedom) depends in any way upon morality or necessity, or anything like that, but only because it exists in reality (if you like, in spite of all morality). If such a reality did not exist, then indeed Lenin and Stalin would be invincible. Fortunately they are not, in spite of the continuous campaign against a recognition of the existence of the life of the spirit.

From all this the following conclusions may be deduced:

1. Djilas' criticism of Marx's theory of alienation is only apparent, because Djilas always remains within the framework of that sphere of thought which created Marxism. Djilas himself writes that man created neither nature nor himself, but he does not grasp that man could not have created the most implausible and unnatural thing that we know in life, that is freedom, freedom of will. He believes that freedom is the product of some human development, he does not see that freedom is a prerequisite of any development, and by this very fact cannot have historical roots. The materialization of freedom, which is always concrete and historical, is quite another matter, but the question of the progress of freedom is a very problematic one. The unceasing struggle for freedom in history must surely show that man was originally created free, and that no myths about man's 'fall', about his alienation, and finally in its ultimate development—neurosis, could exist at all if freedom were only the result of development. The oppressive weight of unfreedom can only be felt by one who has once been, or is in his heart of hearts, free but has been cast into an unfree state. Franz Kafka expressed it very well: 'Who can bemoan a lost kingdom? Only an exiled king.'

2. Marx is correct in stating that man is alienated (unfree), but his theory and practice for the elimination of alienation based on historical violence serves only to show that he himself was a deeply alienated man

[3] Ignazio Silone, *Sudjba odnogo bednogo hristianina* (The Destiny of A Poor Christian) (Rome, 1968).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(not of course in Djilas' sense), and that in fact his teaching about liberation is the clearest symptom of his ailment and not a remedy for it. But man is alienated not from some abstract 'generic being', but from the real, extra-historical centre of his own personality and from the inner kernel of freedom within himself (speaking in religious terms, this kernel is that man was created in God's image). Alienated, or separated, but we must remember here that the devil—*diabolo*—is the mythical divider. It is naive and irrational to deny the existence of the ailment, for it does exist, even though Marx was wrong in his diagnosis and therefore in his therapy also. Marx is in many ways reminiscent of a Biblical prophet who answered God's call and was given the commandment: 'Go and make the people blind so that they look and do not see, listen and do not hear!' But contemporary history shows that the curse of blindness is still with us.

3. Without the discovery of the reality of the other dimensions of the struggle, no criticism of Marxism from any 'scientific' standpoint whatsoever, or victory over totalitarianism, is possible. The theory and practice of Marxism can always be changed, the 'weakest links' can at one moment be the developed, at another the undeveloped countries, the bearers of 'revolutionary violence' can at one time be proletarians, at another peasants, and still later 'coloureds', etc.; but the same spirit of Marxism, the institution of totalitarian dictatorship loses nothing in the change. At its basis is to be found the innermost essence of all totalitarianism, the belief that power gives freedom. Against this belief in power can only be set the belief that all power enslaves, and enslaves primarily him who wields that power, and that to suffer violence without resistance is just as wrong as to commit it.

IN Ignazio Silone's latest book, the hero of the story addresses these words to his adversary, the Pope, the representative of the historical earthly kingdom:

> If you cast a glance through the window, on the steps in front of the cathedral you will see an old and ragged beggar woman, someone who in the life of this world means nothing; she sits there from dawn to dark. But in a million years, in a thousand million years her soul will go on existing, because God created it immortal. But the kingdoms of Naples, of France, of England and all other states with their armies and fleets, and all the rest, will thus be turned into nothing.[4]

This says all there is to be said about the 'kingdom of freedom' on earth and in history, in history which would not exist at all if there were not something above history which some call God, others freedom, and still others purpose, and which has no connexion with the natural laws of development, which are the only concern of science.

[4] Ibid. p. 264

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rise and Fall of Earl Browder

Philip J. Jaffe

EARL Russell Browder was the head of the American Communist Party during the fateful fifteen years between 1930 and 1945. Before that time he was a socialist, an important figure in the American labour movement, a member of the Communist Party, and an important figure in Moscow as well as in China. During his leadership of the American Communist Party his closest friend in Moscow, Georgi Dimitroff, then General Secretary of the Communist International, described Browder as the leading Marxist in the English-speaking world. From 1935 to 1945, Browder was revered and praised by the left in the United States almost as fervently as was Stalin in the Soviet Union. His published output would total perhaps two million words. He had direct contact with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as well as Wendell Willkie, and he even shared a speaker's platform with Senator Robert Taft. He was a welcome lecturer in many universities and often appeared on important non-communist political platforms.

Even after his expulsion from the American CP in 1946, Browder continued to lead a political life for more than 25 years. His visit to Moscow after his expulsion, his endless polemical and other writings, his numerous lectures, his frequent appearances on radio and television and his vast correspondence with political leaders and with students seeking information could provide the material for an unusual and instructive autobiography.

And in fact, on 10 July 1951, Browder wrote a long letter to his literary agent describing his intention of writing his 'political autobiography'. The letter was sufficiently intriguing for a leading publisher to offer a small advance which Browder accepted. The letter was written not long after he had resigned (in 1949) from his post as literary agent for non-fiction Soviet books and periodicals and after he had given up all hope of returning to the Party from which he was expelled, which by this time anyway had become a meaningless movement.

The letter was written by a man who refused to believe the real reasons for his removal from the high post that he had held in the communist world. He still believed in 1951 that his expulsion 'was the result of temporary misunderstanding'. This letter is further evidence of how Earl Browder, in his 'lonesome post in no-man's-land', so romanticized his past that had he fulfilled his proposal and written his autobiography based on this letter, it would have been a portrait not of his life but of some unreal personality. As a psychological document, this letter is as important for what it purports to explain as it is for

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what it omits, even though he later modified some of these opinions and judgments. For these reasons, it is being printed here in full.

Telephone: YOnkers 3–5777.
7 Highland Place,
Yonkers 5, NY

Mr. Ivan von Auw, Jr,
c/o Harold Ober,
40 East 49th St,
New York City. 10 July 1951

Dear Mr von Auw:

I am writing a political autobiography, and would be pleased if you would undertake to find a publisher for it.

What is my purpose in writing this book? And how does that purpose coincide with the interest of any considerable number of readers?

Under the new world conditions I find it necessary to review and revalue my past political life and draw some new conclusions. I imagine many people feel a similar need. Where my position is somewhat unusual lies in the fact that for 30 years I had exceptional opportunities to study and understand both sides of the present world alignment. Today I am studying the new situation in the light of the past without preconception, without advance commitment to any authority except that of reason and fact. My story, therefore, in helping me to re-define my own view of the world, should be similarly helpful to other people.

Like the majority of mankind I am a 'party man' in the sense of having faith in organization, in the democratic subordination of individual to collective decisions. But I have never been a 'party man' in the sense of delegating completely my power of decision on great issues to an impersonal and anonymous 'party' without regard to the substance and manner of the decision. Without my own participation in important decisions I do not 'belong', and I do not accept self-sufficient and arbitrary authority. That fact, I believe, is the reason why in 1945 I was abruptly expelled from the international communist leadership after 25 years of uninterrupted service. When an infallible and unquestionable authority was set up, which demanded blind faith from its followers, it recognized in advance that I would not be among the faithful.

This I did not understand in 1945. I thought the upheaval among the American communists that removed me, although initiated from abroad, was the result of temporary misunderstanding. This belief was based on experience of many years during which the international communist movement had tended steadily toward less 'command' and more 'leadership by conviction and example', not only as between national Parties but within the Parties themselves. This tendency was made official policy in the seventh world congress, and was emphasized in its choice of George Dimitroff as leader.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This policy of dissolving arbitrary authority found its culmination in the decision of June 1943, to abolish completely the Communist International, which was approved by Stalin in a special interview. The national Communist Parties were to stand on their own feet, and work out their own destinies without any pattern imposed upon them from above. It was specifically understood that this meant the development of important variations as between Parties, depending upon the historical background and economic development of their countries.

In 1945 this policy of decentralization was suddenly reversed. The new decision was taken without international consultations, and the first public sign of it was the abrupt removal of Earl Browder from leadership of the American communists. The fact that this step was intended to establish the new norm of authoritative world leadership in its most absolute form was proved a few years later, when the government of the USSR, in a note to the government of Yugoslavia, cited the removal of Browder by the American communists as the model that should have been followed by the Yugoslav communists in relation to Tito. This sudden rise of authoritarianism could hardly have been foreseen in 1945. It has, of course, an explanation, even if it cannot be accepted. I expect to explain it in my book, on the basis of my 30 years' experience.

This assertion of authoritarian control over the international communist movement was accompanied by a new and hitherto undiscussed interpretation of the world-role of America. This new conception was drawn from doctrinal bases, and assumed as inevitable that America should take over and continue the world-role of Hitlerite Germany. If this doctrinaire conception was to guide American communists, it was obvious that I could no longer play any serious role in its leadership. That was true because I had risen to my long-time position of influence only through many years of stubborn fighting for policies rooted in American conditions and history, rather than in abstract doctrine, and it was such policies that had furnished the foundation of American communist successes. It was my judgment, well known in international communist circles, that the whole relation of world forces after victory would make it impossible for America to take up a role even remotely resembling that of Hitlerite Germany, if the communists made full use of the favourable conditions to prevent such developments. The doctrinaire concept of America, I held, would only help the reactionaries into control in America, but even so, could not give them power to make over America as a new Hitlerism.

My understanding of America as a complex of progressive and reactionary forces and tendencies, in which the progressives could be marshalled, united and guided by the communists to victory over the reactionaries, had been approved by the international leaders of communism during the period when rising Hitlerism had been the main enemy. It had been accepted because of its demonstrated effectiveness in swinging America into the anti-Hitler camp; doctrinal preconceptions had been overcome by the necessities of the anti-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hitler struggle. But when Hitler's armies crumbled, these preconceptions were re-asserted, and without notice, consultation or any sort of discussion, the foundations of ten years of highly successful work were swept aside. I was called a 'renegade' not because I had changed in any way, but on the contrary because I had refused to change overnight, without discussion, and according to an arbitrary and vague 'directive'. It was a gross misjudgment of America, but given this initial error it was not a misjudgment of me. I never was a bureaucratic puppet, and could not become one overnight in 1945; I never did parrot slogans without understanding or agreement.

All the chief problems of the world today stem from the failure to make a peace settlement after World War II. The result is neither war nor peace. It might be called 'Trotsky's revenge', since he originated the idea that such a situation might be desirable in 1918, and was roundly beaten for it by Lenin. Or it might be called 'Hitler's revenge', since he had built all his hopes for victory upon the assumption of the 'irrepressible conflict' between East and West. But in no way can it be considered a favourable condition for any sector of the world.

In 1945 and for some time thereafter, despite the abandonment of those policies I considered correct on the side of the communists, I expected serious efforts to make peace from their side, and serious obstacles only from America. But the accumulated events forced me at last to recognize that a serious effort to reach a settlement *had not come from either side*. It became obvious that peace was possible only if both sides changed their approach to the problem. Soviet misjudgment of America was as serious an obstruction as American misjudgment of the Soviet Union. And the argument as to which was the aggressor, so far from helping, only petrified the obstacle on both sides. Unconditional partisanship to either became only a way to merge into the general drift toward World War III.

The world today is divided between two great polar centres of power, representing rival social-economic systems, which are strong enough for mutual extermination but neither strong enough to conquer the other. The world-relation of military power is that of inescapable stalemate. The tendency in such a world is that life becomes more and more militarized on both sides, continuing a tendency already set in motion by World War II. To call into question the unconditional righteousness of 'one's own' side becomes more and more the unforgivable crime. Thus it comes about that the communist world condemns Earl Browder along with Tito as 'agents of American imperialism', and my war-time books solemnly enter into treason trials, the accusation of having read or distributed them becoming evidence to justify the defendants' being hanged. And in bourgeois America, because I refuse steadfastly to become an unconditional enemy of the USSR, as most expelled communists have done, this has brought upon me excommunication more severe than any I experienced in 15 years as spokesman for the Communist Party. Both sides agree to make the 'no-man's-land' between their battle lines as uninhabitable as

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possible. That lonesome and dangerous position, under the full fire of both sides, is where I find myself living. It has, however, one advantage; it gives one freedom to think and criticize, and a perspective from which to use this freedom. It gives one the opportunity to revalue the past of one's own experience and the personalities and policies composing it. And since all freedom of opinion and the battle of opinions has also been banished from both militarized camps, they also are to be found only in 'no-man's-land'. And even Stalin has but recently reaffirmed: 'No science can develop without a battle of opinions, without freedom of opinions'.

When 30 years ago I joined the international communist leadership, the Soviet Union was a young and desperately weak 'experiment', encircled by hostile Great Powers, and its very survival was problematical. Today all that is changed; the Soviet Union is one of the Two Great Powers that remain in the world—'the Big Two'—all others being secondary and finding it necessary to attach themselves to one or the other, or to manoeuvre precariously between them. This marks a new era in world history. Everything in life must be readjusted to this new situation. But this world readjustment cannot be dictated everywhere either from Washington or Moscow. Any attempt to do so, from either side or both, leads to chaos and destruction. The whole world is reflected in Korea today, where the only realistic hope to end what is otherwise an endless slaughter, lies in the acceptance by each side of the idea that a truce at the 38th parallel is a victory, since it leaves the 'aggressor' (which is always the other side), where he began and therefore defeated. The only possible world settlement will follow the same pattern, since the controlling leadership on both sides agrees only on one point, that mutual extermination is preferable to 'defeat' without a major world war.

It is clear that in this new world situation, all the old approaches are bankrupt. New paths must be opened up for the new period. Since it has become clear that as a member of the international communist leadership I would have been forbidden to seek such new paths, I cannot regret my expulsion from it. And I must completely revalue it in the light of this new situation. The vastly increased strength of the USSR proves the soundness of Marxism and the early wisdom of Lenin and Stalin—but it does not invest the leadership of the USSR with immunity from criticism or with infallibility, it does not make them a law unto themselves, to do whatever they please. It does not make them the exclusive architects of the new society everywhere else in the world.

I am writing my political autobiography from the vantage point of my lonesome post in 'no-man's-land'. It will be a review of my personal experience in political life, looking for the roots of the present situation in the past. This will be done not by argument and exposition, but through a story of persons and events.

My starting point will be the background from which I entered the socialist movement. Beginning with the populism of early Kansas, my own experience will show its evolution into the socialism of Eugene V. Debs, the efforts to join together socialism and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organized labour, the struggle for Marxism in America, and then the tremendous influence suddenly exerted in 1917 by the Russian Revolution. It will follow the course of socialism as a sectarian movement, and show how the influence of Lenin raised it to the level where it could 're-discover America' and become a vital part of the main stream of American development.

The story will require a certain amount of documentation, but I hope to keep this to a minimum. After dealing with the early days, and the formative period of American communism up to 1925, I will give my experiences in Russia and China during 1926–29, which are rich with background material for the present day, in events and personalities. In Russia I was a guest-delegate in the Party congresses and conferences which settled the crucial struggles against Trotsky, and inaugurated the first five-year plan. In China I was, first, member of a labour delegation (Tom Mann of England, Jacques Doriot of France, and myself) that toured that country on the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek, during the period of the great split, and, second, for two years as director of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat with headquarters in Shanghai; there I had close contacts with such figures as Mme Sun Yat Sen, Borodin, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Liu Shao-chi, and Mme Liao Chung-kai. It was the experience and contacts of this period which enabled me later, during the second world war, to serve as the channel for the first communications between the Chinese communists and Roosevelt from which emerged the much-disputed (today) effort to bring about a coalition government in China.

The main body of the book will, of course, deal with the 1930s and the war period. I will give an intimate and extended review of the rise of the great mass peace movement of the late 1930s which played a big part to fix America's role in the second world war, and which drew into its orbit not only a major part of organized labour, but also of the Protestant Churches (Stanley High wrote an article in *American Magazine*, about 1938, entitled: 'Have the Communists Captured the Protestant Churches?'), and which gave the country its basic anti-Hitler education. Similarly with the rise of the modern labour movement marked by the CIO and its conquest of the mass-production and trustified industries, and its entry into national political life. I will trace the origins of the modern social security system, now such an accepted part of the 'American way of life', in the early mass fight for unemployment insurance of the early 1930s, with its tens of thousands of local battles and its great marches on Washington. I will tell about the great farmers' movement to stop evictions and forced sales, that brought about the great agricultural reforms later under Roosevelt, and which was organized by the communists. I will tell how the communists extended their influence in the cultural life of the country, to the point where reactionaries complained that the communists 'dominated' the field and froze them out, and where F. D. Roosevelt considered it the most natural thing in the world to send in his application for membership in the League of American Writers, the same organization now on the 'subversive list' of the Attorney General. I will relate my experiences in the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gathering of the 'Left-of-centre' coalition around Roosevelt, and the role of the communists in launching the 'third term' and 'fourth term' movements. And of course I will give much attention to the war years, when the communists won high praise from some typical American industrialists, and when the Army High Command officially removed all restrictions on the advancement of communists as commissioned officers, in recognition of the Party's services, and when the communists had such high confidence from organized labour that it was quite common to hear casual remarks in all circles that 'the communists run the CIO'. In dealing with the war years I will include my correspondence with the President and his aides, as well as interviews and working connexions with many aspects of the Administration in Washington and in many states.

A concluding section will give judgments and conclusions drawn from the experiences related, upon the issues of the day. This will deal with the most controversial issues, and I will not summarize it any further than has been indicated in the foregoing letter. Suffice it to say that I will not shirk any issues.

It should be thoroughly understood that I am not writing a book of scandal, nor following the pattern of 'confessions' of a repentant and reformed criminal. I am not oppressed by the conviction of sin, and have no urge to enter the confessional, either to unburden my soul or to make money. If money were my main object in writing, I would merely sell my name to a big syndicate that would save me the hard labour of producing the commodity.

Equally I am not writing for self-justification, to defend my 45 years' activity in the labour, socialist and communist movements. The public record is sufficiently well established to secure me, in the long run, against my slanderers from both right and left. The slander that I betrayed or disregarded the interests of America is sufficiently refuted by the act of the President of the United States, in America's darkest hour, restoring me to public activity by releasing me from prison 'in the interest of national unity', a decision he had no occasion to regret. The slander from the left that I betrayed or disregarded the interests of the communist movement is sufficiently answered by the fact that American communism grew strong when I was its spokesman and has sharply declined under the policies which I rejected. I do not need to write a book to prove these things. They are self-evident.

I have avoided drawing up a preconceived outline for my book. This will be my major political and literary effort, and I want it to take its own form without the inhibitions that arise from outline writing. I want to keep my mind free for every change that might seem advisable in the course of production.

My speed of production will depend upon the prospects of publication. Perhaps the most propitious publication date would be the summer of 1952. If there is serious prospect for such a date, I can produce the manuscript on time. Otherwise I would adopt a more leisurely pace.

Sincerely yours
Earl Browder

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I HAVE been a friend of Earl Browder for some 35 years and a very intimate friend for the past 25 years. No one could ever be a real confidant of Browder, but I became as near to one as I believe he ever had. I have in my possession hundreds of interviews, articles, speeches and letters by and about Browder, together with his several attempts at a 'political autobiography' he himself gave me.

Unfortunately, his efforts to tell the story of his most unusual career have never even fulfilled the promise held out in the letter to his agent. In fact, his efforts ended, after three attempts, with only a few chapters, and those not in sequence. It was not until October 1965 that he finally dictated his 'full' reminiscences to the 'Oral History Project' at Columbia University. Browder gave me his copy of the 130,000 word transcript, which is available on request, and with Browder's permission, which he readily grants, at the Columbia library.

There is no doubt that these several versions of Browder's autobiography suffer from important omissions and distortions. I have told Browder on more than one occasion that to pretend never to have been wrong and always to have been 'independent' of pressure from whatever source, makes the story of his life less than credible.

The question remains: why these omissions and distortions and this tendency to romanticize his past? Time after time I have pleaded with Browder to write a fuller and more believable account than he had ever done of his political activities in the United States and of his relations with Moscow. I told him that such an autobiography would enhance his stature and could become an invaluable political document. But all my remonstrances fell on deaf ears. It was not that he would say 'no'. He merely remained silent, except on one occasion.

It was sometime in 1967 when he visited me in my office. It was at a time when he was still hoping that I would write his biography. In fact, he suggested that a publisher he had contact with would be interested in such a venture. I explained to him that a biography based exclusively on documents would result in a sterile and useless book. And that unless he unburdened himself of the myriad of incidents, experiences, and debates in his career, regardless of how they pained him, I would not be interested. What followed was once again silence. However, I continued, if I were to write a political sketch of his life for the years after his expulsion, I would divide it into three periods. The first would cover the years 1946 to about 1950, in which period he still had hope, though a continually diminishing one, that he could return to the leadership of his old Party. The second period lasted to about 1960, in which he criticized Stalin, and lost his last few supporters; this was a time in which he gave me many documents and told me many things that he would not have told me or given me in the first period. And finally the third period was one in which he had decided to paint a picture of himself through writings, radio and TV appearances, as a misunderstood American avant-garde democrat who,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had he been given the opportunity, could have put America on the right road to a golden future. In this last period, he actually denied some of the events he had described to me in the second period, even in the face of documents in my possession that he had given me. And for the first time, he did not remain silent. He simply said that I was in error by one year in one of the periods. I didn't even ask what year he was referring to.

THESE recollections are not intended as a substitute for Earl Browder's biography. His political life is dealt with extensively and very ably in Theodore Draper's volumes on the American CP, as well as in Joseph Starobin's volume on a special period of the Party. It is also described, though with less care, in Irving Howe's and Lewis Cozer's history of the same subject. Therefore, except for a few introductory paragraphs, it is my hope that by describing some of the highlights of his career, particularly through heretofore unpublished documents and correspondence, the portrait painted by others might be enhanced and that the question of omissions and distortions in his autobiographies might be explained.

Earl Browder's Early Years

Earl Browder's forebears arrived in America in the middle of the seventeenth century, more than one hundred years prior to the American Revolution. They fought in every American war before the first world war including the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. Browder himself, the eighth of ten children, was born in Wichita, Kansas, on 20 May 1891. His grandfather rode the Illinois circuit as a Methodist preacher and his father was a Unitarian, a Populist, and later a Socialist, though not a member of the Socialist Party.

Browder joined the Socialist Party in 1907 but resigned from it in 1912 in protest against the expulsion of Bill Haywood for his IWW activities. From 1907 to 1930 Browder's political activities were centred almost exclusively in the labour and radical movements of his time, and thus it was only natural that he and the already established labour organizer, William Z. Foster, should come together. Browder even edited Foster's Syndicalist League paper, *The Toiler,* for a short time in 1912 in Kansas City.

Foster, ten years older than Browder, had joined the Socialist Party in 1901 and was expelled in 1909. He then joined the IWW and finally in 1912 he formed his own short-lived Syndicalist League of North America. During the first world war in 1917–18, Foster had successfully organized the meat-packing industry and in 1919 became famous for organizing a steel strike. In 1920, Foster organized the American TUEL (Trade Union Educational League) which in 1921 was recognized by the Profintern (the Moscow based Red International of Labour Unions) as its American section with Foster as its chief.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From 1912 to 1929, Browder and Foster worked together in harmony, a relationship that was broken temporarily only between the years 1918–20 when Browder was jailed for non-registration and for conspiracy to defeat the draft law. As the early organizing stages of the United Communist Convention took place in 1920 while Browder was still in prison, he was unable to participate in them, but he joined the Party in January 1921—as soon as he was released.

However, in 1921, Browder, who had more experience in the AF of L and other trade union organizations than any other Party member, was chosen by James Cannon and Sen Katayama to organize a labour delegation to represent the United States at the first Profintern congress. And among those he chose to accompany him to Moscow was Foster. It was Browder's role in the Profintern as well as his trips to China that gave him his real start in the world communist movement. Foster's visit to the Profintern congress was also significant, for upon his return from Moscow he joined the American Communist Party.

Although Browder and Foster stood together throughout the violent factional struggles that never ceased during the twenties, Browder did not personally take a very active part in these struggles, chiefly because he was out of the country for most of this period, attending congresses in Moscow through 1926 and spending 1927 and 1928 in China. This frequent absence from the United States was undoubtedly a stroke of good luck for Browder because then in the dramatic year of 1929 he could not be accused of factionalism by Stalin.

THE role that chance and luck play in a man's life can be illustrated by the accidental manner in which Earl Browder came to be sent to China, where his experience in and writings about that country greatly added to his prestige and were important factors in his rise in the communist world.

In the middle of 1926, during the period of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek asked Moscow for a labour delegation to be sent to China. The delegation that was chosen included Alexander Howatt from the USA (leader of the Kansas miners, an insurgent group in the United Mine Workers, fighting John L. Lewis). But because of the so-called anti-Chiang Canton coup, the trip was called off.

When the confusion resulting from the coup was straightened out, Chiang in December 1926 sent a Chinese delegation to the seventh enlarged plenum of ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) to make peace and to renew the request that a labour delegation leave for China immediately. Because Howatt had already returned home and was unable to leave immediately, Browder, at the recommendation of Sen Katayama, was chosen in his place and he, together with Tom Mann from England and Jacques Doriot from France and a secretary, Sid Stoler, set out for China by rail, as the 'International Labour Delegation'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the same train, early in January 1927, was the Chinese delegation that became the Chinese Commission at the plenum. Also on the same train was M. N. Roy, who was sent to China as a representative of the Comintern. Roy went to Canton for a week and then flew to Hankow. Browder's group went to Hankow from Canton overland and arrived there in March. Although Browder left China in June 1927 for Moscow, he returned again at the end of that year.

In China, Browder became Secretary of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and editor of its organ, *Pan-Pacific Worker*, first in Hankow and then in Shanghai. Although he returned to America from China via Moscow at the end of 1928, he once again left the US for part of 1929 to attend a conference of the Pan-Pacific Secretariat in Vladivostok.

On the way back from China in 1928, Browder stopped in Moscow to attend the fourth congress of the Profintern as a delegate, and as a guest at the sixth world congress of the Communist International. Back in America, he found his Party engulfed by a whirlwind of factionalism and expulsions. James Cannon and all the Trotskyites were expelled in the fall of 1928 to be followed in the spring of 1929 by the expulsion of Jay Lovestone, the head of the Party, and all Lovestonites. To replace Lovestone, Max Bedacht was appointed as interim Secretary.

Stalin was very critical of the factional struggles in America and in a speech on the American Communist Party, delivered in May 1929 and published in America shortly thereafter as a pamphlet, he castigated a number of Party leaders, including Foster:

> Did not Comrade Foster know that he should have held aloof from the concealed Trotskyites that were in his group? Why, in spite of repeated warnings, did he not repudiate them at the time? Because he behaved first and foremost as a factionalist. Because in the factional fight against the Lovestone group even concealed Trotskyites might be useful to him. . . . Hence, the most important task of the American Communist Party is to put an end to factionalism and definitely cure itself of this disease.

Foster's reputation as a labour leader, however, helped him to remain in the Party despite this criticism.

Finally, in 1930, at the American CP's seventh convention, the Central Committee replaced Bedacht with a Secretariat consisting of Browder as administrative secretary, Foster as trade union secretary, and William W. Weinstone as organizational secretary. But since Weinstone was in Moscow from 1929 to 1931 and in Detroit for most of 1932 and 1933, while Foster, who had campaigned as the Party's presidential candidate in 1932 and suffered a heart attack in the midst of the campaign which incapacitated him for almost three years, Browder became in effect the sole active head of the Party and was even regarded by the general membership as their General Secretary. However, it was not until the Party's eighth convention in April 1934 that Earl Browder was officially elected General Secretary.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From 1930 until 1945, Earl Browder's career as caretaker of the American Communist Party was a period of rapid ideological changes from one extreme to the other. Describing the shifts and changes through which Browder led his Party during these years and just reading his published writings during this period is a distressing experience. And Browder himself partly recognized the sycophantic and dogmatic character of his writings when he said to me in 1970: 'Phil, I just reread my pamphlet on China. I think it was just awful'. I believe he would have said the same about most of his writings in this period if he had reread them. This becomes obvious in the light of his writings and conversations of the sixties and seventies. Perhaps the most acute judgment of his past, particularly concerning his 'political independence', came early in 1971 when, in the presence of my wife, he said to me: 'When I was in Moscow, I was like a child.'

The Year 1932

The year 1932 gave the Communist Party and therefore Browder a big boost when 53 American intellectuals declared in September their support for Foster and Ford in the 1932 presidential election. The chief factor that propelled this group was undoubtedly the disastrous unemployment situation. In October 1932, these intellectuals organized themselves into the 'League of Professional Groups for Foster and Ford', and published a 30 page pamphlet entitled 'Culture and Crisis'. Just one quote from it will give the basic theme:

> The socialists . . . have no convincing plan. . . . The Communist Party alone is working to educate and organize the classes dispossessed by the present system. . . . We therefore pledge our support in the national elections to the Communist Party and its candidates William Z. Foster and James W. Ford and call upon all educators, writers, engineers, social workers, artists, architects and intellectuals in general to join us in this move and form Foster and Ford Committees throughout the country.

This call was signed by such names as Malcolm Cowley, Theodore Dreiser, Waldo Frank, Granville Hicks, Sidney Hook, James Rorty, Frederick L. Schuman, Lincoln Steffens, Edmund Wilson and 44 others. It had a powerful impact throughout the country. A large number of young intellectuals joined the Communist Party or became fellow travellers. A number of these that had not yet made their mark in their chosen fields became left-wing editors, journalists and writers for the Party. Many of the successful big names like the Hollywood group acted behind the scenes and were particularly useful in aiding the Party financially. Not all of the original group of intellectuals remained supporters of the communist cause. Waldo Frank broke on the Trotsky issue at the Writers' Congress, John Dos Passos on the Harlan Strike; Richard Wright, Sidney Hook, James Porty, Granville Hicks and many others followed suit at one time or another. Some even became vocal anti-communists.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1933–35

Two events occurred in this period that in the next decade turned the world around and reshaped the power structures of every country on the face of the globe. One was the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany on 30 January 1933; the other was the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to his first four-year term as President of the United States.

The story of Roosevelt and his presidency from 1932–44 is well known and needs no elaboration here. But it is important in the evolution of Earl Browder as a political analyst to know exactly how he evaluated Roosevelt from 1933 to 1935. In a speech he delivered in Moscow at the 13th plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and printed in the chief organ of that body on 15 January 1934, he said the following:

> The *National Recovery Administration* (NRA) follows the pattern laid down by the War Industries Board of the World War. Never before have there been such gigantic war preparations at a time when the 'enemy' is as yet unnamed. . . . International social-fascism [socialist parties] has hailed Roosevelt's policies as 'steps in the direction of socialism. . . .' But the fascist direction in which the Roosevelt policies are carrying the US is becoming clear to the whole world. . . . Our Party and the Red unions came out openly and boldly against the NRA and exposed it as a . . . movement toward fascism.

Earlier, in the summer of 1933, Browder wrote: 'Roosevelt is carrying out more thoroughly and brutally than even Hoover the capitalist attack against the living standard of the masses. . . .' And in the spring of 1934 at the eighth national convention of the American CP he said: 'The Roosevelt regime is . . . moving toward the fascist suppression of the workers' movement.' The Wagner Labour Act was referred to as an 'anti-strike' measure, and the NRA as 'a slave programme'. In July 1933, in a speech, Browder said: 'The New Deal . . . is the American brother to Mussolini's "corporate state".' In later years, Browder had a difficult time in defending his anti-Roosevelt position in the early thirties. Although he did admit to me that he was a victim of 'an old American pre-revolutionary dogma that nothing good can come out of the two parties', he nevertheless held to the belief, even in 1970, that the New Deal actually 'did not show signs of liberalism'—a view bolstered, in his opinion, by the fact that the man whom Roosevelt appointed to head the NRA was a 'fascist', namely, General Hugh Johnson.

But Roosevelt was not the only target of these three years. Of course, there were the ever-present Trotskyites and Lovestonites, but the concentration this time fell upon the Socialist Party or, more accurately, Social Democracy in general, with the label of 'Social Fascism' attached to it.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Fascism

The refusal of the socialist parties of the belligerent countries in the first world war to oppose wholeheartedly their respective countries' participation in the war and particularly the German social democrats' approval of the Kaiser's war credits in 1914, brought upon Social Democracy in general violent attacks by the newly established Communist International, attacks that did not cease until 1935 and then only temporarily. The second congress of the Communist International in 1920 developed the thesis that world revolution could not succeed until Social Democracy was destroyed. Even in 1922, at the fourth congress of the Communist International, when the question of a united front was on the agenda, Karl Radek said: 'We entered on this road not because we want to merge with the social democrats, but in the knowledge that we shall stifle them in our embrace'. This in the name of a 'united front'.

Very early for the Communist International and its affiliated country members, the term Social Democracy became synonymous with Social Fascism until it reached its apogee in Germany in 1932, when on orders from Moscow, the German Communist Party fought against control of the workers' movements by the social democrats. It is an undeniable fact that the refusal of the German CP to unite with the socialists in the 1932 election brought Hitler to the Chancellorship. It is, of course, idle to speculate now on what might have happened if Hitler's rise to power had been prevented. But certainly the second world war would have been postponed for some years and perhaps avoided altogether. The 1937 economic crisis in the United States might have spread with unpredictable consequences. And, of course, Eastern Europe would not be what it is today.

Speculation aside, the Moscow order to the German CP was a signal for other countries to follow suit blindly. And the American communists did their duty and began in their press and in lectures a continuous and vitriolic attack against the Socialist Party and its followers. A quotation from one of Browder's speeches illustrates the character of the entire campaign. In December 1932, Browder lectured at the Workers' School Forum on Social Fascism. These lectures were published shortly thereafter in a 48-page pamphlet, 'The Meaning of Social Fascism'. To Browder, every socialist, no matter whether in America, England, Germany or elsewhere, was a social fascist and every Socialist Party was in effect 'playing the role [of preparing] the road for fascism, to prevent the struggle of the masses and to tolerate and support the establishment of the fascist governments'.

Communists all over the world had been so indoctrinated to hate and attack Social Democracy that even as late as 1949, when the American Communist Party was in decay and near extinction, William Z. Foster, in his book, *The Twilight of World Capitalism,* dedicated 'To my great-grandson, Joseph Manley Kolko, who will live in a communist United States', was able to write that the American Socialist

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party's 'Thomases, Dubinskys, Bohns, Reuthers et al., fanatical red-baiters and warmongers, have duly become loyal supporters of every reactionary move of American imperialism.'

However, soon after Hitler's rise to power 'social fascism' was no longer a target for attack by the communists, for by then Hitler had become a menace and a danger to the Soviet Union. Whether Stalin regretted his misjudgment of the political climate in Germany in 1932 is not known. But Anna Louise Strong, associate editor of the English language *Moscow News* published in Moscow, told me that after 30 January 1933, it was impossible to obtain a back copy of the paper for the year 1932, indicating a sensitivity to the mistakes of that year.

TO fulfil its role of fighting fascism, the American Communist Party in the fall of 1933 organized its most important and most successful front organization—the American League Against War and Fascism—as the American branch of the International League Against War and Fascism, organized previously in Amsterdam by Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse. The American League, led by the Party '. . . openly but without infringing upon its broad non-Party character . . .', at one time counted seven and a half million adherents through individual memberships and group affiliations.

The rapidly increasing menace of Hitlerism in Europe caused an equally rapid change in Moscow-directed communist strategy. By the end of 1934 Roosevelt was no longer a 'fascist' president but a good democrat, and the new line that was being planned for world communism became clear—a line that came to fruition at the United Front seventh congress of the Communist International in the summer of 1935. Already on 6 January 1935, in anticipation of this congress, the American CP was on good enough terms with the administration for the National Congress for Social Unemployment Insurance meeting in Washington to be held in a Labour Department hall, offered by the Secretary of Labour, Frances Perkins. At this meeting, Browder made a speech in which, among other things, he even came out for a Labour Party. Norman Thomas sent his greetings to this meeting. And from then on and for the next few years, friendship and support for the New Deal was the main line of the American CP. In Browder's report to the ninth convention of the American Communist Party in June 1936, there was not a word said about social fascists nor was there any criticism of the administration. The pitch was against fascism and Hitler. And even an offer of a united front was extended to the Socialist Party.

For four years, the communists all over the world became bosom political friends with all who proclaimed anti-fascism as their motto. Only the Trotskyites, Lovestonites and anti-war socialists remained as enemies.

But this amity didn't last very long. Another confusing shift in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power politics and military tactics occurred. On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, and the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, signed a non-aggression pact that included secret clauses on spheres of interest. To this day, the question of what caused the Soviet Union to make this radical about-turn is often a source of bitter dispute. But it is necessary to remember that on 1 September Hitler crossed into Western Poland, a move that caused England to declare war on Germany two days later. It is reasonable to believe that Stalin correctly predicted (a very rare achievement indeed) that an invasion of Poland by Hitler would bring war to the capitalist world. But regardless of motivation or justification, what the Soviet Union expected to gain from the consequences of such a pact can be gleaned from the following two coded documents received by Earl Browder from Moscow in September and October 1939, just a month or two after the signing of the Soviet-German Pact.

The Two 1939 Comintern Documents in Code and the Soviet-German Pact

Several years ago in the late fifties, Earl Browder gave me two lengthy Comintern messages that he had received in code. He gave me permission to publish them as I saw fit and permission to reveal that they came from him.

It is a well established fact that, at least until very recently, the communist parties of the world functioned as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. However, it is not often that documents come our way that clearly demonstrate the sharp difference between Soviet public pronouncements and Soviet confidential analysis. Therefore I have made no distinction in the matter of Soviet foreign policy between official statements made in the name of the USSR and those made by the Comintern. They are without question interchangeable.

Browder disagreed sharply with the last two sentences of the preceding paragraph. He said that it is true that ' at the very beginning, it was taken for granted that the policies of the Soviet Union and the Comintern would be identical '. In fact, he said ' the Comintern originated in the Foreign Office of the Soviet Union '. But it soon became apparent, he maintained, that the Soviet Union could not commit other Communist Parties to Soviet policy, and said so. Therefore my conclusion, except for the early years, was erroneous. When I asked for one major example to illustrate his contention, he cited the year 1934 when the USSR joined the League of Nations, while the Comintern did not pass any resolution on this event. It was purely a Soviet national affair, he maintained. My rejoinder was that this was not a very good example. The year was 1934. Nazi Germany had resigned from the League of Nations. The Soviet Union had joined it, even though only days before it had attacked the League as an ' imperialist conspiracy ' against the USSR. Now it had suddenly become the main ' democratic ' bulwark against fascism.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Comintern did not need to pass any resolutions on this question; it was already on its way to convert this one act by the Soviet Union into a worldwide United Front against fascism. 1934 was the year when the Comintern was already preparing for the United Front seventh world congress of 1935.

In early October 1938, Earl Browder was in Paris at the invitation of the General Secretary of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, to witness the debate in the French Chamber of Deputies on the question of the ratification of the Munich Pact. The communist bloc in the Chamber of Deputies was the only one that opposed ratification and voted against it. However, Browder remembers clearly that the communist vote was a discipline one—that in reality the French communists shared the national rejoicing at the signing of the Munich Pact. While still in Paris, Browder, on 11 October, wrote a statement on the Pact for transmission to the United States.

Immediately after this Paris visit, Browder flew to Moscow, and went immediately to the then new Comintern headquarters in the Sparrow Hills section of the city. There Georgi Dimitroff, General Secretary of the Comintern and Browder's closest associate in the international communist movement, and Dmitri Manuilsky, met him, and the three spent four days discussing Munich and world affairs in general. Both Dimitroff and Manuilsky read Browder's statement on the Munich Pact and made only one minor deletion of several words concerning Browder's reference to the Metternich Holy Alliance. They said: 'Don't compare this to the Holy Alliance. It won't last more than a year or so.' Browder's 1500-word statement, entitled 'The United States and the New International Situation', was cabled to the United States and appeared in *World News and Views* on 29 October 1938, Vol. 18, No. 52, as well as in the *Daily Worker*. In the light of later developments, the first two sentences in the statement are significant: 'In September, at the time of the highest point of the crisis evoked by Hitler's threats of aggression against Czechoslovakia, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, twice intervened in the European conflict. His appeal for peace and his proposal to convene an international conference for settlement of the questions in dispute were a very important refutation of those who wish to make out that the United States will in all circumstances keep to its policy of isolation.'

This statement that Dimitroff approved was not only one of high praise for F. D. R.'s willingness to participate in European affairs, but also indicated a belief that 'the means at the disposal of the United States for active participation in the fight for peace are numerous'. Nevertheless, Dimitroff told Browder that it would be a long time before he, Browder, would be in Moscow again—a significant 'foresight' in the light of the forthcoming Hitler-Stalin Pact. Dimitroff then instructed Browder to acquire a specified short wave radio receiver with an attached recorder, and to listen for messages in code on a prescribed wave length during pre-arranged night hours.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Week after week, month after month, while Browder's chauffeur sat before the receiver, nothing came through. Finally at the end of September 1939, a month after the signing of the Soviet-German Pact of 23 August, the first message broke the year-old silence. The second and last message on the topic of the war came about two weeks later. Both messages, each approximately 600 words, were de-coded by Browder, and it is the originals in his own handwriting that he gave me. They are published in full at the end of this section exactly as transcribed by him.

The two messages were kept a secret even from CPUSA leaders who were not even aware of the existence of the radio receiver. Browder says that to this day I am the only one who has seen the actual transcript of the decoded messages. The reason for the secrecy could only have been the uneasy personal relationship that existed among some of the leaders, particularly between Earl Browder and William Z. Foster.

The Soviet-German Pact, followed by the Nazi invasion of Western Poland and the occupation of Eastern Poland by Soviet troops, was at first very confusing to the Western communist parties outside the USSR. For a few weeks they voiced strong support for Britain and France and predicted the end of fascism. But it was not long before Dimitroff set them all on the right path of 'understanding' in a lengthy article entitled 'The War and the Working Class of the Capitalist Countries' that appeared in October 1939 in the Russian edition of the *Communist International* and not until November in the English edition, as well as in the US *Daily Worker* on 4 November 1939: 'In its character and essence, the present war is, on the part of both warring sides, an imperialist unjust war, . . . the mobilization of the widest masses for the struggle against the war already being waged, and to bring it to an end, is the prime task of the moment'.

These words of Dimitroff were an echo of the lead article in the same November 1939 issue of the *Communist International*, 'Twenty-Two Years of Soviet Power—Manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International'. It also appeared in the *Sunday Worker* on 5 November 1939: 'By its declaration in favour of the cessation of the war, by its amity and frontier pact with Germany, the Soviet Union has made a new contribution to the cause of peace . . . Proletarians, working people! . . . *Demand the immediate cessation of the plunderous, unjust imperialist war*!'

The Comintern line towards the war had a 'logic' of its own. The Stalin-Hitler Pact of August 1939 was followed by a Secret Protocol and then by a Supplementary Secret Protocol. These provided agreements that ultimately led to a partitioning of Poland between them and the absorption by Russia of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and parts of Finland and Rumania, all independent countries that were not even belligerents. Although Stalin was certain that the war between England, France and Germany would continue, he nevertheless feared at the same time an extension of the war with new participants, *particularly the USA*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American participation in the war could cause the defeat of Hitler and thus endanger Stalin's ability to acquire the new areas agreed to in the Secret Protocols, an eventuality that might even involve Russia in the war which it desperately wanted to avoid. Therefore, the Comintern laid down different, if seemingly contradictory, directions for different countries, all leading to the same conclusion—to keep the Soviet Union out of the war. For Great Britain, it was a call to the working class to destroy the class rule of the bourgeoisie and establish a socialist society. For India, it was to prevent the All-India National Congress of Gandhi and Nehru from becoming involved in the war on the side of Great Britain. For China, it was to maintain an anti-Japanese front with the Kuomintang. And most important—for the United States, it was as described in the coded messages. The seeming contradiction lies in the fact that the entire pitch to stop the war was aimed primarily at the United States in the belief that the war between England and France and Germany would continue, regardless of the communist-organized anti-war propaganda.

What really was the secret hope of the leaders of the USSR? What did the mythology of dialectical materialism tell them about the nature of coming events?: 'The war is driving the capitalist world into a phase of most acute and profound crisis. . . . No longer merely relieve burden of capitalism, but end it . . . Hitler without knowing it leads to shattering bourgeoisie'.

These are just three short sentences from the two documents below. But they clearly indicate that Moscow felt secure in the belief that Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier together would destroy capitalism in Europe, leaving only an isolated and possibly weakened United States as an obstacle to the complete hegemony of the USSR over the war-weary and exhausted belligerents. Some years ago I met a war correspondent who happened to be in Moscow during, and for months after, the signing of the Soviet-German Pact. He told of hearing an important communist official say when war was declared by England against Germany on 3 September 1939: 'We have been waiting for this for 20 years'.

This belief and hope that capitalism could destroy itself in this war if only it could be confined to England, France and Germany, while at the same time keeping America out of the war, made the CPUSA slogans of 'Keep America Out of the War' and 'The Yanks Are Not Coming', so important.[1] The destruction of capitalism could of course

[1] Browder told me that the Party slogan, 'The Yanks Are Not Coming', was no different from F.D.R.'s pledge in October 1940 to the mothers of America that he would never send their boys to fight in Europe. That, therefore, it was not a Comintern-directed slogan but one of agreement with F.D.R. My reply was that similar slogans were used in Britain and France where there was no F. D. R., and that slogans of 'Stop the war' or 'Stay out of the war' definitely originated in the Comintern. Moreover, using F. D. R.'s pledge was a tactic that Browder decided upon in a debate at a Politburo meeting (from a stenogram not otherwise published) against Alexander Bittelman who argued for opposing the war on the simple ground that it was an imperialist war.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be hastened if the working class would heed Dimitroff when he wrote in the article already mentioned: 'It is for the working class to put an end to this war in its own way, in its own interests and in the interests of the entire world of labour, thus creating the conditions for the abolition of the fundamental causes of imperialist wars'.

This was clearly a call for converting the war into a civil war that would overthrow capitalism by communist-led revolutions. But for American communists, the Comintern directives, as spelled out in the two coded documents, were couched in more cautious language. However, Earl Browder interpreted them for the membership with less caution. In a report by him to the eleventh national convention of the CPUSA, held in New York, 30 May to 2 June 1940, under the title, 'The People's Road to Peace', he said: 'The Communist Party's first task is to . . . keep our country out of the European war. At the same time the Communist Party has a special task to inform and educate the masses in the programme of the socialist way out of the crisis. . . . Our Party must learn . . . how to perform both tasks simultaneously; the programme of transforming the privately owned . . . economy into a commonly-owned planned economy of prosperity for the masses, which is socialism—the first stage of communism'.

AND so once again in 1940, as in the years from 1933 to 1935, Roosevelt became an 'enemy' of the people. John L. Lewis, the fiery American Labour leader, fared much better at the hands of the Communist Party than did Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Apparently, judging from the coded messages, Moscow was aware that Lewis was a supporter of the isolationist America Firsters and was therefore against the war. Thus, for the American Party, until 22 June 1941, Lewis was one of its heroes. But not so F.D.R. On 5 September 1940, the Party issued a statement that said in part: 'Mr. Roosevelt has studied well the Hitlerian art and bids fair to outdo the record of his teacher . . . the great tragedy of a whole nation—tricked into the chains of a gang of military adventurers as surely and as disastrously as were the German people'. This was a far cry from just the year before when the CPUSA came out in support of a third term for F.D.R., and praised him for his peace efforts.

It would require another and much longer article than this one to describe and analyse fully the failure on the part of the Soviet ideologists to assess correctly the nature of the war, the future of capitalism and the meaning of Hitlerism. It is only important to note here that for the *n*th time the mystique of dialectical materialism had failed the Soviet ideologists in their attempt to assess even with reasonable accuracy the nature of oncoming events. It failed completely to enable them to comprehend the durability of systems other than their own.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

First Message Transmitted in Code
(Latter part of September 1939)

What sort of changes:

1. The war is driving the capitalist world into a phase of most acute and profound crisis. Now it is not only a matter of fascism but of the existence of the entire capitalist system. Fascism is now secondary; the main and basic thing is the struggle against capitalism, against bourgeois dictatorship, regardless of what mask or what hypocritical slogans are employed in both belligerent and neutral lands to cover imperialist aims.

2. The war is the most acute manifestation of imperialist atrocities and reaction. During the war, the bourgeoisie of 'democratic' lands is trying to reach the level of fascism (see France outlawing CP), adopting attitude to USSR more hostile than that of fascist states. The bourgeoisie of all states equally guilty, equally dictatorial. Consequently 'democracy against fascism' disappears. Thereby is undermined the 'democratic front'. USA will not be an exception. Even remaining neutral, USA, with powerful financial oligarchy, will inevitably take the path of intensifying reaction, if only because it knows that war raises the issue of its overthrow.

3. Now opening up is wider perspective than defence of remnants of bourgeois democracy. We would be pedantic, not revolutionaries, if we should cling to old slogans of people's front, democratic front, when the foundations of capitalism are being undermined. Top leaders of Social Democracy will all more rapidly cross over to reaction, the more powerfully the idea of storming capitalism matures in the masses. Tasks now are: bringing united militant action of working class, strengthening alliance with farmers by independently mobilizing against reaction and exploitation. Must cease to trail in wake of F.D.R., adopt independent position on all fundamental questions. Against entering war, because we do not want people to die for imperialist exploiters. But this is not identical with 'neutrality' of American bourgeoisie, which is not anti-imperialistic but is dictated by rapacious strivings to use European war to strengthen its own positions, thrust competitors out of markets, become predominant on oceans, sovereign over other states exhausted by war. Lifting embargo because wants to profit from afflictions of other nations. Must adopt independent position towards [John L.] Lewis. No collusion, on contrary, everything done to avoid expulsions, etc. But steadfastly defend principles, criticize in appropriate tone all half-heartedness, so that masses see difference between CP and others. New tactical lines: (a) Imperialist war, unjust, equally reactionary both sides. Not war of democracy against fascism, but of reactionary imperialist Germany against the reactionary imperialist states of Britain, France and Poland. Question of who first attacked is of no importance; main thing is, it is war for imperialist domination. (b) War is continuation of the struggle between rich states (England, France, USA) which are backbone of capitalist system, and the 'wronged' states (Germany, Italy, Japan), which by their struggles for redivision are deepening

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and sharpening the crisis of the capitalist system. (c) Bourgeoisie of Britain and France cover up their war of plunder with legend of 'anti-fascism'; Germany with story it is fighting remnants of unjust Versailles. (d) Poland was reactionary multi-national state, built on oppression of Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Jews, disintegrated by corruption of ruling classes. International working class had no interest in existence of such a parasitic state. (e) Soviet Union by coming to the aid of working people of West Ukraine and Byelo-Russia, has extricated eleven million people from hell of capitalism, linked them up with socialism, freed their national and cultural development, rid them of the danger of foreign enslavement. (f) War created new international situation, United Front and People's Front lose significance. Tasks, bold struggle against war, no credits, fire against bourgeois dictatorship of own country, ruthlessly expose Social Democracy which has joined the camp of reaction; expose bourgeoisie as war speculators and freebooters; hold high the banner of proletarian internationalism.

Second Message Transmitted in Code
(Early October 1939)

Historic change and maturing of international situation. Issue no longer democracy vs. fascism and aggression. No longer merely relieve burden of capitalism, but end it. This main conclusion flowing from imperialist war. Requires changes in policy and tactics. At time of Munich this was not our idea. Then we tried to build anti-fascist peace front against fascism and aggression to include USSR. But opening of imperialist war entirely changes the situation. Basic aim of war is redistribution of world. Robber bandit war from which working class obtains only death. Cannot support it directly or indirectly. All communists must ceaselessly expose outright imperialist nature. Must unmask 'anti-fascist' demagogy of Chamberlain and prevent the mass anti-fascist sentiment built up by us from being used for imperialist aims of Chamberlain and Daladier. No longer simply fight against fascism, but against capitalism as a whole. Previously the working class tried to build peace front against fascism. Now must gather all forces against imperialist war and in its course and process, lead and work step by step to abolish capitalism. This does not mean that now say proletarian revolution. But through constant struggle, by unmasking the imperialist bourgeoisie and its demagogy, by showing up Social Democracy, other slogans will be developed. In course of war, must consistently advance slogans which lead toward end of capitalism and all fascism and war. Change in situation class relations. Modify policy accordingly. Communists must never for moment allow separation from working class. Must expect big opposition from imperialist bourgeoisie. Take every step to protect legal existence. New situation changes our relation to F.D.R., always understanding main enemy is camp of imperialist bourgeoisie. But much depends on F.D.R. CP must be more independent, incisive and critical, especially of all bad moves on war. F.D.R. may want to help Chamberlain and Daladier. Big task to unmask fake

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neutrality which covers help to Japan against China, etc. Must stop imperialist bourgeoisie of USA from providing others, enriching itself, and later entering to save crumbling capitalist system. So far US has not entered. Thus policy cannot be same as in Britain and France. But entry is not excluded. As capitalist system weakens as result of war, then American bourgeoisie will move fast to save world bourgeoisie from growing working class opposition and proletarian revolution. Evident big job faces CPUSA especially to prevent anti-fascist sentiment going to support Chamberlain and Daladier, while also preventing least aid to Hitler. Not simple and easy. Some communists may hesitate, but working class will agree. Next period is test of fire. Out of it grow strong, matured. As to Polish Government: It is not the historic one Marx and Lenin defended, whose unity, independence and freedom they worked for. Not creation of the people, but vassal of British, French imperialists, set up mainly versus USSR and against proletarian revolution. Together with Rumania had agreed to attack USSR when Chamberlain said the word; semi-fascist, oppresses working class, denies democracy, itself imperialist, participating in partition of Czechoslovakia. Two-fifths of population other peoples. Under direction Chamberlain rejected aid of USSR. Poland can win freedom and independence now only by socialism. How did imperialist war come? Obviously imperialist bourgeoisie responsible. Communists and USSR did everything to prevent. But Chamberlain, Daladier, Blum blocked peace front because they aimed at war versus USSR. Now war has come, what? Play with their loaded dice? No. Working class must now prepare to clean up whole capitalism, must never live from hand to mouth. Where greatest base of imperialist bourgeoisie? England, France, Germany, USA. Benefit to working class if they are weakened. Hitler without knowing it leads to shattering bourgeoisie. No interest in either. Workers must study CPSU but never imitate. Days change, so needs.

More on the Soviet-German Pact Years

On 2 September 1940, less than a fortnight after the signing of the Soviet-German Pact, at a large meeting in Chicago, the American League Against War and Fascism was converted into the American People's Mobilization (APM) which was in turn changed into the American Peace Mobilization (APM) after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.

The Communist organizational theme of 1939–41 became the united front 'from below', an attack principally aimed against the leaders of the Socialist Party, but with complete silence about fascism. No group that favoured intervention against Hitler escaped sharp criticism. For example, in a pamphlet dated 11 May 1940, entitled 'The Jewish People and the War', Earl Browder wrote: 'This war is an imperialist war, and the Jewish people . . . have nothing to gain from taking sides; they have nothing to gain from an Allied victory, just as they have nothing to gain from a victory by Hitler.'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

So irresponsible was the Communist Party's anti-war propaganda that the American Peace Mobilization, under Frederick V. Field, was even holding tentative discussions about uniting with Senator Wheeler's isolationist groups. But this move was too difficult to be swallowed by the CP leadership and was dropped. However the isolationist anti-war sentiment throughout the nation was so strong that the Communist Party made substantial gains in its membership drive, while Browder received 14 per cent of the vote in a special election for Congress in January 1940.

The Communist Party's intense and unseemly campaign during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, of course, didn't sit well with either Congress or the Department of Justice. Thus two events occurred in this period which should not have surprised any but hard-bitten dogmatists.

1. The *Voorhis Act* was passed by Congress in 1940 to take effect on 1 January 1941; this would have compelled the Communist Party to register as an agent of a foreign power. To avoid such an eventuality, the CP ' dissolved its organizational affiliation ' with the Communist International and modified its constitution to conform to the wording of the *Voorhis Act*.

2. In March 1941, Browder entered the Atlantic Penitentiary after a trial for travelling on forged passports, to serve a four-year term. However, in May 1942, Roosevelt commuted his sentence and ordered his release ' to strengthen national unity '.

The Aftermath of 22 June 1941

During the weekend of 22 June 1941, I attended and was a participant in a lecture discussion session on foreign affairs at a camp in upstate New York. Among those present was the entire editorial board of the *New Masses*, a communist weekly magazine. Before sunrise, on the Sunday of 22 June, there was a knock at my bedroom door with the announcement to get up quickly because Hitler had just invaded the Soviet Union. The whole camp was in astonished confusion. But since the most important discussions had been left for that day, the meeting continued but for the presence of one group. The editorial board of the *New Masses*, realizing that their next issue, in which they had called Roosevelt and Churchill warmongers, was about to go to press, hurried back to New York to rewrite it. The revised edition appeared on time, but in it Hitler became the warmonger and Roosevelt, from whom they asked for help for the Soviet Union, was now the peace-loving democrat.

Likewise, following that historic day in 1941, the Communist Party leadership was anxiously searching for new friends and willing to form coalitions with any group that would favour American intervention against Germany. People and groups that just the day before were called ' running dogs of imperialism ' and ' warmongers ' were now embraced as comrades in arms. No more slogans like ' The Yanks Are Not Coming '. No more ' Keep America Out of the War '. No more such phrases as

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

' capitalism is the root cause of the great evils of war, hunger and oppression '. No longer was this ' . . . an imperialist war in which the working class could have no interest.'

The Smith Act and the Trotskyites

In June 1940, Congress passed the Smith Act, aimed expressly at the Communist Party, which defined as a crime ' to teach or advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force or violence '. It will be remembered that in 1949, 11 of the top leaders of the Communist Party were tried under the Smith Act and received long prison sentences. But in 1941, soon after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, the Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyite) leadership, who opposed the war *even then* on the grounds that it was *still* an imperialist war, were arrested under the Smith Act and were tried and convicted.

Immediately the *Daily Worker*, under the signature of Milton Howard, wrote: 'The leaders of the Trotskyist organization which operates under the false name of " Socialist Workers Party " deserve no more support from labour . . . than do the Nazis who camouflage their Party under the false name of " National Socialist Workers Party " '.

This attack, of course, came because the Trotskyites opposed the war even after 22 June 1941. It is ironic, however, that in 1939 they were attacked precisely because they *were* opposed to the war, but then this was *before* the Soviet-German Pact. For example, in a report delivered by Browder at a meeting of the National Committee of the Communist Party, held in New York on 6–8 May 1939, he said the following: ' Hamilton Fish serves as the liaison agent to link up the Tory high command directly with its " left-wing " agents . . . the Norman Thomas Socialists, the Trotskyists and Lovestonites, who are gathered together in the self-styled " Keep America Out of the War ".'

The 1941 conviction of the Trotskyites in a lower court finally ended in an appeal before the Supreme Court of the US in 1943. In November of that year, the conviction was upheld and 18 of 23 defendants went to jail in Sandstone Prison. But the final conviction of the Trotskyites was achieved not without the help of the Communist Party. Not only was there a continuous barrage in the Communist press against the victims, but the Party prepared for the Department of Justice an important collection of documents to help prove the guilt of the Socialist Workers Party.

The 14 documents marked Exhibit A, B, C, etc., consisted of two pamphlets, ' War and the 4th International ', dated 1934, and ' Manifesto of the 4th International on the Imperialist War and the Proletarian Revolution ', dated 1940; four complete issues of the *International Bulletin for Members Only*, dated August and September 1942, and several pages from the monthly, *Fourth International*, and from the weekly, *The Militant*, for the year 1942. In some of the exhibits the pertinent wording was underlined in red. In addition to the documents,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there was added a 24-page typed manuscript, many of the pages single-spaced, entitled, 'The Fifth Column Role of the Trotskyites in the United States'.

It would take too many pages to quote every underlined paragraph, and besides it should be obvious what the nature of the attack would be. But a few underlined passages from Exhibit C will illustrate the character of them all. In 'A Statement on the War' by James P. Cannon, dated January 1942, he wrote:

> We consider the war upon the part of all the capitalist powers involved—Germany and France, Italy and Great Britain—as an *imperialist* war. . . . The extension of the war to the Pacific and the formal entry of the United States and Japan changed nothing in this basic analysis. Following Lenin, it made no difference to us which imperialist bandit fired the first shot; . . . No imperialist regime can conduct a just war. We cannot support it for one moment.

In addition, a few sentences from the last page of the manuscript entitled 'In Conclusion' will indicate the nature of the entire assembly of exhibits and summaries:

> Being a sabotage organization, concentrating upon the disruption of the war effort, the Trotskyites do not require a large organization. On the contrary, a smaller group is more easily controlled and efficient for their purposes. . . . The dangerous efficiency of this small group is shown by the fact that it succeeded in obtaining aid for the convicted Minneapolis traitors from the AFL and CIO unions representing 1,000,000 workers [exhibit M]. . . . This core of saboteurs is small, but its underground influence is large. Remove the core and you wreck a strong fascist weapon in America.

A set of the above described exhibits was given to me by Earl Browder in the late fifties. But it must be remembered that he was in the Atlanta prison during the first trial of the Trotskyites and did not come out of prison until May 1942. Nevertheless, it was the Party which Browder headed that performed this foolhardy and ultimately self-defeating act of helping another group to be prosecuted under the same Smith Act that only a few years later sent many Communist Party leaders to jail. It was the inevitable consequence of the dogma that he who is not absolutely one hundred percent with me all the time is my mortal enemy.

THIS type of political animosity towards all individuals and groups that were in disagreement with the Party polluted the atmosphere of the radical world for more than two decades. Indeed, callousness and total disregard for the problems of others were the rule not only between Party members but also towards non-Party members.

The war years from 1942 to 1945 hid to a large degree the decadent morality in the communist world. But from 1930 to 1945, the Communist Party was anti-Roosevelt then pro-Roosevelt, then again anti-Roosevelt and again pro-Roosevelt; on and off, anti- and pro-Social Democracy, pro-war, anti-war and again pro-war, and ambivalent on the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Negro question. Only Trotskyites and Lovestonites remained enemies evermore. And such zigzagging could only have been the result of a slavish following of Moscow's instructions. Only near the end of his life did Browder muster enough courage to say to me that he was 'like a child' in Moscow.

Ever since 1947, the Communist Party has been of very little consequence in American life and since 1957 it has moved in the direction of becoming a sect. But from 1920 to 1946 it witch-hunted every opposing political group and personality until almost nothing of national importance was left of the radical movement but a hard-bitten, dogmatic Communist Party. It weakened or destroyed every political god that it didn't worship. Then it ultimately made a mockery even of its own god. It can thus be said with a high degree of accuracy that the quarter of a century beginning with 1920 marked the dark ages of American radicalism. To this fact may be attributed the utter confusion and breakdown that exists today in the radical movements in the United States, for no new political god has yet been found to give stability and meaning to our new generation of radicals.

From the Dissolution of the Communist International
To the Dissolution of the American Communist Party

From May 1942 when he was released from Atlanta prison to the end of the war in 1945, Earl Browder and the Communist Party reached the zenith of their influence on the American scene. It was an easily achieved success because the entire country, almost as one, concentrated on defeating Hitler. In addition, the Party basked in the reflection cast on it by the Soviet Union's phenomenal military achievements against Hitler's armies.

Browder's prestige reached great heights. He even carried on a correspondence with President Roosevelt, although he was mistaken about how that took place. There was no direct correspondence between the two men at all. It was done through a go-between, Josephine Truslow Adams. Miss Adams, a descendant of John Adams, a minor artist and somewhat eccentric, was a fellow traveller of the American Communist Party, a frequent visitor at Browder's apartment in Yonkers as well as a friend of Eleanor Roosevelt. Miss Adams would take down what Earl Browder told her or wrote for her, which she would then send in a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, who in turn would decide which of these letters she would turn over to her husband. By January 1944, F.D.R., intrigued enough to want to learn what was going on in left wing circles, including the communists, had all letters from Miss Adams to Mrs. Roosevelt come directly to him. These letters were full of warnings against Trotskyites, anti-communist labour leaders and against all who were in any way obstructing the war effort. Many of the letters were warnings against a large variety of men and periodicals, like Roger Baldwin, Walter Reuther, David Dubinsky, Alex Rose, James Carey, James Wechsler, whom he

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

called a Trotskyite, and the following magazines: the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, the *New Leader* and *P.M.*, some for opposing the labour draft law.

In 1943, however, an event occurred that was destined to change very radically the political fortunes of Earl Browder. On 10 June of that year the Communist International was dissolved, an act which in the words of Stalin was done to facilitate 'the organization of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism. It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites that Moscow allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to Bolshevize them.'

But Earl Browder was blind to the fact that the dissolution of the CI was only a temporary tactic by Stalin to make Allied unity more secure for the defence of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Browder felt that the prestige he had acquired both in the communist world and in the United States was an acknowledgement that what he termed his 'independence' was real independence. And this feeling was given a special boost just six months later in Teheran, Persia.

The Teheran Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin took place between 28 November and 1 December 1943. Here agreement was reached on plans for the destruction of the German forces including the timing of the second front. It also included outlines for a post-war settlement, which however was not spelled out in detail until the Yalta Conference in 1945.

Browder became so intoxicated with a vision of a new perspective for the world as a result of these two events within six months of each other, that in less than a fortnight after the Teheran Conference, he made a speech in Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 12 December 1943, that set the stage for the dramatic events of the next year and a half. The speech was published in the *Communist* in January 1944.

At Bridgeport, Browder said that the Teheran Declaration 'is the only hope of a continuance of civilization in our time. That is why I can accept and support and believe in the Declaration of Teheran and make it the starting point for all my thinking about the problems of our country and the world.'

The publication of this speech was followed by a pamphlet, 'Teheran and America', published early in 1944, then by a 128-page book, *Teheran: Our Path in War and Peace*, in the middle of 1944. The essence of all three publications may be summed up in Browder's own words when he wrote: 'Capitalism and socialism have begun to find a way to peaceful co-existence and collaboration in the same world.' And before the 1944 election, in which for the first time since 1920 the Communist Party had no presidential candidate of its own, having instead endorsed F.D.R., Browder said: 'We frankly declare that we are ready to cooperate in making capitalism work effectively in the post-war period with the least possible burden upon the people.'

Even in 1945, another of Browder's books was to have been published under the title *American Marxists and the War: Ten Years of*

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Struggle for a Foreign Policy. Although this book was already in galley proofs, it was never published because by this time Browder had been removed as General Secretary of the Party. However, the blurb in the proposed jacket is worth quoting here, especially since it will never see the light of day:

> *American Marxists and the War* is a new and important addition to the study of the history of our times. It is at once a review and an analysis of one of the critical decades in the history of mankind, embodied in the articles and speeches of the spokesman of the American communists. By tracing the continuity of communist policy during the course of the past decade, *American Marxists and the War* provides the basis for the understanding of the historical perspectives outlined at the Teheran and Crimea [Yalta] conferences as well as the all-important question of America's foreign policy in the years ahead.

A 48-page miniature edition of *Teheran and America* was circulated widely throughout Western Europe, distributed by American seamen. It was even translated into Indonesian in March 1944. One of the top leaders of the French Communist Party, former Commissar of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, and one of the signers of the document dissolving the Communist International, André Marty, representing the French Communist Party in the Provisional Cabinet of the French Republic under de Gaulle in Algiers, wrote a letter to Browder from that city on 2 April 1944, which said in part: 'Dear Earl . . . I read in the IPC [*Inprecorr*] in London your beautiful speech of January 1944. We are now publishing it in our theoretical magazine. The situation here is pretty difficult. But we have good hope in the future against Hitler's gang and his friends. All our friends greet you; will you please don't forget me to Raissa [Mrs. Browder]. Yours, André.'

HOWEVER, in 1944 Browder's writings on Teheran did not receive universal commendation in the communist world. Both the British and Australian Parties criticized Browder's thesis. A letter to me late in 1945 from Yenan written by one of the American liaison officers stationed there, reads as follows:

> In December 1944 we received Browder's *Teheran* in Yenan and this was immediately translated by the liaison officers of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] who lived with us at the US Army Observer Section. Mao Tse-tung read the book and immediately told his associates of the Central Committee that the book was essentially an expression of a capitulation policy, particularly the point on unconditional cooperation with American capitalists. [Sanzo] Nosaka [General Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party, who spent the war years in Yenan] told me that he agreed with Chairman Mao. When Duclos' article appeared, Nosaka (and I believe the opinion prevailed in Yenan) stated that he did not think it was a smart move *publicly* to expose Browder. Nosaka stated that a letter should have been written and sent via courier.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An incident occurred a little later than the time I am here describing which will clarify Earl Browder's wide-range thinking on the question of Teheran and its ultimate significance. Early in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek was persuaded by Washington to let one communist be a part of the China delegation to the Founding Conference of the United Nations to be held in San Francisco. The man chosen was Tung Pi-wu, an elder statesman of the Chinese Communist Party and more recently Mayor of Peking. Tung Pi-wu, desiring to meet Earl Browder, met him with his two secretaries in my home for a luncheon that lasted several hours. Present also were my cousin by marriage, Chi Cha'o-ting, and several other important Chinese as well as three or four American friends.

After the luncheon of Chinese food, the conversation through an interpreter began. Strangely enough, there was no discussion of the coming San Francisco meeting, nor of world affairs in general, nor even of the situation in China. The Chinese communists were still four and a half years away from controlling all of China, controlling at this time some extensive areas but only in the North. Tung Pi-wu was of course especially interested and anxious about what America could do to help the Chinese communists survive and prosper. In reply, Browder repeated over and over again that if the Chinese communists wanted help from America, they must understand the new relationships in the world and make it possible for American businessmen to make a commercial profit and not expect any political philanthropy from American capitalism.

Tung Pi-wu must have been convinced by Browder's argument, because after the luncheon meeting, he and his secretaries came to my *Amerasia* office to urge me to develop an import and export business that would serve North China, where the communists were in control. I refused, on the grounds that, first, since the north area of China was being blockaded by the Kuomintang Navy, there was no way for merchandise from America to reach there, and, second, that the Communist Party of China had neither goods that the United States needed nor money to pay for what it might import. Tung Pi-wu, however, succeeded in inducing Frederick V. Field to organize the venture that I turned down. But for the reasons that I gave, Field's venture produced nothing and finally closed up shop.

But what occurred at the meeting with Tung Pi-wu was only a small indication of Browder's intense preoccupation with his analysis of what was in store for the future of the world. His intoxication with his Teheran thesis became so acute that at a National Committee meeting on 7–9 January 1944, he proposed to dissolve the Communist Party as a party and reorganize into what later became the Communist Political Association.

This meeting, however, proved to be a portent of Browder's future as an American communist leader. For it was here that William Z. Foster, even though he did not object to the proposal about dissolution, launched his first serious and bitter attack against Browder's Teheran thesis.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Browder versus Foster: A Bitter Rivalry

The rivalry between Earl Browder and William Z. Foster that reached a climax in the years 1944 and 1945 really began in 1920. From that year until 1930, Browder was a close political associate of Foster and was often called his 'boy'. In fact, sometime in 1971, when I asked Browder how Foster felt when he and not Foster had become General Secretary of the Party, he replied that Foster thought that his 'boy' had betrayed him. However, Browder actually became General Secretary not because of any 'betrayal' but because from 1931 to 1934 he had no opposition. Foster's heart attack in 1932 kept him inactive for almost three years.

But from 1935 on, the bitterness and rivalry between the two men began to take form. Even though both Browder and Foster were honoured at the seventh congress of the Communist International by being elected to the Executive Committee of the CI, after 1935, Browder's star rose while Foster increasingly became just a figurehead; and this was true even after he became Chairman of the American CP.

Browder, in a conversation with me, characterized Foster as of 'an anarcho-syndicalist mentality, who always wanted to be the big chief'. There is no question that Foster was ambitious and power-hungry, and having been in the earlier years the leading figure in the left labour field, his ambition was understandable. Browder, however, had great contempt for Foster not only as a political personality but also as a political rival, and as a result never gave him any important political responsibility.

The bitterness between the two men came to a head as early as 1939. At the pre-plenum meeting of the National Committee, held on 23 March 1939, the following exchange, as reported in the unpublished stenographic report of that meeting, took place:

> *W. Z. Foster*: I have told E.B. [Earl Browder] upon a number of occasions that I did not think that the Party was making the best use of my services. . . . I am something of a veteran in the Comintern and I have been criticized by the Comintern as much as anybody in this Party, and took it all in good part and others have done the same. The trip before that [to Moscow] E.B. was criticized just as severely as I was and he took it in good part and it was no issue for E.B., nobody attempted to limit his work on the basis of it. During our discussion over there, E.B. . . . stated that he was of the opinion that W.Z.F. was wavering on the main line of the Party, but that he had hopes that he could be saved . . . E.B. said W.Z.F. was a good [mass] organizer [before] but . . . that W.Z.F. doesn't understand how to organize any more.

Then, page after page in the stenogram, Foster recounted a number of political propositions that he had put forward and finally exploded with the following:

> I can only explain this whole business upon the assumption of these two statements that E.B. made in M [Moscow], first that W.Z.F. is

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wavering on the main line of the Party and second that W.Z.F. has nothing to offer the Party in the line of practical work. I have no other way of understanding why the propositions have been rejected in such an offhand way. . . . I think that E.B. has got to take the padlock from my hands. . . . I don't think he has to watch me at all, no more than he was watched after he made serious mistakes in the Comintern.

Earl Browder's Reply: I don't think that after the long number of years that we have worked in the movement it is possible for any personal elements to play any role in the problems of leadership of the movement. Therefore . . . no matter what form they may arise in, are essentially political problems which must be the property of the PC [Political Committee], the PC must give the answer to them.

It is not important at this point to go into any great detail about the political differences between Browder and Foster. Judging by Eugene Dennis' statement, however, following immediately on Foster's long report, one major dispute concerned the correct manner of carrying out the seventh world congress decisions. Dennis criticized Foster severely, especially when he described how Foster in Moscow presented 'a separate document' alleging 'that the Party is following the line of tailism . . . following at the tail of Roosevelt and Lewis'. What is important here for our purposes is the bitterness that was generated by the two men, one in power and the other with ambitions in that direction, ambitions that were not fulfilled until six years later.

IT was at the National Committee meeting of 7–9 January 1944, consisting chiefly of a discussion concerning Browder's proposal to dissolve the Communist Party, that Foster came prepared with a speech attacking Browder's Teheran thesis. Although Foster was persuaded not to make his speech at this meeting, he did not give up his attack for long.

Soon each member of the National Committee of the CPUSA received a 7,000-word letter, dated 20 January 1944, criticizing point by point Browder's Teheran thesis—a letter that was brought up for discussion at the enlarged National Board meeting of 8 February 1944. With about 40 of the leading Party members from all over the country attending this meeting, Foster's attempts to have his letter of 20 January read and discussed were rejected. Whereupon, Browder said: '. . . therefore I give the floor to Comrade Foster to add anything he wants to add to the communication you have all read'. (Because of the official rejection of this letter of Foster's, it was not permitted to be published in the open Party press, and it was not read by the membership at large until almost two years later.)

Foster then proceeded to make a 10,000-word speech, of which a few quotations follow as reported in the unpublished stenographic report of this meeting:

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> I have prepared some remarks but I think I will curtail them somewhat to avoid repetition with my [20 January 1944] letter to the National Committee. . . .
>
> I think Comrade Browder, like other outstanding leaders of our movement, is also subject to making mistakes occasionally, and I think he is now in the process of making such a mistake. . . . This error, it seems to me, is to proceed on the basis that the decisive sections of finance capital, which means the bulk of finance capital, those sections controlling the decisive parts of the American economy, are now, particularly since Teheran, playing a progressive role and can be, must be, therefore, included in the national unity that is supporting Teheran. Not only that, but they may even to a very considerable extent be relied upon for leadership in developing the fight for Teheran. My opinion is that this is an error.

The balance of this long speech was a minutely detailed analysis of various facets of the American economy to substantiate Foster's conclusion. Thus Foster had his way because his speech was in reality an enlarged recital of the rejected letter.

Replies, critical of Foster, were made by many present, including such outstanding leaders as Morris Childs, Jack Stachel, Robert Minor, Arnold Johnson, Ben Gold, Lewis Merrill, Pat Toohey, Mother Bloor, James W. Ford, Irving Potash, Ruth Young, William Schneiderman, Joe Selly, Fred (Blackie) Myers, Ben Davis, Max Weiss and Gil Green, who said, ' I can't help but feel that in some respects both Comrade Darcy and Comrade Foster are not completely honest '.

Only Samuel Adams Darcy joined Foster in criticizing Browder. Foster made a brief reply at the end of the meeting to many interruptions like ' not true ', but although this was a distressing meeting for him, he refused to modify his position.

It was finally left to Eugene Dennis not only to make a lengthy reply to Foster in a 7,000-word speech, but also to lay down the law and practically call for Foster's expulsion. He said at one point: ' It seems to me that the most fundamental error and disagreement of Comrade Foster with the position of the Party, the root and source of many of his mistakes, lies in the fact that he completely underestimates the world significance of the military and political changes reflected and embodied in the Teheran Conference.' This was followed by an analysis of the meaning of Teheran in full support of Browder and a point by point critique of Foster's arguments. Then came Dennis' final sledge-hammer attack and warning to Foster:

> Together with this, it seems to me that Comrade Foster has become, consciously or unconsciously, the victim of a factional approach. Comrade Foster has no faith in, and no confidence in, Comrade Browder, or in the National Committee. This, for the information of the comrades here, is not a new question. Comrade Foster has raised on a number of occasions and particularly recently, doubts about the leadership of our Party and particularly Comrade Browder. Here it is necessary to say that Comrade Foster does not

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accept nor understand that Comrade Browder is the foremost, the outstanding leader of our Party. And also that Comrade Browder is a great leader of the international labour and communist movements.

In the period of the democratic front, Comrade Foster attacked Comrade Browder and the CP as pursuing a policy of tailism to the Roosevelt administration and to John L. Lewis. In June 1941, Comrade Foster was not in full agreement with the tactic and policy of organizing a national front within the country. And then, as now, he constantly attacked and challenged Browder and the PB [Politburo].

There is no question as to where the Party will stand. It has already taken its position on the side of the National Committee. There is only a danger that, if Comrade Foster insists on raising his viewpoints in the pre-convention discussion, he may provide ammunition to the Trotskyites, the *New Leader*, the *New Republic* and the *New York Times. And there is also the danger that Comrade Foster by such an action may destroy his own prestige and usefulness in and to the Party.* (author's italics)

AFTER this meeting, Foster, still certain of the correctness of his position, asked Browder to transmit a message to Dimitroff in Moscow, even though it was several months after the ' dissolution ' of the Communist International. Browder agreed, and the following is the exact message, which I possess in the original handwriting, that Browder cabled to Moscow in code:

Agree Browder general estimate Teheran except serious underestimation danger American imperialism. Disagree several points application to America including joint Republican-Democratic Presidential election ticket which would either eliminate Roosevelt or weaken support. Disagree with estimation of progressive role of American big business which minimizes danger of reaction in United States. Disagree with proposals that employers will voluntarily double wages of workers to keep plants in operation. Disagree that regulation foreign trade shall depend on consent of monopolists. Disagree that curbs be placed on monopolists only with the latter's consent. Disagree with acceptance of big business main slogan of free enterprise in such a way as to minimize need for social insurance and curbs upon monopolies and government work projects as protection against mass unemployment. Agree national unity also after war with responsible strike policy but disagree with continuation of no-strike pledge after war. Agree that socialism is no issue in America now or immediate post-war period but cannot ignore socialist lessons of USSR. Will prepare full statement of my views. Will accept your advice.

Shortly thereafter Dimitroff transmitted a message to Foster, through Browder, strongly advising him to withdraw his opposition.

Dimitroff's reply was a severe blow to Foster, who did not attack

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Browder's Teheran thesis again for more than a year.[2] Browder, assured of the correctness of his position by Dimitroff's reply, even sent Foster's letter of 20 January 1944, to Dimitroff. And it is not without interest to note here that portions of this same Foster letter appeared in the Duclos article of April 1945 published in France.

Even as late as 17 November 1944, in a report to a National Board meeting, Foster not only limited his speech to the problems facing the American labour movement, but he even spoke not unfavourably of Browder's Teheran thesis:

> I wish to express my full agreement with the statement and report of Comrades Browder and Dennis.
>
> In order to indicate the tasks now confronting the labour movement, especially as a result of the people's great election victory [Roosevelt's fourth term victory], it is necessary first to analyze the class composition of the forces of opposition we have to contend with.
>
> . . . One of the illusions in the campaign was the widespread belief that a Dewey government would have tried to isolate the United States from world problems by attempting to shrink it back within its own borders. The essence of the electoral victory was that the Dewey programme of militant imperialism was defeated and our country now has the opportunity to advance along the lines of democratic world collaboration as laid down at Teheran. American imperialism was at least partially curbed. In the election issue of 'For or Against Teheran'—'for Teheran' won.
>
> To defeat the forces of organized reaction required an unprecedented effort on the part of the labour movement. Our Communist Political Association also played a not inconsiderable part.
>
> During the war, organized labour should continue its present collaborative relations with the employers, striving to keep war production up to the highest levels, and resolutely maintaining its no-strike pledge for the war's duration.

The essence of this report was 'the urgent task of democratizing and unifying the American labour movement', as one of the most fundamental necessities for the success of the American people in the carrying out of the 'great democratic tasks that confront our nation and the world'.

BUT Foster never gave up. Early in 1945, he wrote a 10,000-word article, 'New Features in American Economic and Political Life and Their Bearing on the Teheran Agreement', which attempted to reconcile his own and Browder's views. Browder refused to publish it and Foster's manuscript is covered with dozens of pencilled marginal notes such as 'Why?', 'How?', 'Which?', 'Not a useful formulation

[2] At a June 1944 Central Committee meeting, Samuel Darcy, the only one who joined Foster in attacking Browder at the 8 February meeting, was expelled from the Party for having lost faith in the Teheran Conference and for believing that the Allied Alliance was breaking up. And it was Foster who led the accusation against Darcy and asked for his expulsion.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the issue', 'Wrong', 'Sounds like PM' [the New York newspaper], 'Much talk but little struggle', 'most important point missing', etc. The following are some selected excerpts from Foster's article, together with a few of Browder's marginal notes:

> These new developments are profoundly significant with regard to the accomplishment of the great goals of victory, a solid peace, and an expanding world economy established shortly over a year ago at Teheran by the agreement signed by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. The purpose of this article is to indicate some of the more important of these major American developments and to discuss them in the light of their effect upon the realization of the Teheran agreement, in its international implications and with regard to Roosevelt's American economic programme.
>
> How will the United States discharge this great world responsibility placed upon it by history? This is a question of supreme importance not only to our own people but to the whole world. Especially with regard to its policies after the war is won. Will our country fulfil its historic responsibility loyally as a democratic affiliate of the United Nations and work to reconstruct a sane world, or will it, in a narrow nationalistic sense, even while formally being a part of the United Nations, follow a policy of aggressive imperialism, using its great strength to grab whatever it can at the expense of other nations and thus heading the world towards a new war? (Browder's marginal note: '? not alone! Isn't the greatest change to become part of a coalition? ')
>
> When the war is won and the huge problem of reconversion of production to a peace-time basis has to be undertaken, the main responsibility will fall upon the government.
>
> It will not simply be a matter of releasing the wartime controls, as so many purblind businessmen suppose, but a complicated process of economic readjustment under the leadership of the government. It will be either that or an economic smash-up of major proportions. Indeed, even some of the most rabid shouters about 'free enterprise' concede that the guiding hand of the government will be necessary during this crucial period. (Browder's marginal note: 'How and Why? ')
>
> The period of free competition, of the spontaneous, self-regulation of the capitalist national and world market, is rapidly giving way to state controls over the economic system. In our country this current is not so pronounced as it is in many European lands, where the nationalization of key industries is on the agenda for early action, but its course is nonetheless very evident. Only by increased intervention by the government in the economic processes, both in their domestic and foreign phases, is there any possibility of avoiding devastating economic crises in the post-war period and any hope of carrying out the general world peace programme of Teheran. Eric Johnson and other apostles of monopolistic 'free enterprise' are wasting their wind with their shouts that the government must take its hands off our national economy. In the post-war period our government, like all other capitalist

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governments, will assume far greater, not less, economic functions than it has previously exercised in peace time. (Browder's marginal note: 'When? Now? Wrong! US is more backward in ideology than in fact'.)

Monopoly's ruthless grabbing at political power in this country must also be defeated by the democratic forces. The Dewey campaign in the recent election was an effort on the part of the most reactionary sections of powerful American industrial and financial monopoly capitalists to seize control of the government which would have made ducks and drakes of the whole Teheran programme. Fortunately, the people on 7 November dealt a resounding blow against this conspiracy of the reactionary monopolists, (Browder: 'Only?') by the re-election of Roosevelt. But that the danger is still urgent is evident from Republican-Democratic poll taxers in Congress and by the preparations already being made by the Republican Party for the elections of 1946. (Browder's marginal note: 'Monopoly has been in power and flourished as never before'.)

The main resistance to the full production programme is to be found in the ranks of the great industrialists and bankers. (Browder's marginal note: 'Also the main planning for full production!')

Of course of all the new features, domestic and foreign, in American political life, none is more momentous than our country's changed attitude, in popular sentiment and government policy, towards the USSR. Instead of the pre-war policy of suspicion and, in still earlier days, of plotting an armed intervention against the Soviet Union, the American people and their government, under the pressure of the war, have developed a friendly attitude and a policy of active collaboration with that country. This great political fact holds most important implications for the whole world. It is the American phase of the changed relations between the anti-Axis capitalist sector of the world and the first great socialist country.

The war is definitely being won, both against Germany and Japan. . . . In the main, the world struggle to achieve the great democratic goals of Teheran is making good progress and our country is playing a constructive role in the fight.

The excerpts are noteworthy not only because of Foster's support 'of the whole Teheran programme', but also because of his persistent demand for strong government support for the post-war period of reconversion, which recalls for us the Varga dispute with Stalin on the same general topic.

Dissolution of the American Communist Party

The conclusion that Earl Browder drew from his understanding of Teheran was 'that the two party system provides adequate channels for the basic democratic rights' and that therefore the Communist Party as then constituted was an obstacle to 'national unity'. Thus at the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tenth convention of the CPUSA in May 1944, and by an almost unanimous decision, the Party was dissolved and reconstituted as the Communist Political Association. In a long preamble to its Constitution, the objectives of the new organization were spelled out. A few excerpts will suffice to describe its basic approach:

> The Communist Political Association is a non-party organization of Americans, which, basing itself upon the working class, carries forward the traditions of Washington, Jefferson, Paine, Jackson and Lincoln. . . . It upholds the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights, and the achievements of American Democracy against all enemies of popular liberties.
>
> It is shaped by the needs of the nation at war . . . it looks to the family of free nations, led by the great coalition of democratic capitalist and socialist states, to inaugurate an era of world peace, expanding production and economic well-being. . . . It adheres to the principles of scientific socialism, Marxism, the heritage of the best thought of humanity and of a hundred years of experience of the labour movement, principles which have proved indispensable to the national existence and independence of every nation; it looks forward to a future in which, by democratic choice of the American people, our own country will solve the problems arising out of the contradiction between the social character of production and its private ownership.

The heart of the objectives of the CPA was, of course, based on the Teheran and Yalta conferences. As Earl Browder explained it, the CPA would act as a political educational organization rather than an independent political party, and by not proposing its own candidates in elections, it would add its strength to the whole American democratic movement. And finally, Browder made the following pledge: 'We will not permit . . . that any struggle over the question of socialism, for or against, shall be allowed to divide the progressive majority of the American people, who must be kept united on the road of democracy and progress at all costs'.

IT is of some politico-psychological interest to note that although Foster was a severe critic of Browder's Teheran thesis, he did not oppose the conversion of his Party into an Association, either at the January 1944 meeting, or at this May 1944 meeting. In fact, he was so cowed by the almost unanimous opposition of his critics and by Dimitroff's reply, that he asked for the honour of nominating Earl Browder as President of the new Communist Political Association. And he himself was elected as one of the Vice Presidents, together with Eugene Dennis, Robert Minor, James W. Ford, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Benjamin J. Davis Jr., Robert Thompson, Gil Green, Roy Hudson, and William Schneiderman. John Williamson was elected Secretary and Charles Krumbein, Treasurer.

These names are of no special importance today, except that in little

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than a year, and because of an article published in France, every one of them turned against Browder and with a hyena-like ferocity, called him the betrayer of everything holy in the communist world.

Although Foster accepted the conversion of the Party without one word of criticism, he, nevertheless, remained a frustrated seeker for recognition and even power. I have already described his vain attempt, early in 1945, to publish an article reconciling his and Browder's positions. However, he did succeed in having published in the June 1945 issue of *Political Affairs* a smaller version of his earlier effort, under the title of 'The Danger of American Imperialism in the Postwar Period'. Here he wrote such words as:

> By far not all American capitalists favour a policy of aggressive imperialist expansion. Large numbers of them followed the general Roosevelt line. These more far-sighted elements among the capitalists . . . are accepting the general policies laid down at Teheran and Yalta. . . . The overwhelming masses of the American people are in favour of the general objectives laid down in the great conferences of Moscow, Teheran and the Crimea [Yalta]. But these objectives have to be fought for in order to make them prevail over the demagogy and stratagems of the militant American imperialists.

Since the Duclos article, with an introduction by Browder, was published in the *Daily Worker* on 24 May 1945, and it was published two days earlier in the *World Telegram*, it is perplexing at first that Foster's article, still praising Teheran, appeared in the June issue of *Political Affairs*, while in the same issue there appeared a rather mild article on V-E day by Browder. However, both articles were written early in May and were printed before the appearance of the Duclos article. Browder's article on a non-contentious subject may be explained by the fact that he was already in possession of the Duclos piece given to him by Frachon, the French Communist Party's delegate to the San Francisco Conference. But soon enough, the heavy hand of Moscow was felt in the American communist world.

The Duclos Article

In the April 1945 issue of *Cahiers du Communisme*, the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of France, an article signed by Jacques Duclos, a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, appeared under the title, 'On the Dissolution of the Communist Party of the USA'.

More than half of the article consists of quotations from Browder's speech in Bridgeport, his pamphlet 'Teheran and America' and from Foster's letter of 20 January 1944, as well as from the preamble to the Communist Political Association. The English-language version of Duclos' article is by and large an accurate translation from the French except for a few minor omissions and additions. One peculiar slur against Browder occurred when he was mentioned as the 'former

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secretary' of the American Communist Party, when he was still in fact the head of the American communist movement. The chief points of the criticism of Browder are as follows:

> Earl Browder declared, in effect, that at Teheran capitalism and socialism had begun to find means of peaceful coexistence and collaboration in the framework of one and the same world. . . . Earl Browder drew political conclusions regarding . . . the internal situation in the US. Some of these conclusions claim that the principal problems of internal politics of the US must in future be solved exclusively by means of reforms, for the expectation of unlimited inner conflict threatens also the perspective of international unity held forth at Teheran . . .

thus radically disfiguring the meaning of the Teheran declaration by transforming it:

> into a political platform for class peace in the United States.
>
> In his report to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPUSA (January 1944) . . . Browder indicated that American businessmen, industrialists, financiers and even reactionary organizations do not admit the possibility of a new economic crisis in the US after the war. On the contrary, all think that the US national economy after the war can preserve and maintain the same level of production as during the war. (This is worthy of note in view of the attacks on Eugene Varga a year or so later for holding views not too dissimilar from Browder's.)
>
> The Teheran agreements mean to Earl Browder that the greatest part of Europe, west of the Soviet Union, will probably be reconstituted on a bourgeois-democratic basis and not on a fascist-capitalist or Soviet basis.

This last statement was in response to Browder when he said in part that the above-mentioned areas 'will be a capitalist basis which is conditioned by the principle of complete democratic self-determination for each nation. . . . It means a perspective for Europe minimising, and to a great extent eliminating altogether, the threat of civil war'. Was the Duclos or Moscow criticism of this question a premonition of the post-war fate of Eastern Europe?

Of course, there was finally a severe criticism of Browder's conversion of the American Party into an Association, as well as a mild criticism of Foster for supporting such a change; 'Earl Browder proposed to name the new organization, "Communist Political Association", which, in the traditional American two party system, will not intervene as a "party", that is, it will not propose candidates in the elections, will not enter the Democratic or the Republican Party, but will work to assemble a broad progressive and democratic movement within all parties'.

Duclos went on to say that as a result the American working class was deprived of an independent political party, and that the new CPA can only 'cloud the vision of the working masses. . . . In truth nothing

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

justifies the dissolution of the American Communist Party'. Browder is also accused of having revised the principles of Marxism 'through the conception of a long peace between the classes in the United States, the possibility of suppressing class warfare in the post-war period and the establishment of harmony between labour and capital', and of 'spreading dangerous illusions which will have a negative influence on the American labour movement unless they are properly countermanded . . .'

And significantly, on the manner of achieving socialism, Duclos wrote: 'Furthermore, one can observe a certain confusion in Browder's declarations regarding the problem of nationalization of monopolies and what he calls the transition of capitalism to socialism. Nationalization of monopolies actually in no sense constitutes a socialist achievement. . . . No, in nationalization it is simply a matter of reforms of a democratic character, *achievement of socialism being impossible to imagine without preliminary conquest of power*'. ('Seizure' instead of 'conquest' is a more accurate translation from the French. Author's italics.)

Ever since 1945, there has been a seemingly unresolved question of why it was that Duclos wrote this article and how he obtained the material from which to quote so extensively. Many, including Browder, have maintained that Duclos did not write it but merely signed an already written article in Moscow.

Why Duclos did not write the Duclos Article

Unfortunately, no true portrait of Jacques Duclos can possibly be drawn from official documents or from his recently published autobiography. However, there is a book in Italian and French, but inexplicably not in any other language, which throws a light on Duclos that, in my opinion, makes it a certainty that he could not have written the anti-Browder article of 1945. The book, *With Jacques Duclos in the Defendant's Dock at the Cominform Constitutive Meeting at Szklarska-Poreba (Poland) 22–27 September 1947*, was written by Eugenio Realé, who together with Luigi Longo was one of the two Italian Communist Party delegates to this Cominform meeting. This meeting was so important in the eyes of Stalin, that he sent as the Soviet delegates both Andrei Zhdanov and Georgi Malenkov, the former the number two man in the Soviet hierarchy and the latter destined for the Premiership after Stalin's death.

At this meeting Realé took detailed notes of all but one of the discussions from which he made his reports to the Italian Party leadership. It is these notes 'without any additions or corrections . . . even to the point of leaving mistakes in dates and figures uncorrected' that make up this book which he published in 1958, two years after he broke with his Party and communism following the Hungarian tragedy.

Although this book by Realé contains a wealth of highly important material never published officially, for our purposes we will concentrate

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the attacks on Duclos and the French Communist Party and on Duclos' replies.

Although this first Cominform [Communist Information Bureau] meeting was called, in the words of Realé, to deal first with 'small consolidation of communist power in Eastern Europe' and secondly to organize 'propaganda and struggle, by all means available, against American assistance to Europe [Marshall Plan]', it is of special interest to note Togliatti's parting words to Longo and Realé. Palmiro Togliatti, then General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (ICP), sensing with that uncanny premonition that comes from long and bitter experience in the communist world that his Party would come under attack, refused to be a delegate, claiming bad health as an excuse. As Togliatti was bidding good-bye to Longo and Realé, he said: 'If we are going to be reproached for not having been able to seize power and for letting ourselves be expelled from the government, well, you tell them that we could not after all transform Italy into another Greece and that not only we but the Soviets as well bear responsibility for this.' Perhaps in Togliatti's view, Stalin's agreement with Churchill to stay out of Greece was connected with his being prevented by the Western Allied powers from participating in the liberation of Italy.

Realé writes that at the Szklarska-Poreba Conference, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Kardelj and Djilas, with the other delegates concurring, criticised the Italian and French parties for 'having lost their revolutionary character, for having not known how or having not wanted to seize power and having been thereafter ignominiously evicted by the governments in which they had participated' immediately after the war.

The following are excerpts from Realé's descriptions of Duclos' first speech in which he was describing the condition of his Party in France:

> Duclos . . . had not only a book-keeper's budget to present—a dry and detailed listing of figures. Worse still was the cold and hostile atmosphere that greeted him. All those staring eyes must have seemed to him to be waiting for him to err either accidentally or deliberately. Jacques Duclos' exhibition was really painful: imports and exports, circulation and inflation, so many quintals and so many tons, prices and wages. . . . The true assessment of the situation was not to be found in the statistics that Duclos was monotonously reciting but in the question that he was cleverly but in vain trying to evade.

What Duclos was 'trying to evade' was soon brought down on his head with unrelenting speed. The severe attacks against Duclos and Longo were led by Edouard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas, the two delegates from Yugoslavia. For a long time it was believed that it was Tito himself who did the attacking, but he was not a delegate to the conference. However, in Tito's report to the second conference of People's Fronts of Yugoslavia (published in Yugoslavia's *Communist*, No. 3, in 1947) he accused 'certain countries' of a lack of determination and courage on

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the part of People's Fronts, thus indicating that he was aware of the role that the two official Yugoslav delegates were to play at the meeting.

This is the historical background for the following attack against the Communist Party of France, through its representative Jacques Duclos. In November 1946 in the first assembly elections under the Fourth Republic, the French Party, with a membership of a million, fought hard to bring Maurice Thorez to power. With support from the Socialist Party, Thorez nearly made it but he failed to capture the Premiership by 29 votes out of a total of 500 cast in the Assembly. In spite of this near victory, the communists were expelled from a coalition government, only a few months later, in May 1947. It is this use of parliamentarianism for the purpose of gaining power that was the reason for the humiliation that Duclos and the French Communist Party as well as Longo and the Italian Communist Party suffered at the hands of Moscow in September 1947 at the organizational meeting of the Cominform.

EDOUARD Kardelj specifically attacked the French and Italian parties in noting that in the struggle 'the victor is the one who wages the fight with the clearest ideas, who retains the least illusions on parliamentary coalitions and who in the struggle to gain the majority within the masses, succeeds in winning it and taking power'. Moreover, Kardelj equates the position of the French and Italian Communist Parties at the end of the war with 'Browderism':

> Marxism-Leninism and the theory of the workers' movement teach it to us. If the workers' parties drown in parliamentarianism everything is done for. It is no overstatement to say that within the international workers' movement there has been a tendency towards revision of Marxism-Leninism, towards a deviation. Browderism phenomenon in the United States. The imperialist system weakened as a result of the anti-fascist war. After the war certain communists thought that a peaceful, parliamentary period of appeasement of the class struggle was ahead. Deviation towards opportunism and parliamentarianism. Errors in the policy of the French Party and the Italian Party as in other Parties.

Djilas continued the attack:

> The essential fact in the international evolution is the American will to dominate the peoples; this constitutes for the famished peoples a danger perhaps greater than fascism itself. It seems that not all the Parties realized this, and placed their stakes on the parliamentary game. They did not know how to take advantage of the insurrectional period. Their governments threw their countries at the feet of American imperialism. The FCP [French Communist Party] had come out the strongest; the socialists under American sway prepared a plot and chased the communists from the government. . . . Only the French communists have not understood. . . . The communists were expelled because the American imperialists demanded it. The strikes in France do not in any way

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> have the character of a struggle for the communists' return to power. . . . The attitude of the FCP after its expulsion is in no way accidental, it has a history. . . . The FCP did not stage the insurrection. They let themselves be influenced by opportunists and capitalists, by those who awaited the English. . . . What should have been done was to ponder over everything we learned from Lenin and Stalin, in other words, that the war of the USSR is a very long struggle. Despite the heroic struggle of the partisans, the FCP made successive concessions to reaction, it allowed the dissolution of the Resistance forces, the expulsion of the partisans from the Militia, etc., the FCP hoped to take power through elections. . . . Our comrades were the victims of the electoral machines in which they blindly believed. . . . The French communists always affirmed that they would never have left the field of legality. No discipline. Anyone can join that party. . . . Adaptation, political and ideological liberalism.

In his final speech to the conference, Duclos at first made a guarded admission of his mistakes:

> We are reproached with not having sufficiently unmasked vis-à-vis the masses, the Marshall-Truman Plan. We are reproached with not having fought imperialism. Allegedly, it is through lack of political courage that we gave in to the threats of the reactionaries. Let us admit that the removal of the communists from the government was not a domestic policy matter (prices, etc.) but a consequence of American pressure. But we did emphasize this, although not enough . . . it is certain that we should have done more to denounce American pressure. . . .

But neither Zhdanov nor Malenkov was satisfied with Duclos' answers. Zhdanov said: 'When a Party understands that it has been wrong, it must say it *urbi et orbi*. You did not do so.' And Malenkov said: 'We would like Duclos to briefly specify in conclusion, to say what errors were committed by the leadership of the FCP'. Only then did Duclos give something like a *mea culpa*:

> We are aware of the fact that the FCP waged an insufficient struggle when it was in the government. The reasons for that weakness stem from an error in the assessment of the evolution of the situation in France. It is clear that it is not in the past few months that one has to seek the reasons for our insufficiency. The error comes from our not having assessed the true nature of our participation in the government. From the beginning the reactionaries had no other preoccupation than altering the balance of forces. What was lacking was an action that would have tilted the scale in favour of the working class. There was opportunism, legalitarianism, and parliamentary illusions. . . . If we courageously carry out this self-criticism before the Party, we shall arouse among the masses a state of mind favourable for the fight. The French people must be mobilized against American imperialism.

Duclos was unable to escape his past, for the delegates were aware that already in 1946, in a speech at the Marigny Theatre in Paris, Duclos

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

insisted that the French Communist Party's essential tasks were 'to rebuild France and to establish a new democracy'. In order to do this, he said 'we must follow a policy of confident collaboration with all of them without exception; we must follow a policy of friendship, and I repeat, nothing must disturb the relations of our country with all of the allied nations'. And he went even further: 'Any Frenchman who adopts an attitude tending to create differences among the allies or speculating on differences that might arise is harming the higher interests of France. . . . To us, everything is a question of struggle. But we are not among those who confuse the necessity and fertility of struggle with the spirit of adventurism . . . we want to push forward and not end up in abortive and disappointing failures.' These last quotes of Duclos appeared in a pamphlet, 'France Faces Her Destiny', published in New York in 1946.

In the light of this 1946 speech, the attack on him by the Rumanian delegate, Anna Pauker, was clarified by her berating Duclos for saying that 'we will appeal to the people and we shall say to them that we want to continue our friendship with the English, the Americans and the Soviets'. This she called a vile and opportunistic slogan.

Thus in emphasizing unity and friendship between all the Allies after the war, Duclos was taking a position not too far removed from Browder's. Since Duclos had views not too dissimilar from Browder's, he could not himself have written the attack on Browder. The question remains, who wrote the Duclos article?

THE Communist Party of France has throughout its existence been the most orthodox in its allegiance to Moscow—it has been the Party with the least amount of 'inner democracy', and Maurice Thorez, its General Secretary, was considered the symbol of that orthodoxy and was often called the French Stalin.

Thorez was a prime figure in the French Popular Front in the middle thirties, and even joined the army to fight fascism. However, when his support for the Popular Front was abruptly terminated with the signing of the Soviet-German Pact in August 1939, Thorez, after obtaining a 24-hour leave, deserted the army and escaped to Moscow where he remained for the duration of the war.

Although the French government revoked Thorez' citizenship after his desertion, de Gaulle restored it when Thorez returned to Paris in November 1944 and Thorez was elected to the French Constituent Assembly. He even became Minister of State in de Gaulle's Coalition Government in 1945.

As Thorez was leaving Moscow in November, the war against Hitler was about over with an Allied victory all but a certainty. Soviet troops were all over Eastern Europe. Plans were already laid for the February 1945 Yalta Conference.

It does not require great perspicacity to realize that Stalin was already thinking hard and making plans for the future. His plans

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

undoubtedly included not only his vision of a new Eastern Europe but also what he would demand at Yalta for his participation in the war against Japan. Stalin, moreover, was convinced that the United States would suffer an economic crisis that would give him a freer hand in Europe and Asia.

To succeed in his plans, whether in Europe or Asia, Stalin needed pliant and obedient Communist Parties all over the world. Certainly this would mean that the new American Political Association, as Browder had organized it, would be unable to function 'correctly' in an America that would 'certainly' become weakened through a severe economic crisis. Earl Browder, therefore, had to be straightened out.

Moscow had all the speeches and articles that Browder, in his misjudgment of Stalin's mentality, had sent there. Moscow already possessed the lengthy message that the Communist Political Association had transmitted to Comrade Stalin and to the Red Army in May 1944. Furthermore, the New York office of the Soviet News Agency, *Tass*, had most likely sent all the material needed for the Duclos piece. And *Tass* would send it to Moscow and not to Paris, where in 1944 Duclos was still in hiding. It is therefore clearly evident that the so-called 'Duclos article' could not have been written in France but was written in Moscow, probably under the guidance of Andrei Zhdanov, the number two Stalinist in the Soviet hierarchy.

And who could be the best possible messenger to bring the article to Paris but the French Stalin, Maurice Thorez, who was leaving Moscow for Paris? In Paris, it was probably translated and discussed and printed not too long after the return of Thorez. The inexact translation of the speeches and writings of Browder and Foster that occupied more than half of the entire article indicated that they were not translations from English but were re-translations from another language. And to make it seem that the article originated in France, Jacques Duclos, a reliable organization man, was picked to sign it, even though, as noted above, his views in 1945 were not too dissimilar from Browder's.

Earl Browder's Great Misjudgment and His Excommunication

From the day that the Duclos article appeared in an open magazine, it became inevitable that the American Communist Party would face a violent inner struggle. Although Duclos chided Foster for not having opposed the dissolution of the Party, the major attack on Browder was based on an extensive use of quotations from Foster's writings and speeches against Browder's Teheran thesis. This naturally fed Foster's pent-up bitterness of long standing against his rival, and made it almost impossible to solve the oncoming struggle amicably.

The immediate effect of the appearance of the Duclos article was utter confusion and bewilderment not only among the leadership of the Party but also among the rank and file. Those who called Browder a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

genius, a great Marxist, and 'our beloved leader' one day, called him a 'revisionist' and 'betrayer of the working class' the next.

One Party leader after another, without shame, beat his breast in an orgy of confession and self-abasement that rivalled the forced confessions of the Stalin purges of the thirties, the difference being that in the United States these confessions were made voluntarily out of fear of expulsion and loss of jobs rather than out of fear of death.

One of the leaders who turned against Browder on 22 May 1945, the day on which the first meeting to discuss the Duclos article was held, was John Williamson, then Secretary of the Communist Political Association. But just two days before, on 20 May, on behalf of the *Daily Worker* staff, Williamson wrote a eulogy in honour of Browder's 54th birthday. The published eulogy used such terms as 'beloved leader of our movement . . . mature Marxist leadership. . . . You are one of the great leaders of the people . . . we have the highest confidence that under your firm guidance we shall continue. . . .'

National Board Meetings were held continuously from 22 May to 28 June. During these meetings, the entire leadership of the Party, like robots, performed the shameful political somersaults à la Williamson. One of the mildest of the confessions was spoken by James W. Ford: 'I share fully in the responsibility for the opportunistic line which has led our organization into the swamp of revisionism'. Others pleaded 'that they had not known what was going on' or that 'they had been afraid to speak' or that 'Browder had confused and terrorized them', etc. etc.

On 22 May, two days before the Duclos article was published in the *Daily Worker*, the first meeting of the National Board to discuss the article was held. The unpublished stenograph of this meeting states that Browder opened it by producing a telegram that Foster suggested he send to the French Communist Party. The telegram began with 'We greet and accept your criticisms in a spirit of communist solidarity', followed by some 600 words consisting of a recital of Foster's well-known position. In reply, Browder made it clear that he was not ready to accept the sending of the telegram and suggested that he accepted the leadership of the French Party 'in France' but not in America. The telegram was not sent.

It was Eugene Dennis, however, who only a few months before had called Browder 'a great leader', who at this meeting led a violent attack on him in a long speech, an attack that in the main followed the Duclos-Foster line. For the purpose of this chapter, however, the following statement by Dennis is of great revelatory significance:

> I think I can say with a great degree of validity and truth, that many of our mistakes and departures from Marxism have taken place because we have not yet developed, particularly in our national leadership, the most effective collective work and self-criticism and we do not involve the membership fully and actively in the formulation of policies. As every comrade . . . will admit,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> very frequently, because of an atmosphere *of strained relations in the Board arising very often from the abnormal relations between Browder and Foster, this had, in effect, a tendency to delimit or circumscribe free and self-critical discussion.* (author's italics)

Browder defended himself in a 7,000-word speech that began: 'Since quite a decided majority of the Board has been convinced by Duclos' article that we made fundamental errors, . . . I must say that so far the criticism that has been made does not satisfy me'.

However, his speech was a fighting one. Browder, throughout, spoke as if he believed that an amicable discussion could solve the crisis that Duclos had brought upon the Party. Browder's last sentence was: 'You will find me proceeding very circumspectly to make sure that the correction of one error is not the production of three new ones'. It is interesting that later Browder was not proud of this speech, for in a collection of his speeches and writings that he published after his expulsion, this one was omitted.

FOLLOWING Browder's long defence against Dennis, Foster took heart and regained some of his aggressiveness when he warned Browder to give some thought to his future, saying: 'I am convinced that the outcome of that struggle will be completely to undermine the prestige of Comrade Browder as the leader of the Party'. This produced an amusing colloquy. Browder replied, 'I am not at all concerned with the question of what is going to be my position in the future'. (Interruption by Foster: 'But we are, Earl'.) Browder: 'All right that's your business then; that's not my business and I refuse to occupy my mind with this question. One thing I know about that question. At no time in the future am I ever going to be a political zombie. Do I have to explain what a zombie is?'

(Interruption by Dennis: 'Yes, what is it?') Browder: 'A zombie is a modern myth about a dead person who has been raised up by some magical process and walks around under the control of another mind. And when our Association is having a basically political discussion, I am going to say nothing which is an echo of someone else's thought. . . .'

Two days later, on 24 May, the Duclos article appeared in the *Daily Worker* with an introduction by Browder. Since this was the first official disclosure of the article to the membership, Browder's introduction was still an effort to minimise any differences that existed between him and Duclos, in the hope that an honest discussion would lead to an amicable solution.

IT was not until the CP National Committee Meeting on 18, 19 and 20 June 1945 that Foster felt himself in a strong enough position to attack Browder with everything at his command. This time Foster's attack was direct and unmistakable:

> Comrade Browder is very slow to learn the lessons of Duclos' letter.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> This slowness does not surprise us who have worked closest with him. . . . Such a political discussion, however, did not take place because of the bureaucratic system of supercentralization that Comrade Browder had managed to create in the Party. We must admit that Browder, with our complacent acquiescence had built up almost a one-man control of our Party. . . . The situation was not much better in the Political Bureau than in the National Committee. . . . This bureaucratic situation was made much worse by the flood of adulation and hero-worship that was directed towards Comrade Browder by our members and leaders. Such petty-bourgeois praise-mongering injured Browder no less than it did our Party, by upsetting his political balance.

The 5,000-word attack by Foster on the political personality and autocratic rule of Browder made it a certainty that the end of the struggle between the two rivals would not be an amicable one. In fact, it led to a most painful series of confessions at this very three-day meeting in June. Everyone present made long 'self-criticism' speeches full of abject apologies and admissions of errors of judgment that covered not only Browder's Teheran thesis but everything he stood for from 1930 on. Browder replied in a 20,000-word speech that more or less repeated his thesis without any significant change.

Finally, at the Special Emergency Convention held on 26 to 28 July, Browder remained unyielding and refused to modify his basic thesis. He who had enjoyed unanimous support in May 1944, now, a little over a year later, failed to obtain a single supporting vote. He concluded his speech with: 'My subordination of myself to the decisions of the Committee must not be understood as approval on my part of its manner of handling the discussion. I most emphatically disapprove of this conduct. I intend to defend before the international movement . . . the false theories and practices which have been introduced among us following the rejection of our former policy.'

In a stormy session, Browder was removed as President of the CPA and a temporary Secretariat was elected consisting of Foster, Dennis and Williamson. Then the Convention reconstituted itself as the Communist Party and added Robert Thompson to the above three as an elected Secretariat. In February 1946, Browder was also expelled from membership of the Communist Party. In July 1946 at Foster's proposal, Eugene Dennis was elected General Secretary, John Williamson, National Labour Secretary, and Foster himself, National Chairman.

Both of Browder's appeals—the one to the National Convention, when he wrote: 'I appeal to the Convention to cancel those decisions which refer to me personally as a "renegade" and "revisionist"', and the other, in February 1946, against his expulsion from the Party—of course, fell on deaf ears.

THE reaction in the international communist world to Browder's removal as leader of the American communists was not unexpected.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, the relation between Foster and Mao Tse-tung has a special interest worth noting. On 24 July 1945 Foster sent the following telegram to 'Comrade Mao Tse-tung' in Yenan: 'The American Communist Political Association will call a special conference on 26 July. The heart of the subject is to criticize and correct Browder's revisionist line and adopt Marxism to reconstruct the Communist Party and elect a new leading organization. I would be proud *if you would send me a congratulation telegram*' (author's italics), signed Foster as 'General Secretary. Communist Political Association.' (Which he wasn't.)

A reply came on 29 July to 'Comrade Foster and Central Committee of the American CP' (sic) congratulating him 'on the great victory of the American working class and the Marxist movement. . . .' (The entire text of the letter may be found in Stuart R. Schram's book, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*.) However, the sentence in this letter: 'In his past activity, Comrade Browder has rendered many services to the struggle of the Chinese people, which deserve our gratitude', was omitted from the *Daily Worker* and even from Mao's *Selected Works*, published in Peking in 1961.

This reply to Foster was followed by a long editorial on 1 August in the daily, *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, entitled 'Learn a Lesson from Opposition of American CP to Revisionist Line'. It is not a very astute political document. It is full of commonplace comments about Browder's revisionism, tying it in with analysis of pro-Kuomintang and pro-Japanese elements in China, finally concluding with: 'In China, the old Chen Tu-hsuism and the new Chen Tu-hsuism during war of resistance is identical with Browder's capitulation line which stressed only unity and no struggle. Must study Mao's line more thoroughly because American CP struggle against revisionism of Browder shows Mao's line is correct.'

The question arises: Why did Foster choose Mao as a correspondent and not Stalin or Dimitroff? Mao, after all, was still more than four years away from controlling China. The answer, perhaps, lay in Foster's knowledge that he was not a favourite with Stalin and in his memory of Dimitroff's rebuff to him the year before, yet he needed some support from an international figure in the communist world.

THE question remains, however, even to this day as to why Moscow chose the method it did to correct another country's communist line even though the Communist International had been dissolved in 1943 making it improper to send a message to the United States direct from Moscow. As Sanzo Nosaka of Japan said, a message through a courier and a conference in secret session might well have not only changed the communist line peacefully but might in fact have induced Browder to accept the criticism against him and slowly but surely do the bidding of Moscow.

Browder, who had Stalinized the American Communist Party, was useful to Stalin at key periods in history—during the United Front period,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

during the period of the Soviet-German pact, and during the four years of the war. But by 1944 Stalin needed an approach to the United States that was the very opposite of Browder's Teheran thesis. Stalin needed acceptance of the thesis that the United States was destined to suffer from a severe post-war economic crisis; this would make it easier for him to succeed in his ambitions in Europe. It was Browder's tragedy that he was pathologically unable to accept criticism of his thesis. He thus outlived not only his usefulness to Moscow but also what he believed was his greatest achievement as a Marxist and a communist.

Yet there is evidence that Moscow did not intend to have Browder removed as leader of the American communists. After 25 years of experience with him, Moscow had every reason to be confident that, handled properly, he would in his own way have modified his position and ultimately fallen into line. Many believe that that might have happened, and I am one of them. But Moscow, apparently, failed to take account of the never-ending bitter feuding between Foster and Browder. That Moscow was not enamoured of what occurred in New York may be gleaned from the fact that, even as late as December 1945, there was no 'criticism of Browder in any of the theoretical organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', according to Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

It was reported that Dimitroff said to Kardelj of Yugoslavia that it was too bad how the Browder affair turned out. It was also reported that Rakosi of Hungary, when he was in New York at a meeting of the American CP Politburo in 1947, walked out and slammed the door shut in anger at Foster and Foster's line. In September 1946, the London *Daily Mail* reported that Duclos called the American communists 'an immature and uninfluential group'.

Now to return to Browder and his great misjudgment. He never ceased to believe that the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was intended to allow 'the national Communist Parties to stand on their own feet, and work out their own destinies without any pattern imposed upon them from above'. And he was surprised when 'in 1945 this policy was suddenly reversed without international consultations'. But he misjudged completely how Stalin saw the world in 1945, especially after the Yalta Conference in February of that year when Stalin realized that he would not have an easy time with his Allies. And Browder was not alone in his misjudgment. He was in the good company of Franklin Delano Roosevelt who said towards the end of his life: '[Stalin] won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.'

EARL Browder was a very successful strategist during most of his reign as head of the American Communist Party. He enjoyed extraordinary adulation from Party members and great respect in the communist world as well as in much of the non-communist world. It is no wonder that he succumbed to the illusion that he was an 'independent'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leader of his Party rather than an obedient servant of Moscow. And because of this illusion, he went so completely overboard on the issue of the meaning of Teheran that to repudiate all that he had stood for, and for which he was so lauded, would have been too degrading an experience. This was true especially in face of the revengeful Foster, who did not hesitate to ruin the Party in order to gain control of it. Twice Foster was dishonest when he 'pleaded' with Browder to remain as leader, knowing full well that Browder's stubbornness and pride would not allow him to give in. Two years later, in my meetings with the Politburo, I questioned Foster on this period of struggle between him and Browder, and his reply supports the above conclusion.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa in the 1970s: Political Unrest and Cultural Ferment

Ali A. Mazrui

IF one were to try and discern the likely prospects for Africa in the decade of the 1970s, two trends appear to be particularly probable—first, political unrest; and secondly, cultural revitalization. Political unrest includes problems of institutional fluidity, the military/civilian pendulum, the phenomenon of retribalization, and the changing fortunes of the different party systems. But Africa will also witness a cultural revitalization. The basic cultural dualism which has already concerned writers and artists in much of Africa will now probably move on to produce an art of reintegration. But this art will also include a reassertion of certain important elements in the indigenous heritage.

Let us look more closely at these two related themes of political unrest and cultural revitalization in the coming decade on the African continent.

The Pendular Model of Change

Much of the political upheaval in Africa is connected with two types of problem—the problem of fragile institutions and that of fragmented identity. The institutions are fragile partly because the political communities are newly created in their present form, encompassing units the members of which have yet to recognise each other as compatriots. In all societies, conflict between groups is inevitable, and the nature of much of social life is concerned with ways of resolving a variety of different conflicts of interests, of values, and of beliefs. Political institutions are fragile if they lack the capacity to withstand the strain of trying to resolve some of these conflicts. They are also fragile if they do not as yet command enough faith and enough mystique among the people they are supposed to serve to make them politically authoritative.

It is in the nature of institutional instability of this kind to create a pendulum model of social change. This model is, of course, different from a model of social change in which the process of transformation is seen in terms of a specified direction. Sometimes alternative models of social change are unilinear, inexorably moving towards a single unalterable destination. Many theories of social evolution, including Marxist historical materialism, do postulate a movement in terms of stages towards a particular ultimate destination. Indeed, some contemporary theories of modernization and political development are based on this kind of assumption, postulating as they do a social evolution from a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simplistically conceived kind of underdevelopment and traditionalism to a narrowly specified model of development and modernity.[1]

In the case of political movements and movements of ideas the analogy which is sometimes pertinent is that of wave-formation, but in the case of political changes in Africa in the coming decade, the most relevant analogy might well be that of the pendulum, swinging between one kind of institutional arrangement and another.

The metaphor derives its pertinence from three factors. One factor is the very nature of *sudden* political change. Most political shocks generate their own reactions, and it is within these reactions that the springs of a swing-back tense up ready to be released.

But in the case of a former colony there is another factor which encourages swings between two particular poles of institutional arrangements. This factor is the simple one of a profound dualism in the political culture of the country. We have on the one hand residual indigenous ways of political response, political reasoning, and of political interaction. On the other hand, we have institutions created during the colonial period to serve a different kind of polity, and derived in their genesis from the experience of the metropolitan powers. The syndrome of ambivalence in a former colony takes the form of swings between rebellion and residual emulation. The values underlying the new institutions, such as the purposes of general elections, or the anti-nepotistic assumptions of bureaucratic rationality, or the purposes of a parliament or a political party, all come into conflict periodically with modes of political behaviour derived from very different traditional experience. Anti-nepotism as a principle of bureaucratic rationality, for example, might clash with the principle of kinship obligations as derived from traditional culture. The idea of a floating vote in mature democracies gradually achieves an optimum size which ensures a balance between stability and changeability. But in new societies the floating vote might constitute the bulk of the electorate, swinging recklessly from supporting one party to supporting another. Alternatively, the very idea of a floating vote might simply clash with an indigenous notion of loyalty and prior commitment unchangeable by the vicissitudes of political campaigns.

The pendulum model of political change in Africa arises then both because changes are so sudden that they generate a sharp backlash, and because the whole personality of the polity in a newly liberated African country betrays a profound ambivalence between the values associated with newly created institutions inherited from the metropolitan power on the one hand, and the residual modes of political response more deeply rooted in local traditions on the other. Both syndromes—that of swing-back and that of cultural ambivalence—are likely to cause pendu-

[1] I have discussed this point more fully in my article 'From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis', *World Politics*, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (October 1968). This essay is also published as a chapter in Mazrui, *Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa* (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 85–101.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lar swings, especially in the field of establishing a new set of political institutions.

In other areas of national life, like cultural activity or economic arrangements, the pendulum model may be totally irrelevant. Economic change could at times be unilinear, though subject to temporary interruptions when there are obstacles in its way. Change in ideas and in methods of cultural creativity can be more like wave-formation. Certainly the cultural dualism between imported ways and indigenous ways in an African country, while having a pendular effect in politics, could have a different effect on literature, the arts, and on systems of education. The syndromes of swing-back and of cultural ambivalence are pendular in their effect on political institutions but not necessarily pendular in other areas of social change.

There are two or three interrelated reasons for the differences between institutionalized political change and other areas of social change. One reason concerns the proximity of politics to practice. Art and intellectual speculation can engage in flights of imagination, and these sometimes help the artist or the theoretical thinker to transcend the cultural dualism of his predicament. The range of choices is much greater where there is no need to be governed by the limitations of practicality. Novelists can therefore experiment with new modes of writing and even with the concept of the anti-novel; poets can range from discipline and rhyme to total aesthetic eccentricity; social thinkers may even build 'models' or speculate about the future on a grand scale without the restraints of practical implementation.

But those who are called upon to write practical constitutions for their countries, designed to be implemented in day-to-day politics and intended to govern the behaviour of men in their political and social activities, cannot indulge in too high a flight from the level of experience. Even a revolutionary constitution, if it is really designed to be made operational and implemented in a particular society with all its habits and tendencies, has to curb the innovative instinct.

If then the invention of political institutions needs to take account of prospects for implementation, the choice of alternatives becomes limited. A particular regime may introduce highly innovative institutions. But when there is a reaction against these institutions the tendency is not to plunge into another set of innovations but to grope back to the rock of experience. And when further disenchantment sets in, subsequent reformers may once again be drawn towards that which was tried before but inadequately implemented, to see if the same basis could be used for a further experimentation.

A third factor may seem to be more universal. It concerns the simple fact that much of politics springs from the competitive spirit in man. In liberal democracies this competitive spirit is institutionalized in political parties which then compete for power and for political opportunities. Swings towards radicalism or towards conservatism

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become part of the pendular phenomenon of the liberal polity when electors go to the polls.

But in situations like that of Africa the swings are not between supporting one party and supporting another, but are in effect swings between one political system and another. The pendular effect in Africa is concerned not merely with support for a particular leader or for a particular political party, but is likely to be in terms of swings between whole political systems.

On Parties and Soldiers

Ghana led Black Africa in the attainment of independence. Ghana is also leading Black Africa in the phenomenon of systemic swings. The Ghanaian experience may be an indicator of the likely turn of events in much of Africa in the decade of the 1970s.

It will be remembered that as independence approached, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana had been praising liberal competitive democracy. In June 1955, at the height of the opposition challenge, Nkrumah could still be saying at a rally of the Convention People's Party:

> I have always expressed both in public and in private the view that we need a strong and well-organized Opposition Party in the country and the Assembly. . . . We must not forget that democracy means the rule of the majority, though it should be tempered by sweet reasonableness in the interests of the minority.[2]

At that time it was still important for Nkrumah to maintain the image of competitive parliamentary institutions, both on the eve of Ghana's independence and in the first year or so of that independence. But Nkrumah's view on this matter gradually changed, and the road towards a one-party system was then taken. The opponents of the regime were harassed. And ideologues in Ghana turned their talents to the justification of the one-party state.

Ghana enjoyed half a decade of the one-party system before the final end in February 1966 when Nkrumah's regime was overthrown and the Convention People's Party was banned. The country fell under military rule, with civilian advisers. Party politics took an enforced pause.

Then came 1969, and the world witnessed one of the most significant developments of the decade in Ghana. A constitutional political opposition came to life again, and quickly assumed its original vigour. In August 1969 K. A. Busia's party, the Progress Party, polled 59 per cent of the popular vote and 104 seats or 75 per cent of the National Assembly. Originally no less than 16 parties had made an appearance, but mergers took place and reduced the contest finally to five parties. Of these the major contest was between Dr Busia's Progress Party and Mr Gbedemah's National Alliance of Liberals.

Ghana was therefore once again back to a multi-party system—and the political philosophy behind it had reverted to that which Nkrumah

[2] *The Evening News* (Accra), 14 June 1955.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

still accepted in 1955. We had here then an example of the pendulum swing in Africa's institutional experience; the next swing came more recently.

In a different way Kenya has exhibited similar tendencies. There also we have had the example of movement to and from a one-party system, though in the case of Kenya the same regime has remained in power throughout these pendular swings. In 1964 the Kenya African Democratic Union, the original opposition party in the country, liquidated itself and merged with the ruling party. In one momentous decision the country changed from a two-party system to a one-party system. But then within the ruling party new tensions began to arise, and gradually a faction of the Left of the party began to be discernible as a major source of challenge. By 1966 the Leftist faction broke loose from the ruling party, and formed the Kenya People's Union. The original opposition, KADU, had been an opposition from the Right whereas KPU, as we have indicated, was an opposition from the Left. But in power there still remained the Kenya African National Union.

With the emergence of the Leftist party, the vigour of Kenyan politics entered a new phase. Then came the disturbing events in Kisumu in October 1969. Kenyatta had visited that town, and supporters of the opposition had booed the President. Emotions culminated in a situation in which the President's guards opened fire. A number of people were killed; the nation tensed up for a new crisis. The government decided to ban the Kenya People's Union, and to detain its top leadership. Kenya was once again back to a single-party system. The systemic pendulum was at work, as political evolution resulted in alternating structural phases of public life. There was a time when many regarded the one-party system as inevitable in most African countries. If it is indeed inevitable in Kenya, the trend towards it has not been unilinear. If there is supposed to be some kind of inevitability at work here, it has found areas of tactical accommodation with the realities of institutional reversibility.

The Kenyan type of institutional swing presupposes a certain kind of flexibility in the regime in power. Kenya has yet to declare a one-party system *de jure*. Technically there is no reason why another group of people should not form a new opposition party. In reality there are political difficulties in the way of any such action. But the legalities of the situation are such that alternative parties are not outlawed. Kenya's laws in relation to the dominant regime have therefore permitted systemic changes *de facto* while the same regime has remained in power. But where alternative parties are outlawed, and a country becomes a one-party state *de jure*, systemic changes may need more fundamental political disturbances than Kenya has yet experienced. The Ghanaian model of systemic change is a more likely one for repetition elsewhere than the Kenyan.

But Ghana has been a model not only of changes between one-party and multi-party systems: it has also demonstrated a pendular tendency

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in military/civilian relations. Ghana and the Sudan are particularly illuminating in this regard. Both countries have known alternating spells of military and civilian authority. On balance, Ghana's experience shows a marginal structural preference for civilian supremacy in spite of recent events. The Sudan, on the other hand, shows a tendency towards a greater degree of military intervention than has so far been discernible in Ghana.

In African terms, however, both countries seem to be endowed with the ethos of a *civic soldiery*. By the term 'civic soldiery' we mean here a category of soldiers sufficiently socialized into the ethos of civilian supremacy to feel uneasy about exercising power without civilian tutelage, who are sufficiently sensitized to the virtues of civic order to feel very inhibited about brutalizing ordinary citizens. In October 1964 General Aboud fell from power in Khartoum. Aboud's fall was itself a triumph of public opinion in Northern Sudan, and an index to some degree of meaningful if transient national consensus. A series of demonstrations in Khartoum, some of which were led by university teachers, shattered the confidence of the military regime. It is not in every country that the military would bow to popular indignation. It is not in every country in Africa that popular indignation expresses itself in spite of possible reprisals from government forces. It is true that the vulnerability of the military regime was partly due to its own internal division, and yet the very divisions within the military forces seem to have been partly connected with patriotic sentiment and with a reluctance to shed too much Sudanese blood in the streets of Khartoum.

As I have had occasion to say before, the fall of Aboud in October 1964 was as creditable to Aboud and the military at large as it was to demonstrators in the streets demanding a return to parliamentary politics.[3] But in 1969 a swing back to military power took place in the Sudan, with more casualties than had been the case in previous swings. The restraining effect of the civic ethos was still operative; an alliance with the radical and Marxist sections of civilian opinion was concluded by the soldiery. A swing against the Marxists came in 1971 which was manifested even more strongly after the short-lived Marxist coup of July that year.

In Ghana the civic ethos was also alive. The Ghanaian coup of 1966 was in many ways one of the most polished and sophisticated of all coups in the Third World. The regime took advantage of civilian disenchantment with Nkrumah's era, and quickly sought to involve not only the civil service but also other sectors of opinion in decision-making. Party politics were banned, but popular dissent was given latitude in newspapers and other publications. Important governmental decisions were subjected to public criticism and public evaluation while the soldiers remained in power. And the National Liberation Council shared the glamour of political leadership in the country with civilian

[3] See Mazrui, 'The Multiple Marginality of the Sudan', op. cit. pp. 174–76.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public figures, especially K. A. Busia who later took over as Head of Government.

Even after the last military coup, relations between ordinary soldiers and ordinary civilians in Ghana have been less tense and more cordial than is evident in some other African countries. There are parts of East Africa where villagers are frightened by the approach of an army lorry, where a car driver would think twice before overtaking a military vehicle. But there is a lack of bitterness in military/civilian relations in Ghana which is rare in the conditions of present-day Africa.

On Tribe and Nation

However, political issues in Africa concern not merely fragile institutions but also, as we indicated, problems of fragmented identity. We might here distinguish between ethnic identity, national identity, and racial identity. In this paper, we use the term ethnicity interchangeably with tribal identity. We use the term national identity to refer to allegiance to the country as a whole. We use the term racial identity to describe that feeling of racial empathy which makes Africans in Uganda or Nigeria or Zambia or Tanzania empathize with black people in Rhodesia and South Africa. Racial allegiance in our sense is at the heart of pan-Africanism when pan-Africanism is animated by bonds of colour rather than by the continental mystique. When pan-Africanism is animated by the African continental mystique, the Arabs of North Africa and the black people south of the Sahara find a platform for solidarity. But when pan-Africanism is animated by a bond of race or colour, it is blackness which provides the foundation of solidarity.

By a curious paradox the 1970s are likely to witness *both* a resurgence of ethnic identity *and* a consolidation of national identity.

The beginnings of national identification do, of course, lie within the womb of colonialism itself. The colonial experience and the reaction it provoked in Africa helped to make politics national in African countries. The rise of agitation for greater political participation at the centre entailed a growing involvement of people as a whole in national issues. Instead of intratribal intrigue within each ethnic community colonial politics gradually released a consciousness among Africans of the territory as a whole as an arena of political argument. The initial stages of this nationalization of politics in each country did not take the form of a direct struggle for independence but very often took the form of a more limited extension of African political participation at the national level. In British Africa particularly the Legislative Council had a special meaning. Political struggle by Africans was initially designed to increase African influence within the Legislative Council. Political participation was conceived in terms of extending the franchise and increasing African representation within that colonial legislature.

And yet much of what was happening during the colonial period in each territory was in reality a centralization of politics rather than a consolidation of national political activity. What was agitating the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

masses as they followed that first generation of modern leaders in Africa was an identity based on racial differentiation, rather than an identity rooted in national recognition. Kenyans were reacting against British rule not because they really already felt that they were Kenyans but because they felt they were Africans being ruled by Europeans. That nationalism was rightly called *African* nationalism, rather than the nationalism of individual countries and territories.

With the withdrawal of imperial rule, and the relaxation of racial humiliation, cracks within the solidarity of anti-colonialism soon appeared. A resurgence of identification on the basis of smaller ethnic units erupted in one African country after another. There has in fact been what I have had occasion to call *retribalization*.

In Kenya tensions between the Luo and the Kikuyu have been part of this phenomenon of a fragmented identity. In Uganda the Buganda question still looms large, hanging like a tragic question mark over the fortunes of the country as a whole. In Nigeria retribalization attained tragic dimensions. The Ibo, for so long part of the vanguard of the pan-African school of nationalism, found themselves retreating, in the middle of 1966, back into an ideology of the paramountcy of ethnic interests. Their deepest political passions were retribalized. The painful drama of conflict and civil war in Nigeria unfolded itself. The imperial retreat had resulted in a loosening up of the bonds of racial solidarity. And then the primordial ethnic passions flared up again and loosened even further those ties of social cohesion.

And yet there is a pendular phenomenon even in the interplay between nationality and ethnicity in each African country. Retribalization is not inconsistent with long-term national integration in each African country. Where the forces of retribalization are brought back to the mainstream of national experience, this could constitute a higher level of integration than was normally attained when tribalism was first permitted to subside under the impact of anti-colonialism. The dialectic between nationality and ethnicity might well have a kind of Hegelian progression. Nationality might indeed every so often be overshadowed by tribality, but the changing relations between the two might lead to a higher stage of interpenetration between them in the direction of wider affinities. The cumulative experience of resolving conflicts between antithetical forces is, after all, one of the great indices of national integration.[4]

Not all tribal conflicts, however, strengthen national consciousness, but only those which are animated by the desire to control the national political system or to get a fair share of the products of the nation. The tensions which grew up in the course of 1968 and 1969 between the Kikuyu and the Luo in Kenya are typical of those which,

[4] See Mazrui, 'Conflict and the Integrative Process', op. cit. pp. 102–21. The issues of resurgent ethnicity are also discussed more fully in Mazrui, 'Violent Contiguity and the Politics of Retribalization in Africa', *Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1961).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while momentarily endangering the nation, nevertheless strengthen and deepen the awareness that the control of the centre is important for the tribe. All the ferocity of argument and passion of grievances expressed by the Luo were animated by the conviction that they were not receiving their fair share of what the Kenya nation had to offer. As long as the Luo continued to aspire to a greater share of that national cake, they would maintain a sense of having a vested interest in the nation.

And even the smaller communities in Kenya which gravitated in sympathy either towards the Luo or towards the Kikuyu were, in that very alignment of forces, deepening their national consciousness. Tribal conflicts remain consistent with deepening nationality whenever the objects of the conflict are themselves national and whenever the ultimate instruments of the resolution of that conflict are nationally based.

But tribal conflicts become more difficult to reconcile with deepening national consciousness where secession becomes an issue. The desire to break away from the nation by definition militates against a continuing loyalty to that nation. This, then, is where we must distinguish between the Nigerian pattern of ethnic tensions, which included deep separatist tendencies, on the one hand, and the Kenyan pattern of ethnic tensions, which has been a competition for the effective control of the nation rather than an attempt to break it up.[5]

Yet even ethnic conflicts which include secessionist tendencies are not entirely irreconcilable with the growth of nationhood. In the case of Nigeria we must remember that those who supported the Federal side during the war were forced by their predicament to experience a new sense of national commitment. Large numbers of Nigerian intellectuals, discovering themselves to be engaged in a mortal battle for national survival, built up within themselves new resources of patriotism. A civil war can itself be a moment of psychological immersion with the nation even where the civil war is not animated by a desire to control the centre, as was the civil war in Spain in 1936, but is animated by a desire to break loose altogether, as was the case with the Ibo in Biafra's bid for sovereignty. Certainly being on the Federal side in the Nigerian civil war deepened one's sense of allegiance to the nation. But what about the allegiance of the Ibo to Nigerian nationality? There can be little doubt that the immediate effect of the events which started with the Northern riots of May 1966 has amounted to a national alienation of the Ibo. Since the end of the civil war the Ibo remain Nigerians under silent protest, unwilling citizens of the union.

And yet, judging by the experience of the United States in the hundred years since the Civil War, it is possible for the vanquished in a civil war to continue to hate that section of the country which fought them and at the same time develop a new loyalty to the collective nation

[5] We are excluding in this analysis the distinctive case of the Somali in Kenya and their desire to be reunited with Somalia. The case of the Somali is more like that of the Ewe of Ghana and Togo than either the Luo and Kikuyu in Kenya or the Nigerian ethnic picture.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a whole. The South in the United States has retained deep wounds from the Civil War, with imminent hostility towards the Yankee and the Northerner. And yet, by a curious destiny, the South in the United States has remained anti-Northern without being anti-American. On the contrary, the South developed a new passion for the country, evolving a conservative anti-radical patriotism of its own. It has continued to distrust the North, but mainly in terms of a presumed Northern disloyalty to the ultimate values of the American people as a whole.

The question arises as to the likely pattern of Ibo allegiances in the future. It is conceivable that the Ibo would remain passionately anti-Northern, anti-Hausa, even anti-Yoruba, while at the same time evolving a kind of loyalty towards Nigeria. The preoccupation of the Ibo might be diverted towards a quest for the control of some of the institutions of power in the national context. They might, like the Luo, become more eager to have their fair share of the national system than to destroy that system. When such a phenomenon happens, ethnic animosities might once again turn out to be not inconsistent with the consolidation of national identity.

On Race and Continental Identity

What is the effect of this dialectic between tribality and nationality on the question of *racial* identity?

There was a time when it was tempting to conclude that one of the factors which made Africans emphasize the pan-African bond was their domestic vulnerability in terms of ethnic tensions. Where the danger of tribal conflict was acute, diversionary relief might be found in a vision of pan-black solidarity. If Africans in Kenya could not learn to accept each other because they were Kenyans, might they not learn to accept each other because they were Africans? And would not this bond of Africanness based on racial affinity carry them beyond their own borders and establish lines of empathy and identification with other Africans elsewhere in the continent?

Similar responses and behaviour did in fact occur, but only for as long as the colonial presence was an important factor in the sociological context. With the withdrawal of the colonial presence it was no longer the case that tribal tensions within individual African countries helped to promote a pan-African sentiment which would transcend tribal loyalties. On the contrary, empirical evidence in the first few years of independence would seem to suggest that those countries which did *not* have deep tribal divisions internally were the most pan-African. The torch of pan-Africanism at its most ambitious passed from Nkrumah's Ghana to Nyerere's Tanzania. Of course, there are a number of reasons why these two countries under their particular leaders were cast in radical roles in the politics of the continent. But among the factors which facilitated their radicalism in pan-African ideology must be included their relative freedom from profound domestic preoccupations affecting their very survival as national entities.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of course Ghana did have its ethnic problems even under Nkrumah, but they were nowhere as deep and potentially convulsive as those of Nigeria. Nkrumah was a pan-African for a variety of reasons, one of which, it must be said, was the simple fact that he could afford to be one in terms of domestic politics. Nigeria, the Congo, Uganda were not among the radical voices of pan-African sentiment. It is conceivable that one of the reasons was their profound domestic preoccupation with national survival. Tanzania, Nkrumah's Ghana, Modibo Kéita's Mali, Sékou Touré's Guinea—these were all eloquent voices of pan-African and black solidarity at its most ambitious. Each of them had domestic splits of one kind or another, but none of them was comparable to Nigeria, the Congo, or Uganda in terms of internal structural fragility.

Of course, domestic peace in an African country is not a sufficient condition for the espousal of a pan-African ideology by that country. Ghana needed a Nkrumah, and needed also the accident of being the first black state to be decolonized, in order to capture the leadership of pan-African militancy. But while relative internal peace might not be a sufficient condition for conversion to active pan-Africanism, it is often a contributory factor of some importance.

The relationship between national identity and racial/continental identity is more difficult to grasp. At first sight it might appear that the consolidation of national identity might militate against the racial/continental identity. One might expect that the more nationalistic Tanzanians grew as Tanzanians, the less militant they would become as pan-Africans. But this would depend very much upon the precise nature of the ambitions held by Tanzanians in their narrower identity as Tanzanians. If they had a vision of continental participation on a larger platform of politics, they would inevitably get involved in issues of politics beyond their own borders. If the precise composition of their domestic nationalism included a strong element of racial pride, it would not be easy to draw a distinction between their territorial identity and wider loyalties.

Pan-Africanism as a theme in African politics is not likely to disappear in the 1970s. It is certainly bound to retain some hold over the imagination of many Africans for as long as southern Africa remains white-dominated.

In the course of the 1970s the Republic of South Africa itself is likely to attempt a more interventionist foreign policy. In the face of efforts by African states and their sympathizers to impose diplomatic isolation on South Africa, South Africa is likely to react by measures designed to neutralize that isolation. Within the African continent itself South Africa will try to forge for herself some degree of presence in as many African countries as it is possible for her to entice. It was predictable that the former High Commission Territories, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, were going to fall under the shadow of Pretoria's power and influence. A less inevitable model of South Africa's policy of diplo-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matic interventionism has been Malawi under the presidency of Hastings Banda. Dr Banda decided on a policy of substantial collaboration with his big industrial neighbour to the south. Diplomatic relations have been established, and trade relations have been strengthened. A dramatic visit to Malawi was arranged in 1970 for Dr Vorster of South Africa, as the official guest of Dr Banda, and in 1971 Dr Banda reciprocated with a state visit to South Africa.

It has already been pointed out that the most likely development in the coming years is not an increasing capacity of black states to intervene in the affairs of South Africa, but an increasing efficiency by the Republic of South Africa in influencing events in black states. The *entente* which has developed between Pretoria and Zomba is certainly a case in point. But it remains to be seen whether Pretoria's attempt to extend her influence northwards remains successful. Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta has seemed to be particularly tolerant towards Malawi. Dr Banda paid a highly successful state visit to Kenya, and has since then stopped more than once at Nairobi and chatted there with some of the Kenya leaders. In June 1970 he even held a press conference at the airport in Nairobi on his way back to Malawi from London, and used the platform to defend his policy on South Africa. The main thrust of his argument was the proposition that *apartheid* would crack as a result of inevitable interaction between the races in southern Africa, and not as a result of a contrived separation either by the Republic itself or by those who sought to isolate the Republic from the main flow of political activity in the African continent and beyond.

Meanwhile, white rule in South Africa provides a lingering source of activation for the spirit of racial solidarity among the black states and for the whole vision of racial and continental identity. In the words of the late Tom Mboya: 'As long as any part of Africa remains under European rule, we do not feel that Africans will be regarded in the right way.' The ultimate feeling behind racial militancy in Africa, as perhaps in black America, is the feeling that racial equality is indivisible. Until all Africans are regarded as the equals of Europeans, no African can be sure that he is accepted as an equal. The liberation of southern Africa is essential not only for its own sake but also for elevating the African in the eyes of the world—and in African eyes too. The underlying logic of this belief is that the slave needs his freedom to be the equal of free men, as well as to exercise it.[6]

The Arts and Creative Unrest

The 1970s in Africa are likely to be years of cultural revitalization. The first wave of restlessness in Africa was the one which led to the

[6] The Mboya quotation is drawn from the *Mombasa Times* (Kenya), 11 January 1962. I first discussed the idea of 'equality is indivisible' as a basis of African nationalism in my article 'On the Concept of "We are all African"', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVII, No. 1, March 1963. This article was later published as a chapter in Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson and the University of Chicago Press, 1967).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

growth of the nationalist movements. Frustrations at certain levels of society, especially among intellectuals and others with educated ambitions, released the urge for change. Very often when we are looking at the psychic unrest of the individual, the craving is in fact for upward mobility. African nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s, by its commitment to the elimination of foreign rule and colonial administration, opened up many positions which could temporarily allay psychic restlessness.

In French-speaking Africa the restlessness did take the form of cultural creativity. Poetry, drama, novels, philosophical formulations about society, poured forth with impressive abandon. The French policy of assimilation and its assumptions about the cultural inadequacies of the African helped to provoke the creative response. Among the aesthetic rebellions of Francophone blackland was the old school of *négritude* and its commitment to cultural revivalism. Under the impact of French cultural arrogance, a psychic restlessness was released among those Africans who felt most keenly the humiliation of it all. The quest for aesthetic vindication led to an eruption of creativity.

Since independence there has been a decline of literary creativity in much of French-speaking Africa. A blanket of black authoritarianism has smothered it in several places. And yet it would be a mistake to regard a literary pause as a pause in aesthetics at large. The performing arts in French-speaking Africa seem to have got stronger since independence. African ballet and the art of the drum have assumed a new sophistication in the playhouses of Dakar. While great writers like Camara Laye and Mongo Béti have retreated into relative silence, other areas of artistic creativity seem to be throbbing with verve. The Dakar Festival of the Arts in 1964 had its shortcomings and quarrels; the Festival in Algiers in 1969 released its own froth of political emotions. But the Festivals in their own way were a mirror of cultural revitalization in much of the black world.

In English-speaking Africa psychic restlessness under colonialism did not immediately erupt in the form of aesthetic creativity. Black response to British rule was more political and less cultural than black response to French rule. It is because of this that the leadership in pan-African movements and in the anti-colonial struggle as organized forms of resistance to colonialism passed to English-speaking Africans. It was the Anglophones who set the pace of colonial liberation. It was they who asserted more sharply than their French-speaking counterparts their separateness from the metropolitan power.

And yet after independence something started to happen in English-speaking Africa too. That sense of cultural dualism, of a coexistence between the imported from the West and the indigenous rooted in the local soil, has led to cultural experimentation in Anglophone circles too.

Until the civil war Nigeria took the lead in this cultural renaissance. The best novelist in the English language, the best playwright in the English language in Africa, a galaxy of some of the most inspired of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poets of Africa, were all Nigerians. Then there was the dance and the theatre, Ibadan throbbing with innovation and the reckless search for artistic expression.

The Institute of African Studies of the University of Ghana in Legon has a mixed record in its contributions to African arts. But there is one area where its record is impressive. And that is in the field of dancing. A good deal of innovation, of the fusion of traditional with modern techniques, of the utilization of modern instruments for ancient movements, all these have been bursting forth from this one single institute in Ghana's capital. Of course, the experiments have had their critics, and indeed they have had their failings and shortcomings. But there is a clear commitment to the promotion of a Ghanaian presence in Africa's cultural world.

East Africa has been slow to respond to the new challenges. In Uganda cultural preoccupations were oriented towards the goal of conservation rather than revivalism, yet in spite of that there have been tendencies towards a new promotion of the arts and the creation of a Ugandan participation in Africa's renaissance. The National Theatre and Cultural Centre were set up partly with this in mind. The Heartbeat of Africa Dancing Troupe was again symptomatic of a groping for a new and larger stage to accommodate indigenous performers. These are tendencies towards the nationalization of tribal aesthetics.

Meanwhile educational institutions are also exploring new ways of artistic participation and the promotion of the local renaissance. A School of Drama at Makerere was established some years ago. Several literary magazines have sprung up in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Novels and short stories are coming out of East African Publishing House. Epic poems and long narrative ventures in verse are being attempted. Even politicians have entered with gusto into this general arena of aesthetic experimentation.

Julius Nyerere is participating in the task of enriching the Swahili language partly through calling upon it to carry the load of literary masterpieces originally written in other languages. The subtle process of enriching a language consists in diversifying its uses and augmenting its versatility. Nyerere's translation of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* is a contribution both to local Swahili theatre and to the effectiveness of the Swahili language as a literary medium.

Uganda is another country which has produced a major political figure in search of a literary role. Akena Adoko, formerly Chief General Service Officer of the Uganda Government and once one of the most powerful political figures in the government, has written a narrative in blank verse about the events of 1966 in Uganda, when the Central Government had a military confrontation with one of the Regions and when the leadership of the ruling party was threatened from within. Akena Adoko's *Uganda Crisis* is an important document about a critical year in the recent history of Uganda. But what is significant from the point of view of this

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analysis is that the author aspired to make it a work of art, and not just a political documentary.

French-speaking Africa has, of course, a longer tradition linking active politics with literary endeavours. It has been pointed out often enough that Léopold Senghor of Senegal was a poet, Kéita Fodéba of Guinea a producer of ballets, Bernard Dadié of the Ivory Coast a novelist, and Cofi Gadeau a playwright, before they held office in their respective states. And yet the cultural ferment is not to be viewed purely in terms of the more conspicuous exercises of famous figures. Because the psychic equilibrium of African society has been disturbed, the dynamo of restlessness is active at different levels. The place of the individual is critical in all this. Very often the unrest which has erupted is in fact a case of individual response. In Africa the problem assumes an extra dimension because of the element of interrupted individuation in the whole process of social change. Collective tendencies in traditional African life are in many cases still strong, and the growth of individualism has been interrupted in part by a quest in the new states for national cohesion or socio-political conformity. The demands for obedience in many political systems in Africa, and the attempt for extra control of the educational system, of the press, and of other areas of potential intellectual self-assertion, all carry the risk of arrested individuation.

The first great individualists are the outstanding figures in an emerging elite. This has been the experience elsewhere in the world most of the time and has been the experience in Africa as well. The first modern individualists in Africa were to be found within an emerging intelligentsia. But again when their ambitions found fulfilment with the departure of the foreign ruler, there was a tendency for many of them to develop a concern for conformity. Social and political conformity become an assurance for the status quo, and the status quo includes the preservation of the positions of power already achieved. So the first decade of independence has in some spheres included forces arresting the process of social individuation.

But the competitive spirit of those who are out of power, or who are coming up in the generation ladder, is likely to find new innovative outlets. The cultural ferment in literature and the arts is only one manifestation of this unrest.

The Arts and Cultural Miscegenation

But at least as important a factor behind the ferment is that old dualism of the imported and the indigenous, of the metropolitan and the local. But the indigenous traditions themselves are in turn diverse. In this case we have cultural pluralism. Cultural dualism might therefore be described as an extra-national phenomenon; while cultural pluralism might be seen as an intra-national pattern.

Both dimensions are leading to artistic experimentation and attempts at fusion. The dualistic dimension becomes connected with the issue of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

racial identity. A desire to assert an African essence, to discover a black meaning of things, becomes an aspect of the consolidation of racial identity. The movement known as *négritude* has been one manifestation of this, but other areas of black assertiveness are also an outgrowth of the phenomenon of dualism. Pride in African culture and the African heritage lies at the heart of the crisis of racial identity.

But the issue of cultural pluralism is also generating experimentation of its own kind. The link this time is with problems of national rather than racial identity. How can the particular ethnic heritages of individual communities be amalgamated into a new national heritage?

At Makerere University the problem became concrete partly in the issue of the localization of the history syllabus. It was easy enough to argue that the teaching of history at Makerere should cease to be Anglo-centric or even Eurocentric, and become more concerned with major themes of historical development in Africa. But Africanization in a department in Uganda is not enough. The next stage is how far can a department of history in a Ugandan university take account of its immediate geographical location and give due emphasis to Ugandan material. Historical material available for utilization in the teaching of history was preponderantly derived from the history of two or three ethnic communities. Historians paid a disproportionate amount of attention to the Baganda, the Banyoro, and the Banyankole. The reason was partly connected with the centrality of Buganda in the affairs of Uganda, partly tied to the mystique of monarchies, and partly also tied to the accident that highly institutionalized traditional states tended to afford more obvious sources of information about the past than segmentary societies might do.

And yet for a department of history at Makerere to give a disproportionate attention to Buganda in its syllabus would be an act of political sensitivity, and likely to be interpreted as a continuing attempt to exaggerate the significance of the Baganda in the nation's affairs.

The new head of the Department of History has therefore embarked on a comprehensive programme of intensive research in those areas which had previously been under-researched by historians. There is a clear commitment in the Department to the cause of building up a Ugandan historical course with some semblance of ethnic balance in the presentation of the nation's past.

Meanwhile the Department of English at Makerere has been renamed the Department of Literature and is to include among its offerings a variety of oral literatures drawn from the different communities of Uganda. Again a conscious attempt has to be made to create balance in presentation. Fusion of the different literatures might not be possible, but balanced structures of presentation might be the initial stage of a national heritage.

The creative unrest released by cultural dualism is older than that generated by cultural pluralism. As we indicated, in Francophone Africa

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much of the nationalist movement during the colonial period was cultural in impetus, and motivated by a desire for racial vindication.

But after independence it is no longer enough to try to prove that the African genius for cultural creativity is as rich as that of Europe. It becomes necessary to discover areas of cultural unity in the richness of each African territorial entity. The 1970s are likely to go further in responding to the challenge of cultural pluralism than the 1960s. But in literature the preoccupation with cultural dualism so characteristic of the 1950s and the 1960s is likely to decline as a theme in the actual works, though not necessarily as an inspiration behind the very urge to create and innovate. In other words, novels might no longer be obsessed with cultural contact and the conflict between values, imported and traditional—but much of the urge to write novels and excel in creativity might still bear the stamp of racial pride and owe some of its inspiration to the legacy of colonialism and aesthetic duality.

Concurrently with the swinging changes of politics, the decade of the 1970s will witness a creative unrest in the continent, groping for solutions, groping for self-recognition, and innovating. The decline of literature in French-speaking countries is likely to be reversed, and in any case the performing arts even in Francophone Africa have continued to flourish with vigour. Both literature and the performing arts in English-speaking Africa are likely to reach new levels of attainment, in response both to dualism and pluralism within the cultural destiny of their societies.

There may be occasions when political instability might be too acute to sustain cultural creativity. And yet it is impossible to be sure what kind of instability in politics is likely to be totally counter-creative in culture. For Africa as a whole the instability and political agonies of the 1970s might well turn out to be the pangs of mother culture in the throes of creative labour.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Egypt's Politics of Conspiracy

P. J. Vatikiotis

WHEN President Nasser died on 28 September 1970,

> Sharawi Gumaa, Sami Sharaf, General Muhammad Fawzi, Amin Huweidi and Muhammad Faiq—and I am not altogether certain whether Faiq was wholly with them or not—assumed that the power to govern the country was in their hands, as represented in the Ministry of Interior, the Army, political organization and propaganda. They imagined that by their alliance and grouping they could lead and manipulate Anwar Sadat and the country's internal affairs as they wished. And I should like to state here that Sami Sharaf told me personally after Gamal's death and before Sadat's accession . . . that they, the five, had met daily since the days of President Nasser in order to make an appreciation of domestic affairs and policy, which they reported directly to the President on his instructions. Sami told me that the President had appointed this committee before his death, so that this group of five men felt that they held power in their hands.

This statement by Ahmad Kamel,[1] Chief of Egyptian Intelligence until 13 May 1971, is interesting not only because of what it says about the cabal of ex-army officers, but also for what it reveals about the nature and style of rule in Egypt: a style which was particularly developed and perfected under President Nasser. Serious students of modern Egyptian history and politics are not surprised by new revelations to the effect that any new political structures and organizations introduced by the Free Officers regime in the last 15 years had been no more than agencies of control by the central government. Nor are they shocked by the prevalent ethos of personal dependence politics, and the preference of Egyptians for conspiracy over open political activity which requires a more public commitment to one's convictions. What has been sad and counterproductive for Egyptians themselves has been the perpetuation and further entrenchment of this political style, without any concern over legality, even if only as a formality. Above all, and most disastrously—I say disastrously because Egyptian society in the last 150 years had produced many talented, imaginative and courageous people—this style reflects the real stuff of Egyptian politics, which derives largely from

[1] All quoted excerpts from the testimony of the former Chief of Egyptian Intelligence, Ahmad Kamel, before the State Prosecutor in preparation for the trial of Ali Sabri and his fellow-conspirators last summer, and as published in *al-Nahar* of Beirut (September 1971), are my own free translation from the Arabic. The text itself is difficult for two main reasons. First, the witness moved often and rapidly from the neo-classical form of Arabic to the spoken vernacular dialect of Egypt. Second, he tended to jump from one episode to another without any regard for their chronological occurrence. Similarly, he referred to one person or another in disjointed fashion, and often repeated the same remarks about men and events in several consecutive interviews with the State Prosecutor's interrogator.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the character of the leaders of conspiratorial cabals who themselves are only superficially educated, intellectually shallow and lacking in any cultural depth. At the same time, these same people suffer from the more widely shared attributes of a tradition-bound, or value-oriented, society. The web of sycophancy, duplicity and mistrust therefore tended to spread itself over the governing groups of Egypt like a deleterious malignancy.

To what extent the text of Ahmad Kamel's testimony before the State Prosecutor last May, as published in Beirut's *al-Nahar* in September, is an authentic document one cannot say. Who released it and why, are even more difficult questions to answer. An internal analysis of the text, however, moves one to accept its authenticity.

ON 2 September 1971, *New Society* in London published my interpretation of the 13–14 May 1971 episode. At that time, I had not seen the text of Ahmad Kamel's testimony. The argument I put forward, however, that the crisis was the result of the confrontation between Nasser's *apparatchiks*, allied temporarily with Ali Sabri, and the new President Sadat over power is corroborated and strengthened by Ahmad Kamel's testimony. That testimony also substantiates the existence of overlapping security and intelligence organizations which sprang up during Nasser's rule. Moreover, it shows clearly what was always suspected: the fact that all political organizations and structures which were formed after 1953, or which emanated from such ideological formulations as the National Charter of May 1962, or the Political Reorganization Programme of 30 March 1968 were—and are—no more than additional venues and agencies of central political regimentation, coercion and control. They also have served, and continue to serve, as frameworks for the formation and operation of several intelligence and internal security services which are directed by different members of the governmental, or state, hierarchy and the lieutenants of the Head of State.

In these circumstances, several cabals of these lieutenants and other members of the state hierarchy arose. The relationship between their members appeared to be founded either on older comradeships and friendships, as, for example, among ex-army officers, or on family connexions, or both. Sami Sharaf, for example, Minister for Presidential Affairs, and General Muhammad Fawzi, Minister of Defence, are reportedly cousins on their mothers' sides; Muhammad Faiq, Minister of Information, and Ali Sabri are related by marriage; Amin Huweidi (former Chief of Public Security), Sharawi Gumaa (Minister of Interior), Ali Sabri and Sami Sharaf were close associates in the vast and varied political security services under President Nasser. Saad Zayid, a leading member of the 'secret vanguard organization committee' of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), is related by marriage to Sharawi Gumaa. Ahmad Shuheib, a minion and client of Sami Sharaf, was linked to the latter since his Military Academy days. Ahmad Kamel himself felt

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that he was somehow beholden to Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur, a leading member of the ASU Executive and Central Committees, who had been his instructor in the Military Academy.

Essentially, the crisis of 13–14 May arose from the confrontation between what one might call for the sake of convenience the Nasser Mafia and President Sadat over power. The question was: Who was to govern Egypt? This question never arose while Nasser was alive; for he was the sole ruler of the country. Scribes, paid conspirators, propaganda purveyors and court sycophants assisted him in the task. They inevitably also benefited from, if they did not share in, his power. But they did not challenge it, or question his right to govern.

When Nasser died, his Mafia assumed that his successor, Sadat, could be brought under their control. They believed they could govern effectively with him as their front man. When they discovered he was 'cagey, unpredictable and wished to follow his own line in domestic matters and external policies', they decided to act against him. And they failed, because the weakness of their conspiracy lay in the fact that there were too many chief conspirators with equally potent, and therefore conflicting, ambitions; they were plagued by mutual distrust and consequently unfirm, hesitant action.

This is how Ahmad Kamel described the situation at the time of President Nasser's sudden death in his testimony:

> They (the conspirators) did not find before them any candidate for the Presidency other than Anwar Sadat. . . . They, who were in positions of authority and controlled the country under Nasser's leadership: Sharawi, Sami, Fawzi, Amin Huweidi and Muhammad Faiq. In fact, this group could not find anyone to fill the vacuum left by the President's death other than Sadat. But on the understanding that he would fill the vacuum by cooperating with them. And by cooperation I mean that Sadat would not make a move without their approval. They had great respect for Ali Sabri, but they could not consider him for the Presidency because he was hated by the masses—and they knew that very well. There were rumours about Zakariyya Mohieddin, especially after the *Ahram* had published his photograph along with the obituary he had written of President Nasser. . . . But this group objected to him as President on the grounds that he was a strong personality and it would be very difficult to control him, or for him to allow himself to be led by them. They also were of the opinion that Husein Shafei was not fit to be President of the Republic. There was therefore no other possible candidate than Sadat. Moreover, circumstances were propitious and in his favour as he was already Vice-President of the Republic. . . . They helped in his election as President by making use of their vanguard special organization in the ASU. . . .

Who were 'they'? Ahmad Kamel identifies the cabal as consisting of Sami Sharaf, Sharawi Gumaa, Ali Sabri, Labib Shuqeir (at one time President of the National Assembly), Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur, Muham-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mad Fawzi, Muhammad Faiq, and their various 'agents', 'assistants', and generally 'men'. On the periphery, in favour of the conspiracy, were Amin Huweidi, one-time Chief of Public Security (*al-amn al-'amm*) and Minister of State, and Fathi Deeb of the Intelligence Services. 'In fact', Ahmad Kamel asserts, 'this group which existed in the days of the departed Chief, had already begun to impose themselves upon the country openly in an attempt to dominate the State after the election of Anwar Sadat to the Presidency'.

What was the conflict about? What were the conditions which brought about the confrontation between the Ali Sabri cabal and President Sadat? Clearly, the conflict was about power. Or, as Ahmad Kamel described it pithily, '*amaliyyat sira' 'ala'l-sulta*', 'an operation of a struggle for power'. 'They did not oppose the new President because they wished to follow a Nasserite policy, but in order to dominate the State.' Yet the pretexts and convenient contentious issues for it were mainly three: the proposed Federation of the Arab Republics of Libya, Syria and Egypt; the question of peace or war with Israel as outlined in the Rogers proposal for an interim settlement on the Canal and whether Egypt should accept this American initiative; and relations with the Soviet Union. There were, of course, in addition, several contentious areas of domestic policy which became more complex and difficult after the workers' and students' disturbances in 1968 and again in 1971.

Ahmad Kamel reports:

> When Sadat returned from abroad in March 1971, there was already sharp disagreement between him and Ali Sabri over the declaration of the new Federation. Ali Sabri felt it would be insulting and humiliating for Egypt. He urged his colleagues, Sharawi Gumaa, Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur, Labib Shuqeir and Dia' al-din Dawud to oppose it in the ASU Executive Committee.

It is interesting that Ahmad Kamel felt relations between Sabri and Sami Sharaf (apparently not a member of the ASU Executive Committee) were cool at that time, because 'Ali Sabri had asked Sami where Sadat was and Sami told him at the front, when in fact he was in Moscow'. Is this an indication that there was, from the beginning, a Sami Sharaf–Sharawi Gumaa alliance against Ali Sabri? 'Muhammad Faiq', Kamel adds, 'tried to reconcile the differences between them'.

The fateful meeting of the Executive Committee took place on 21 March. The decision against the Federation proposal was taken by four votes to three. Sadat did not attend the meeting. But he put the issue before the larger Central Committee where opposition to the Federation had spread. Gumaa, the Minister of Interior, wished for Sabri to remain quiet in the Central Committee, in order to avoid forcing Sadat to go to the 'people' in the National Assembly. Kamel goes on to say,

> From my secret information (as Chief of Intelligence, that is), I learned that on 23 March 1971 the group met at Gumaa's office, or his home (I could not determine exactly where) to plan for

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> political action (*al-taharruk*), and the stand they would take in the Central Committee. The plan was simple: they would try to prevent public opinion from becoming pro-Federation, create confusion, internal upheaval, and prepare for the ousting of Sadat. They felt they ought to postpone the decision over the Federation in the Central Committee and the Cabinet, especially when the National Assembly Speaker, Labib Shuqeir, had promised to send the matter to committee. Then they could mount a two-pronged attack through (a) their control of the political organization in the country, and (b) the armed forces.

The conspirators, therefore, according to Kamel, agreed to postpone the decision over the Federation in the Central Committee which was to meet on 25 March. Gumaa's assumption was that this would give them time to canvass members of the larger Central Committee for support. Some would be instructed to oppose the Federation, others to support it, and a third group to recommend postponement of the issue. Finally, they would insist on a vote in favour of postponement. Ali Sabri approved of the plan, but feared that pro-Federation votes (i.e. Sadat's friends) would carry the National Assembly, as they did in the meeting of 29 March.

Sabri was upset over this outcome, because his agent in the Assembly, Ahmad Shuheib, had promised better things there. Gumaa was also discomfited. At this point Sabri warned his fellow-conspirators that, according to Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur, Sadat would force them into a choice: 'Either he will ride them [dominate them], or they will have to arrest and imprison him'. Shortly thereafter, at the beginning of May, Sadat's decree, dismissing Sabri from his ASU office, was published. Sabri then expressed the view to Abul Nur that Sadat intended to purge all of them. Muhammad Faiq in the meantime communicated the view to the conspirators that the whole membership of the ASU was terrified. Sabri suggested that they should stir and move the trade unions and syndicates, which would, in any case, await his signal for action. He requested Faiq, the Minister of Information, to prepare public opinion for such an eventuality.

What is significant and shows that neither Sharawi Gumaa nor Sami Sharaf wished the success of Ali Sabri is the fact that, after a meeting they had with General Fawzi, they advised Sabri to await further reactions and developments. Were Sharaf and Gumaa ready, in the first week of May, to ditch Sabri in order to save their own positions?

> Sharawi also asked him [Sabri] to be patient and assured him they would move in his favour, and to have confidence in their strategy; that they would exploit his dismissal very well; that Abul Nur was to meet with them for that purpose, and that General Fawzi was annoyed and disgusted [with Sadat, that is] . . .

Sharaf and Gumaa, it appears, tried to give Sabri the impression that they were well on the way to implementing the plan of action they had all agreed upon.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rogers' visit to Cairo, however, put a damper on these plans, even though some ASU groups protested against Sabri's dismissal on principle. A few days later, in May, Sharawi Gumaa's dismissal surprised them all. It was this development, in part, which precipitated the mass resignation of his colleagues in the Nasser Mafia as a means of embarrassing Sadat and in the hope that it would lead to his downfall. 'At that point', Ahmad Kamel reports, 'Sharaf's office got in touch with me and asked me to resign too. I did not, however, until I learned that Mamduh Salem would be appointed Minister of Interior in place of Gumaa.'

It is interesting to note that the Mafia's man in the National Assembly, Labib Shuqeir, opposed the Federation scheme by arguing that it would be useless without the Sudan. Dia' al-din Dawud, one of the Left ideologues in the ASU, insisted that the proposal of the Federation must have the consent of the peoples of all the states concerned. Abul Nur felt confident that the army would arrest Sadat on orders from General Fawzi and that would end the matter there.

Essentially, the Mafia had agreed on a division of labour among them in mounting the show-down operation with Sadat. Ali Sabri was to use the ASU apparatus for agitprop (*al-tahrid*), and Sharawi Gumaa the apparatus of the Ministry of Interior security services for the execution of their plan (*al-tanfidh*). They were to do this not only in connexion with the Federation issue, but also regarding the so-called Egyptian peace initiative of February 1971 and the Rogers peace plan of the following spring, which recommended an interim agreement with Israel in Sinai and on the Canal. The postponement tactics in the ASU Executive and Central committees were meant to allow General Fawzi time to move with the army.

Ali Sabri objected initially to the Rogers peace plan in a meeting of the National Defence Council, a high-powered body chaired by the President and drawing its membership from senior and key cabinet ministers. He expressed the view that hostilities against Israel must be resumed regardless of whether the country was ready for them or not. After the meeting, he asked Sharawi, in his capacity as Minister of Interior, to foment public opinion against Sadat's peace initiative regarding an interim settlement with Israel.

> Whereas Sabri could work only in the ASU Executive Committee, Sharawi controlled a vast network in the cabinet, the ASU units in the cities and provinces and his own special security organization. Moreover, he managed to draw to his side, among junior and senior ministers, such people as Saad Zayid, Hilmi Said, Muhammad Faiq, and Muhammad Fawzi.
>
> The overall plan therefore in opposing Sadat over the Federation and peace initiative was to make full use of the state apparatus and political structures such as the ASU Executive and Central committees, the National Assembly and, through General Fawzi, the Army. The cadres of the special intelligence organization of the Minister of Interior headquartered in the old Revolutionary Council building, and consisting of no more than ten people each,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were to infiltrate and dominate the larger organizations. Men in them like Yusuf Uzuli, Ahmad Shuheib, Saad Zayid and Hilmi Said were trusted lieutenants of ministers like Sharaf and Gumaa.

To recapitulate then, neither Sabri nor any of his colleagues were necessarily opposed to the Federation or the peace initiative as matters of principle but solely in order to challenge Sadat. The conspiracy, according to Ahmad Kamel, began in earnest in early April and depended for its success on several pivotal forces, or elements:

(1) General Muhammad Fawzi, Minister of Defence, for the collaboration and/or loyalty of the Army;
(2) Sami Sharaf, Minister for Presidential Affairs, for the support of the elite Presidential Guard force;
(3) Sharawi Gumaa, Minister of Interior, for the use of his 'special security organizations', and 'because Gumaa and Sharaf always worked closely together';
(4) Muhammad Faiq, Minister of Information, for propaganda purposes;
(5) Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur, Secretary General of the ASU, for the organization of 'popular demonstrations' against Sadat and their utilization by Gumaa, the Minister of Interior;
(6) Hilmi Said and Saad Zayid, for the direction of the ASU 'special vanguard organizations', especially in the Cairo area.

The implementation of the plan began with pressure on Sadat in the Executive and Central Committees—the crisis of 21–23 March, and the planned week of postponement which was to give Fawzi and the Army time to plan their move. But when Abul Nur warned Sabri that Sadat was about to dismiss him before the Central Committee meetings of the 25th and 29th March Sabri precipitated the attack on Sadat. Yet instead of getting a postponement of the decision over the Federation, the Central Committee in its meeting of 29 March accepted Sadat's proposals, especially after the enthusiastic support for them in the National Assembly meeting on the same day.

When Sadat announced Sabri's dismissal on 2 May, the conspirators tried to rush the operation. They rang me up just before the National Defence Council was to meet that day to announce the postponement of the meeting by two hours (from seven to nine p.m.). Sharawi, Sami and Fawzi contacted Sabri and told him they would move by exploiting his dismissal. Then the Defence Council met to discuss the Rogers proposal. Riad (the Foreign Minister) left the meeting after that, but the conspirators met for an extra hour on their own. Sharawi raised the possibility of Sadat's dissolving the ASU, and they agreed to oppose him. If that did not force Sadat to change his mind, then they would all resign. Abul Nur suggested that he, Sharawi and Fawzi meet Sadat to dissuade him from dissolving the ASU. Then they would ask him to accompany them, at which time they would have him arrested.

Sabri waited until 4 May before formally submitting his resignation to Abul Nur, the General Secretary of the ASU. He assumed

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the latter would bring up the matter before the ASU Executive and Central committees. Abul Nur, however, hung on to the resignation. Meantime, Dia' al din Dawud was also dismissed from the ASU. Abul Nur reported Sabri's resignation at the Executive Committee meeting of 8 May. Sharawi visited Sabri in his home on 10 May and agreed on the tactic of their mass resignation, which they did on 13 May after they had met in Sharaf's home. At that point, Mamduh Salem, with a contingent of security forces, broke into the Ministry of Interior.

ALMOST interesting part of Kamel's testimony is what he says about himself and his role in the affair, as well as what he says about some of the main conspirators.

Ahmad Kamel graduated from the Military Academy in 1946. He remained on active duty until March 1964, when he had attained the rank of colonel. He had in the meantime attended Staff College in 1958. In 1964, he moved to the Office of the President of the Republic with the grade of 'Director General', but with no specified duties. While Husein Shafei was Secretary General of the ASU, he was seconded to work in that organization, where he spent three months without really doing any work.

> I returned to the office of the Presidency and presented myself to the Minister, Sami Sharaf. There had been no prior close relations between us. I asked him, 'Where will I be working?' Sami put me in his office. He was then Secretary to the President for Information. I remained there for six months without much to do.
>
> Then Sami sent me back to the ASU in charge of the 'Vanguard Organization'. This marked the beginning of my political work. Until that time I had not read anything about socialism. But when I had so little to do in the President's Office, I read. I was also happy in the Vanguard Organization in Heliopolis, because I had something to do. Early in 1965, I became secretary of the Vanguard Organization, whose overall chief was Sharawi Gumaa. The Heliopolis group, however, was headed by Sami, assisted by Ahmad Shuheib. In October 1965, I was appointed Governor of Assiut Province. After the June 1967 setback, in July, Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur was appointed Assistant Secretary General of the ASU, when Ali Sabri was removed from that post. I knew Abul Nur well, for he was my instructor and deputy CO of my company in the Military Academy. Our relationship continued, but was never a close one until he became Assistant Secretary General of the ASU. He told me he wanted me in the ASU, and asked me to take charge of the youth organization in it (*munazzamat al-shabab*) in place of Husein Kamel Bahaeddin. I then went to see Sami and asked him for time to think the matter over. A month later, I came to Cairo and went to see Sami. He told me the condition of youth was terrible, the regime and country were in danger, and he needed my support. I noticed he was crying (*wa basseit biyibki bid-dumu'*). I was really disturbed and told him I would take over the task of youth. Then I went to the office of Abul Nur in the ASU and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assumed my responsibilities for the Youth Organization. Of course my relations with Sami had become close during the years from 1964 to 1967. From Assiut, I used to send him directly my reports on matters pertaining to the province. Then on 1 August 1967, I was appointed Secretary for Youth (*amin al-shabab*), and to the ASU Secretariat as Minister of State, but with the salary of a vice-minister for a period of nine months. . . . During the student troubles in February 1968, and at the time when President Nasser announced his Political Reform Programme of 30 March 1968, Ali Sabri replaced Abul Nur in the ASU. . . . The Helwan workers' demonstrations were organized by the ASU. . . . On 7 May 1970 I was appointed Governor of Minia for a period of seven months until November 1970, when I was made Chief of Intelligence. . . .

. . . I do not know the real story behind my appointment as Chief of Intelligence. Sami Sharaf told me that he and Sharawi Gumaa nominated me and Anwar Sadat approved. But before that, during the reshuffling of the government, Sami had told me that I had been nominated for the Ministry of Youth; but then he said they had nominated me for Intelligence because General Hafez Ismail,[2] the previous Chief of Intelligence, was a sticky man (and he was our teacher) and they were unhappy with him; so they wished to remove him from Intelligence and therefore nominated me.

I had met Anwar Sadat only once, on 26 April 1971 at 9 p.m., after a meeting of the ASU Central Committee, in his home. He told me then that he planned certain changes in the country's political organization, but not exactly what kind of changes. I replied that it was the appropriate time to do so, since he had to give priority to the battle (i.e. the Arab-Israel conflict), and that opinion in the Army was opposed to a federation with Syria, because between us and the Syrians there was an outstanding feud, meaning by that the secession from the UAR of September 1961. I explained that the movement of troops into Syria to quell any move against the Baathi regime there under the Federation treaty would mean destroying the Nasserites in Syria (i.e. the pro-Egyptian elements) if they ever moved against their own Baathi regime. Finally, I informed him that opinion in the Army was opposed to federation with Libya at a time when the Libyans were treating Egyptians badly. Sadat responded to my first point by saying that we must improve our relations with Syria; to the second by asserting that troops would not move into Syria, since only Libya is intended by that arrangement in the contingency plans. Moreover, he assured me that he would protect the Nasserites in Syria under all circumstances. As for Libya, he told me it was Kadhafi who asked for union in order to strengthen his revolutionary regime at home. I urged Sadat to explain this situation to the Army; and to tell them he prefers to give first priority to the 'battle' (i.e. against Israel) and leave the matter of the domestic situation until later. . . .

2 One-time Egyptian Ambassador in London, currently Adviser to President Sadat on National Security.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Was Ahmad Kamel advising Sadat and proposing a course of action on the instructions of Sharaf, Gumaa and their group? For Ahmad Kamel proceeds to say,

> After my meeting with Sadat I went and reported to Abul Nur, and then to Sami Sharaf in Qubba, where I found Sharawi there too. Their comment was: 'We wish he would listen to you, because you are right; but he [Sadat] will do as he likes.' This was about 11 p.m. on 26 April 1971. And it was the only time I met Sadat until 13 May 1971 when Muhammad Said of Sharaf's office rang me at 9.30 p.m. to tell me to resign. By then, Mamduh Salem was at Sadat's side, and Sharawi Gumaa had been sacked. . . .

At one stage in his testimony, Ahmad Kamel described the clique (*shilla*) of Sami Sharaf. Among its members, he singles out Ahmad Shuheib, a member of the National Assembly, Chairman of the Board of the state-owned Cotton Company, and the man responsible for the special Vanguard Organization cell for the Eastern region of Cairo. Another member was Mustafa Fahmi Suleiman, Chairman of the Board of the nationalized department stores, Seidnawi Company. There was also Fathallah Rifaat, Vice-Chairman of the Board of the *Bank al-Taslif* (State Credit Bank); Khalid Fawzi, Chamberlain of the Presidency of the Republic; Mustafa Kamil Murad, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly and President of the Federation of Cotton Exporters; and Gamal Nazim, a vice-minister in the Ministry of Youth. This group met frequently, and Ahmad Kamel asserts,

> The Vanguard Organization always worked on instructions; it never did anything without instructions . . . everything was sent down from above; nothing ever went up from below. Nor did important matters ever get discussed seriously. The Organization merely followed instructions. The man who issued the directives and instructions was Sharawi Gumaa with the approval of Sami Sharaf. . . .

As for the practice and style of operations of the Nasser Mafia, Ahmad Kamel reports that when they discussed the matter of Nasser's successor, they agreed to nominate Sadat and issued instructions for his support. They assumed they could control and manipulate him in such a way as to remain the rulers of the country in fact. He explains further,

> Sami really was only interested in having some influence and power, nothing much more. After the death of Nasser, Sharawi dominated him, and convinced him they could govern the country together. . . . Neither of them, however, was concerned about the public interest. . . .
>
> . . . I had observed that very early in the National Defence Council discussions of Sadat's peace initiative statement of 4 February 1971, no definite conclusions or final agreement were reached. Soon after that, Sabri began to organize opposition to Sadat, and then followed the issue of the Federation and the resulting confrontation. . . .

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> . . . Certain cadre members of the Special ASU organisation (e.g. Dr Muhammad Dakruri, Yusuf Makawi, Ahmad Abd al-Akhar, Mahmud Othman) objected to the move against Sadat without their being consulted. But Sharawi retorted, 'I taught you politics'.

In an interesting aside, during his testimony, which illustrates in part the position of Muhammad Hasanein Heikal, Chief Editor of the *Ahram*, Ahmad Kamel reports that he told Sadat in discussing the elaboration of policy for public consumption, 'And I told him regarding domestic public opinion, a leading article by Heikal can take care of the whole matter.'

As Chief of Intelligence, Ahmad Kamel suggests in his testimony he knew that Sadat was about to dismiss Ali Sabri. He even confirms,

> I told Sami and Sami told Abul Nur who, in turn, informed Sharawi. . . . These two (Sharawi and Sharaf, that is) are extremely devious and diabolical. They adopt obscure means and indirect ways for the attainment of their objectives. These attributes characterized even their personal dealings and their relations with their staff, and this is the result of their close connexion with one another over a long period of time.
>
> . . . Both of them denied to Ali Sabri they knew anything about his imminent dismissal.

Ahmad Kamel asserts that as Chief of Intelligence,

> and in accordance with my duties, I had to inform Sami of Sabri's imminent dismissal. It was natural that Sami would tell Sharawi because, as I have already explained, these two never kept anything from each other and were always acting together.

Yet one must ask here, did they tell one another everything? Did they really trust each other? The burden of Ahmad Kamel's testimony seems to point to widespread mistrust and deviousness among colleagues in the top echelons of the Nasser regime hierarchy.

THROUGHOUT his testimony, Ahmad Kamel makes it clear that the Mafia wanted to resume hostilities with Israel and involve the Russians. They believed people would not rebel against an ill-considered resumption of hostilities because they felt they controlled the sinews of power.

> The Russians, in the opinion of Ali Sabri, could not possibly abandon the Egyptians to their fate. It was therefore imperative to involve them in the battle so that they would support us in it. . . . Partial victory would confirm the Mafia in power; defeat would be blamed on Sadat in his capacity as President. . . . There was absolutely no thought for the public interest. . . . The principal aim was for them to remain in control of authority, to retain their absolute influence over the President and, if he were to disagree with them, they were prepared to depose him. . . . They argued that if they clashed with the President, the Army would intervene to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> remove him, while politically the ASU organizations would support them. They, moreover, assumed the Army was on their side because of the presence of General Fawzi as Minister of War.

Ahmad Kamel also reports that in the crucial days of the confrontation, the Executive Committee of the National Defence Council, consisting of Gumaa, Sharaf, Fawzi, Abul Nur, Mahmud Riad, Muhammed Faiq and himself (Ahmad Kamel), met daily. Furthermore, the Sharaf-Gumaa Mafia was equally hated by the Army and the population at large: they were known as 'the five who governed'.

Sharawi Gumaa, Ahmad Kamel contends, was of the opinion that in the show-down with Sadat, the Army could be used and a Presidential Council set up from among the members of the ASU Executive Committee, with General Fawzi as President.

Regular meetings of the secretariat of the Special Vanguard Organization of the ASU used to meet in Sharawi Gumaa's office. The core members of these meetings consisted of Sharawi Gumaa, Hilmi Said, Saad Zayid, Muhammad Faiq, Sami Sharaf, Ahmad Shuheib (who was Sami's man), Yusuf Uzuli, Muhammad Aruq (of the Voice of the Arabs), Mahmud Amin al-Alem, a leftist intellectual, and Ahmad Kamel himself. Asaad Khalil acted as secretary to this group. According to Ahmad Kamel, Sharawi Gumaa frequently argued, before this group, that Sadat was 'placating the Americans' (*byigari al-amrikan*), even though they (the Americans, that is) would not 'help us solve the problem' (i.e. the conflict with Israel). Sharawi obviously knew that Sadat planned to reshuffle the leadership of all political organizations in the country, including the membership of the ASU Executive and Central committees.

> Zayid argued that they should remove Sadat. Sami objected, not so much to the idea, as the style. Mahmud al-Alem wanted them to build an underground organization, Communist style. Faiq was ready to use the broadcasting services. I (Ahmad Kamel) suggested they should exploit the visits of Sadat to Damanhur and Alexandria. I told them I would be prepared to use my boys (agents) in the student unions.

Is that perhaps one of the ways in which Mamduh Salem, Governor of Alexandria, got wind of the conspiracy, through his own agents among the student unions?

Elsewhere in his testimony, Ahmad Kamel states that, in regard to the Rogers visit, Sharawi Gumaa told Sadat on 2 May 1971 that Sabri's dismissal was inopportune, for it would appear as a gift to the Americans. After this meeting, Sharawi is reported by Kamel to have said of Sadat, 'this man will drive us mad with his million opinions'. Sharawi too feared Sadat's dissolution of the ASU, and suspected that the President had the support of the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, and the Chief Editor of *al-Ahram*, Muhammad Hasanein Heikal. In the National Defence Council and the ASU, Sharawi suspected that

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sadat could count on the support of Yusuf Makkawi, Muhammad Dakruri, Ahmad Abd al-Akhar and Muhmud Othman. These, Sharawi and his Mafia felt, were 'sons of dogs' (*awlad kalb*); and 'this was their view of anyone who did not follow their orders', adds Ahmad Kamel, because the country 'was governed by five men, and these were Sharawi Gumaa, Sami Sharaf, Muhammad Fawzi, Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur, and Muhammad Faiq'.

Ahmad Kamel further suggests that when Sadat told Sharawi he intended to change the top ASU leadership because 'those in it were Ali Sabri's men', a sub-committee was formed after 12 May 1971 to organize the coup. It consisted of Ahmad Shuheib, Yusuf Uzuli, Muhammad Aruq, and Mahmud al-Alem. The sub-committee had basically two tasks: one of them consisted of drafting Riad's and Sadat's speeches in connexion with the peace initiative, the question of war and peace with Israel and relations with the Soviet Union. The other was to study ways and means of utilizing the Special Vanguard Organization of the ASU in the confrontation with Sadat, in case he decided to dissolve the ASU. Ahmad Kamel himself, as Chief of Intelligence, was to use his student agents in Alexandria, namely, Ismail Saad and Ahmad Abd al-Wahhab. The latter, however, reported to Ahmad Kamel that things were not going well in Alexandria, because of Mamduh Salem's countermeasures. Amin Huweidi and Fathi Deeb (old intelligence hands) were in on these deliberations and plans, mainly because they were unemployed at that time.

> In fact this group, or clique, existed in the days of the departed Leader [Nasser]. It began to impose itself openly and attempted to control the regime after the election of Anwar Sadat.

After the Voice of the Arabs had broadcast the mass resignation of members of the Mafia on 13 May 1971, this group managed in fact to organize some demonstrations.

Throughout his testimony and whenever he was asked by the State Prosecutor's interrogator how he had come by the details of his information, Ahmad Kamel admitted he had taped most telephone conversations between members of the Mafia and especially those between Sami Sharaf and Sharawi Gumaa. It is also on the basis of his secret methods of gathering information that he asserted at a certain stage of his interrogation that Labib Shuqeir of the National Assembly was 'an opportunist who suddenly attained a prominent position in the ASU Executive and Central committees'; that Dia' al-din Dawud 'took the line of Ali Sabri'; that Abdel Muhsin Abul Nur and Saad Zayid 'openly suggested in at least two meetings of the Mafia, on 2 May and 12 May respectively, the forcible removal of President Sadat'.

One of the greatest difficulties faced by the conspirators arose from the fact that although Sadat informed them he intended to dissolve the ASU, he never gave them an indication of the time. Ahmad Kamel thus concludes by saying,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> There was no zero hour or particular timing for the planned coup. The timing depended on the behaviour of Sadat with respect to the dissolution of the ASU.

Sadat, however, dismissed certain key members of the Mafia first, confident of the support of his two key back-up men: Mamduh Salem of Alexandria in the police and security services, and General Muhammad Sadeq in the Army.

THE year 1971 was proclaimed by President Sadat 'the year of decision'. His intention was for Egypt to make the irrevocable choice between war and peace with Israel. His proclamation, however, was ill-considered for several reasons. At home, Sadat's position had been weakened by the May 1971 upheavals, for in one sweep he had eliminated all of the security apparatus edifice which had been constructed under Nasser's rule. Sadat was forced to do this before he had had the time to construct his own elaborate security structures. To this extent, his triumph over his rivals left him exposed to the stresses and strains of domestic political difficulties. Labour unrest was followed by student disturbances.

The reconstitution of the government under the premiership of Aziz Sidqi was, in part, a way of sorting out the aftermath of the May 1971 episode. But that episode had also strained Egypt's relations with her superpower patron, the Soviet Union. The deterioration of these relations was further promoted by Sadat's dealings with the Americans over the possibility of an interim agreement with Israel regarding the Suez Canal. The Russians had already reprimanded Sadat once about his American links when he visited Moscow in early October 1971, sharply reminding him of the fresh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between them and Egypt. The bloody repression of the communists in the Sudan in August that year and Sadat's association with Numairi further poisoned and embittered these relations.

The muddle into which Sadat had got himself and Egypt by January 1972 was thick. He seemed to try his predecessor's favourite juggling act without Nasser's dexterity: a belligerent, or militant, stand against Israel at home; a peaceful and reasonable approach to the West in the hope that the Americans would succeed in pulling the Egyptian chestnuts out of the fire—that is, prevailing upon Israel to withdraw from the Canal on terms favourable to Egypt; and a demand for greater military support from his ally, the Soviet Union, to counter Israeli military power.

The first part of the juggling act was perhaps the most dangerous for Sadat. Having eliminated the Nasser Mafia, he allowed an inevitable amount of debunking of the Nasser regime, if not, in fact, of his illustrious predecessor himself, while at the same time promising the Egyptians a programme of political liberalization. By December 1971, after the trial and sentencing of the anti-Sadat conspirators, certain

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sectors of the urban population, particularly the students (whether instigated by other elements or not is a moot point), no longer believed the regime's declarations of intent. Whereas Nasser's credibility gap had widened dangerously after 9 June 1967, Sadat's acquired the proportions of an abyss. The indeterminate official statement of the regime on Tuesday, 28 December 1971, regarding peace or war with Israel, was not made by Sadat, but by the ASU as a body. In it, the government claimed that the decision to fight was final and irrevocable; but it argued that the precise date for the resumption of hostilities would depend on certain crucial factors. There was, for instance, the difficulty arising from the fact that sister Arab states were not ready and/or willing to countenance war against Israel; there was the question of the kind and degree of assistance the patron superpower was prepared to extend to Egypt in case of war.

The student demonstrators who demanded a clear decision from the government were suppressed after Sadat's 'fog' speech, pleading the intervention of the Indo-Pakistan war which had monopolized the attention of the Soviet Union. The promise that a date for the resumption of hostilities against Israel would be set after talks with the Kremlin leaders has not been fulfilled. Sadat's latest visit to Moscow established that the Soviet leaders were not prepared to underwrite an Egyptian crossing of the Canal. At the same time, they were loath to accept any agreement between Egypt and Israel fathered, or god-fathered, by the Americans. It was also clear that the involvement in Egypt was creating difficulties for the Russians. Seen from the perspective and in the context of events in the Asian subcontinent, those of Soviet-US and Soviet-Chinese relations, Egypt, if not the Middle East region as a whole, was temporarily relegated to a lower point in the Russian order of priorities.

All the Russians have appeared willing to do for Egypt—and Sadat—for the time being has been to increase their military assistance on their own terms and for their own purposes. Such assistance is not intended to provide Egypt with the capability of resuming hostilities against Israel, but to serve as a Russian bargaining counter to the American delivery of more aircraft to Israel when President Nixon visits Moscow in May 1972.

FROM the episode of May 1971 and Sadat's first year in office one can observe, with caution, certain political trends in Egypt. It is clear, for instance, that Sadat must continue to govern on the pattern of his predecessor, but without Nasser's charismatic and other advantages. Having moved closer to the officially conservative Muslim regimes of the area—Libya, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia—Egypt must forego temporarily the competition for the leadership of so-called radical movements and regimes in the Middle East. Both of these trends present domestic difficulties for the regime in so far as the generation of Egyptians—army officers and civilians—who were weaned on the Nasser and post-Nasser

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extravagant promises and the inflated potential of the relationship with the Soviet Union is concerned. The regime itself is not strong enough, nor is its superpower patron willing, to resolve the conflict with Israel one way or the other. Although until now the unsavoury characteristics of the regime exposed by episodes like the one briefly illustrated here have pushed some sections of the Egyptian public to demand war against Israel, the very inability of the regime and weakness of the society itself to engage in it, as well as the patron superpower's unwillingness to fight it for them, may, ironically, lead Egypt, whether under the present or a future regime, to opt for a negotiated settlement with Israel.

The effects, however, of the difficulties encountered by Sadat during his first year in office, and the way in which he tried to deal with them, on Egyptian domestic politics and on Egypt's conduct of foreign policy could be more lasting. While there is an element of conspiracy in politics everywhere, one has the impression that in regimes like the one established in Egypt by Nasser, which are characterized by the monopoly of national leadership and the unlimited and non-accountable nature of public power, conspiracy tends to replace commonly understood political activity. By its nature, conspiracy breeds mistrust: mistrust undermines men and policies: in fact, all public endeavour. Above all, it corrupts men and institutions, and engenders a malaise best described as one of *immobilisme*. Lesser men abjectly solicit those considered close to authority, and the latter, in turn, sycophantically court the despot and seek the benefits of his favour. In the absence of impersonal institutions which provide the framework of political life, the regimes of soldiers-turned-presidents have reduced politics to the conspiracies of the sultan's men.

It would be accurate, though somewhat cynical and defeatist, to say that all of this is very much in the tradition of rule in Egypt since time immemorial. The Mamluk legacy of 500 years in particular rendered this political style a permanent feature of the country's history. To deplore it, one can argue, is to judge Egyptian politics by irrelevant criteria, which are inspired by non-Egyptian conceptions. Yet Egypt has experienced, albeit briefly, serious attempts at breaking away from this more traditional and commonplace political morass.

The episode of 13–14 May 1971 had been wildly interpreted by observers outside Egypt. Some suspected it was an American-inspired operation to strengthen Sadat's position. Others argued it was an attempt to grab power by Russia's 'men' in alliance with the Egyptian Left. It is difficult, in the face of Ahmad Kamel's testimony, and of what we already know of the patterns of rule and political behaviour in Egypt, to accept either of these interpretations. This is not to disregard, or deny, the respective interest of the superpowers in seeing their own 'men' in power. What can be asserted is that such an arrangement is superfluous, because it is unnecessary, in the case of the Soviet Union, currently the dominant superpower in Cairo. Its massive military,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic, and technological presence in the country is a fact. Yet the Soviets have had no political control over the troika of state power: the army, the security and intelligence services, and the bureaucracy. And I contend that they do not need to. For so long as the nature of power and pattern of rule—and, significantly, the Egyptian's perception of them—remains what it has been over the last 20 years, the Russians need have influence over and immediate access to only the President of Egypt. After all, despite the upheaval of 13–14 May, the victorious President Sadat felt obliged to reaffirm immediately Egypt's attachment to the USSR, her need of Soviet assistance, and her undying loyalty and friendship to her patron power. Sadat felt the need immediately to explain and justify his actions to the Soviet rulers. The latter, in turn, felt wholly justified in expecting Egypt to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Although the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union may be to help establish a communist regime in Egypt, given its present relationship with that country, the objective is not, for the moment, important. It is immaterial to the Russians who the ruler on the Nile is and what he does with his rivals for power at home, so long as he can maintain his personal rule and, at the same time, preserve Egypt's relationship with the Kremlin.

POLITIQUE ETRANGERE

La grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

(37è année) No. 1—1972

Jean CHAUVEL	La Chine et les Nations Unies
Marianne BASTID	La Chine après la révolution culturelle
Pierre GALLOIS	1967–1972
Vassil VASSILEV	La politique d'intégration économique en Europe de l'Est
Friedrich-Wilhelm FERNAU	L'Eglise orientale et son prochain concile
Denis BURNOUF	La situation en Turquie après les interventions du Haut-Commandement dans les affaires publiques
Jacques SIRE	La frange des Carthaginois

Le numéro: F. 9.–

Prix de l'abonnement:

France: ..... 48.–F.

Etranger: ..... 64.–F.

CENTRE D'ETUDES DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE

54, rue de Varenne, Paris 7°

C.C.P. : PARIS 1865-41

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Solzhenitsyn and the Nobel Prize

Per Egil Hegge*

[*The increased campaign against Solzhenitsyn led to a cancellation of the visit by the representative of the Nobel Prize Committee, the Secretary of the Swedish Academy, Dr Karl Ragnar Gierow, who was to confer the prize on Solzhenitsyn at a private ceremony in Moscow. However, he was refused a visa and the ceremony did not take place. Earlier Solzhenitsyn disclosed in an interview given to the correspondents of* The New York Times *and of* The Washington Post (*published on 3 April 1972*) *that he is not only subject to constant chicaneries and persecution but that he is afraid that some more drastic steps may be taken against him. The escalation of the charges against him in what is obviously a concerted campaign confirms these fears.*

We publish below the information provided by Per Egil Hegge about the earlier phase of Solzhenitsyn's continuing Nobel Prize story.]

First Inquiries

It was in June 1970 that I first attempted to make contact with Alexander Solzhenitsyn's circle—a tight circle, whose members have always been as much concerned for his protection as for their own, and who have therefore never been particularly anxious to have dealings with foreigners.

I knew of the wariness of this circle and assumed that there was not the slightest chance of meeting Solzhenitsyn, still less of securing an interview, unless he should receive the Nobel Prize for Literature that autumn. I accordingly asked one of his friends whether Solzhenitsyn would be prepared to grant an interview to Scandinavian journalists in the event of his winning the prize . . . I eventually received an answer, through channels which I am unable to disclose, to the effect that, in that event, he might possibly allow himself to be interviewed. And there the matter rested.

I was later to learn that my enquiry had aroused enormous interest in that small, closed circle. In the spring of 1970 the Swedish Academy had made very discreet enquiries among these same friends to discover whether the award would make his position more vulnerable than it already was. Thus they knew that there was some possibility. And their reply to the Swedish initiative had been unequivocal: he would be in a stronger position with the prize than without it. . . .

* These are extracts from the book *Go-Between in Moscow* (*Mellommann i Moskva*), J. W. Cappelens Forlag (Oslo, 1971). They are published here with the kind permission of the author.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Phone-Call to Solzhenitsyn

In late September and early October I talked to one or two people who knew Solzhenitsyn and learnt that the imminent Nobel announcement had brought the excitement of his closest friends to fever-pitch. At that time it had been made known that the decision would be announced on 22 October, and throughout September Swedish newspapers applied considerable pressure to the Academy, demanding that the prize should go to Solzhenitsyn. This was evidently what caused the Academy to announce on 7 October that their decision would be made public the following day.

That very evening I sought out one of Solzhenitsyn's acquaintances, making sure as usual that no one followed me there. . . . I interpreted this acceleration of the Stockholm announcement as an indication that Solzhenitsyn was *not* this year's winner, that the Swedish Academy wished to escape from the pressure of public opinion, and, moreover, to spare the candidate any unnecessary suspense in his present, rather exposed situation.

We agreed that I would in any case ring a friend of his the following day to tell him who had won the prize, whether or not it was Solzhenitsyn. I expected to hear the decision a few minutes after it was made known in Stockholm and promised to ring at about five past three in the afternoon. UPI, the American telegraphic agency, has its offices in the building where I was then living, and a piece of news like this is transmitted as an urgent bulletin the moment it becomes available.

That afternoon a handful of colleagues and I were gathered round the teleprinter up in the UPI office. At a few minutes past three transmission was interrupted and the words 'Stockholm—Flash—' were tapped out onto the paper, followed by: 'Nobel prize to Russian writer Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn.' It promised to be a lively and difficult evening.

Together with four or five colleagues I went downstairs to my apartment and called up Solzhenitsyn's friend. At first he could not grasp what I was saying, but at last this gave way to jubilation. My colleagues and I sat down to wait. . . .

At about 3.45 the telephone rang. It was my acquaintance once again. He sounded extremely agitated. 'I've spoken to him and told him he's won the Nobel prize, but he won't believe it. Could you please ring him and tell him it's true. He'll believe you.'

So I was given a phone number and was told that a lady would answer the phone. I should then ask to speak to 'the neighbour', and Solzhenitsyn would come to the phone. I was also asked to speak loudly as he was living out of town and the line was bad. . . .

I dialled the number. A woman answered, sounding very busy, and I asked if I might speak to 'the neighbour'. I subsequently learnt, from someone who will figure again in this story, that I was the fourth person to ring. The three previous callers were friends who had heard the news

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from foreign radio broadcasts. However, Solzhenitsyn himself had somehow become convinced that this year's winner was to be announced on 17 October, the day he had planned to finish his new novel, *August 1914*. Hence he refused to believe them. . . .

Almost a minute went by before another person took the receiver.

'Alexander Isayevich?' I asked.

'Yes.'

I introduced myself as a correspondent for *Svenska Dagbladet* and said: 'May I congratulate you on winning the Nobel Prize for Literature?'

'Where did you get this information from?' He sounded almost irritated, and I was told later that he had had so many phone-calls that day that he had not been able to get very much work done on his novel.

I replied that the Swedish Academy had officially announced the news in Stockholm 45 minutes before. There was no reaction.

I then asked if he had any comment to make.

'I am not prepared to give interviews. But I should like you to convey my thanks to the Swedish Academy privately. I repeat—privately.'

'I can do that, of course, but can't I write in the paper that you are grateful for the award?'

'No, I want you to convey my thanks to the Swedish Academy privately.'

'But Alexander Isayevich, that's not really good enough for us. You must realize that the whole world is interested in your reaction.'

There was a moment's silence. Then he said: 'All right, I'll dictate a statement to you, but only on condition that it is quoted exactly word for word. I intensely dislike being misquoted.'

'Agreed.'

He then dictated: 'I am grateful for the award. I accept the prize. I intend to come and receive it on the traditional day in so far as this depends on me. I am in good health. The state of my health is no obstacle to my making the trip.

[*Solzhenitsyn promised to call Hegge should he have anything further to say.*]

The 'Celebration'

One of the things I asked the Nobel prize-winner was whether he proposed to celebrate the occasion, and he replied somewhat hesitantly that he did. I later discovered what form this celebration had taken.

One of his friends went straight down to the Tchaikovsky Conservatory, found Rostropovich and told him the news. Rostropovich was giving a cello-class at the time, but he jubilantly sent his pupils home and drove out to his dacha. Meanwhile, Solzhenitsyn had gone back to his writing-place, in a little cottage a short distance from the main building. Once again he was annoyed at being disturbed, but Rostropovich made

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him come out and receive their congratulations. Solzhenitsyn asked those grouped about him: 'Who was it who sold the journalist my phone number?'

However, he did not sound really irritated and let them persuade him to come over to the main house a little later on, after Rostropovich had prepared some coleslaw and a drop of punch. The world-famous cellist proposed a toast and made a short speech, and a reluctant Solzhenitsyn was prevailed upon to read a chapter from his new novel, *August 1914*. Thereupon he excused himself, retired to his writing-place, and went on working as usual through till midnight, presumably trying to make up for the time unavoidably lost on this day full of interruptions and distractions. He had planned to have *August 1914* completed in October. His work schedule is planned out far in advance in minute detail, and he refuses to tolerate any disturbance whatsoever when his work is in progress. . . .

The Decision Not to Go to Stockholm

Two weeks after the Swedish Academy had announced its decision I was back in Oslo for a thorough medical examination, as I had been troubled for quite some time by attacks of dizziness. On the way back to Moscow I talked to a number of people in Stockholm about the preparations for the Nobel ceremony. Naturally, they were chiefly interested in knowing whether Solzhenitsyn would be coming. They had a fairly good idea of the considerable difficulties he would encounter in attempting to obtain an exit and re-entry visa.

Now there was no real doubt that he would be allowed to travel *out* of the country. When he was expelled from the Writers' Union, *Literary Gazette* wrote that he was more than welcome to settle abroad, where his slanderous writings were so highly valued. He did not deign even to reply to this suggestion, and in Moscow no one, not even foreigners, really believed that he would ever leave his homeland of his own accord. . . . It was not until 27 November, 13 days before the Nobel ceremony, that Solzhenitsyn announced his decision not to go to Stockholm. I am convinced that he made up his mind not later than 25 October, less than three weeks after saying that he would go.

The men who persuaded him to remain at home were one of his closest friends, whom I shall not name here, and the physicist, Andrei Sakharov, who 'worked on him' one weekend out at Rostropovich's dacha. This happened either on 17–18 October, or on 24–25 October. They persuaded him that Russia needed him more than did the Swedes, and that the danger that he would not be allowed back was too great to risk. He yielded to these arguments. . . .

Negotiations with the Swedish Embassy

I was strengthened in my belief that Solzhenitsyn would not go to Stockholm when, on 28 October, I was contacted by a man to whom I

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shall refer as Ivanov. This is the commonest of names, whereas he is the rarest of men, and I may well write more about him on another occasion. He had, and probably still has, good contacts with Solzhenitsyn's circle of friends.

Ivanov told me that Solzhenitsyn wished to visit the Swedish Embassy at the end of November, to arrange for his Swedish entry visa, or else to advise them that the trip had come to nothing, as the case might be. The novelist would have liked to come on Friday, 27 November and wanted a card inviting him to come for a talk on that day. This was to avoid the risk of being stopped by a police guard outside the building. Ivanov asked me to inform the Embassy of this request.

I explained to him that there were no policemen posted outside the offices of the Swedish Embassy and hence no written invitation would be required. He replied that it was quite conceivable that the authorities would station a policeman there as the day of the ceremony, 10 December, approached, and that was why Solzhenitsyn wanted an invitation. . . .

At the same time Ivanov told me that Solzhenitsyn wished to meet me on 20 November and he named the time and place. I immediately asked whether there was any chance of an interview. Ivanov replied that, while this was not out of the question, he doubted whether Solzhenitsyn would be interested in giving his views at this meeting. At this point I felt obliged to tell Ivanov that I was a far from suitable choice as go-between since I have neither the inclination nor the training appropriate for diplomacy. This was especially so where the Swedish Embassy in Moscow was involved. . . . [*Hegge recounts two incidents which might have made him unpopular with the staff of the Swedish Embassy.*] He merely replied that neither he nor Solzhenitsyn had any other means of making the enquiry, and that he would be grateful if it were done. Nor could Ivanov see that delivering an enquiry like this would require any diplomatic talents. Thereupon I agreed to do it.

At the same time Ivanov asked me while I was there to find out whether there was any possibility that Solzhenitsyn might be allowed to receive the award at the Embassy, should it prove impossible for him to go to Stockholm. This I promised to do.

I then wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Swedish Academy, Dr Karl-Ragnar Gierow, informing him, as Ivanov had said to do, that on 27 October Solzhenitsyn had received the letter and other materials which the Academy had sent to him on 10 October. Since the Academy only had his old address in Ryazan, the letter had gone there first before being redirected. . . . I also advised Dr Gierow that the prize-winner had asked to be received at the Swedish Embassy on 27 November, and that he wished to enquire into the possibility of the presentation being made there should the Stockholm trip prove impossible. I drew no conclusions in the letter, which I delivered to the Swedish Embassy in a sealed envelope with the request that it be taken out by a member of a group of Swedes who happened to be visiting Moscow just at that time. . . .

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On 2 November I had a talk with A., one of the Swedish diplomats in Moscow. Like all confidential talks in Moscow our conversation took place as we strolled through the streets. . . . I informed A. of my talk with Ivanov and passed on Solzhenitsyn's request for an invitation to visit the Embassy at 12 noon on 27 November. I also told him of Solzhenitsyn's desire to explore the possibility of a presentation ceremony being held in the Swedish Embassy.

A. replied that he would have to put these requests to the Foreign Office in Stockholm. He emphasized that he would need to do this in such a way that the Foreign Office would not conclude that the Embassy itself had made contact with Solzhenitsyn. I was astounded to hear this, but tried to conceal my feelings as best I could. By then I already had the impression that the Embassy did not want to act as intermediary in any capacity. I likewise knew that the Swedish Academy had sent the Embassy copies of the official materials intended for the prize-winner. These were duplicates of the materials he had, in fact, already received on 27 October. An Embassy official, B., with whom I discussed this, made it abundantly clear that the Embassy could not arrange for them to be delivered to Solzhenitsyn as this did not lie within its competence. The copies remained at the Embassy.

A. said that, in his personal opinion, it would be difficult for the Embassy to arrange any kind of ceremony for the Nobel prize-winner. ' After all, we are here to maintain good relations with the Soviet authorities, and a ceremony in honour of a writer whose award is not only being criticized, but criticized with the obvious approval of the authorities—that presents difficulties ', he said.

While assuring him that I realized this, I pointed out that, since the prize was presented in Stockholm by the King, it must be possible for it to be presented in Moscow by the King's personal representative, the ambassador.

But what staggered me most of all was when A. returned my letter to Dr Gierow, saying that it had not after all been possible to send it out with one of the Swedes, who had departed some days previously. I was extremely annoyed at this, but did not let my feelings show. . . . Later I did succeed in sending the letter out.

On 5 November I had a phone-call from A. asking me to come down to the Embassy. We went for another walk, during which he told me that the Embassy could not invite Solzhenitsyn to come; that is, they could *not* give him the written invitation he had asked for. However, should he still wish to come on the date and at the time he had indicated, that would be in order. A. added that a presentation ceremony at the Embassy would not be possible, and he repeated that the Embassy's task was to maintain good relations with the local authorities. He made it clear that this decision emanated from Stockholm and asked me to inform Solzhenitsyn—or rather, Ivanov—of this.

I promised to do so and said that I would very likely be meeting Ivanov the following week. I also told him that, in my own opinion, he

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ought to draw the attention of the Foreign Office in Stockholm to two points: firstly, it was possible that this refusal would embitter Solzhenitsyn and that he would not come to the Embassy; secondly, the Swedish Government ought to be prepared to defend its action in case it became known. . . . In addition I reminded him that, five years before, Ambassador Jarring had not only congratulated that year's Nobel prize-winner, Mikhail Sholokhov, but had invited him to the Embassy, and A. could doubtless imagine how the conduct of the Swedish authorities in 1970 would appear by comparison.

A. said that he quite realized that it didn't look 'particularly heroic', but he repeated that the first duty of the Embassy was to preserve the good relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. . . .

I did not know, and still do not know, the best way to go about telling a winner of the Nobel Prize that he is just a private person and cannot be invited to the Swedish Embassy because the Embassy wishes to maintain the good relations between two states. Perhaps I should have asked. I refrained from doing so, but was not looking forward to my meeting with Solzhenitsyn. . . .

[*At a meeting with C., another Embassy official, Hegge was rebuked for allegedly suggesting that the Embassy was 'afraid' to make contact with Solzhenitsyn. Hegge observes that this episode might have served the previous year's prize-winner, Samuel Beckett, as the basis for a 'new and very absurd play:* Waiting for Solzhenitsyn'. *Meanwhile, the official campaign against Solzhenitsyn was increasing in intensity.*]

On 19 November I had finally managed to contact a man whom I shall here call Petrov. He too deserves to have a novel written about him when the time is ripe. He told me that the Head of the Moscow Gorkom, Grishin, who was also a candidate-member of the Politburo and hence one of the 20 top Soviet leaders, had sharply attacked Solzhenitsyn at a closed party meeting which was not reported in the press. He also told me that there had been a meeting of the party members of the Writers' Union in Moscow, at which the chairman, Arkady Vasilev, had expressed 'his personal opinion', that Solzhenitsyn ought to be offered a one-way ticket to Stockholm. Then they would be done with an awkward problem.

Quite obviously, his friends' fear that they would lose him if he went abroad was not without foundation. . . .

First Meeting with Solzhenitsyn (20 November)

I drove into the town centre without being followed. I parked the car a good way from the meeting-place and walked the rest of the way. . . .

Ivanov told me that Solzhenitsyn would be there in about 10 minutes and that he had changed his mind and did not now intend to apply for an exit visa. He wished to notify the Swedish Academy of his decision in a letter which he would hand in at the Swedish Embassy on 27 November together with a request that it be sent in the diplomatic bag. The letter

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would contain a detailed account of the reasons for his decision. Ivanov told me briefly that Solzhenitsyn regarded the risk that he might not be allowed back as too great for him to go. He also anticipated a hostile campaign, to coincide with the day of the actual ceremony, 10 December, and he wanted to be at home for it. . . .

Ivanov then asked me to wait while he went for Solzhenitsyn, who came up smiling warmly and looking very lively and cheerful. He held out his hand and said simply: 'Glad to meet you.' His grip was very firm.

Even in the twilight I could recognize him at once from his pictures. A reddish full beard, a face full of wrinkles, narrow, somewhat twinkling eyes, a stooping figure, but powerful and supple, with a swift, slightly swaying gait. A man who had survived—not only four years in the front-line, but a further eight years in prison camp, and cancer of the stomach besides.

His voice is clear, with a pronounced Southern Russian accent, and he accompanies his speech, which is very rapid and precise, with animated gestures. He uses simple, everyday language, with nothing of that rather ponderous, old-fashioned style which marks his books, and especially his open letters. He was wearing a beret, an old anorak slightly the worse for wear, a pair of trousers, which looked about the same as mine—and I had on my worst ones.

The winner of the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature.

He asked me how much Ivanov had told me, and I gave him a summary. He referred to the speech by party secretary S. Pilotovich in Minsk as the reason for his decision and said that a campaign after the fashion of the Pasternak affair would presumably now be unleashed. [*On 17 November Pilotovich had told a press conference of the dangers of bourgeois ideological erosion particularly among the creative intelligentsia.*] Solzhenitsyn was also convinced that what the authorities would prefer would be to give him a single ticket and thus be rid of him. He interpreted Vasilev's pronouncements, of which he was thoroughly informed, as adequate grounds for fearing that he would not be allowed to return.

We started walking up one of the central streets in the direction of the Swedish Embassy, as I wanted to show him where it was. At that point he asked about the invitation card from the Embassy and I gave him their reply. He also asked about the possibility of receiving the prize there, and I told him about that refusal too. I said that, in my estimation, the decision had been made at a high level in Stockholm, and that the Embassy as such was not to blame. All the same, I had expected a very sharp response and glanced at him warily as we walked along the street. He did not even seem surprised, let alone bitter, and simply said: '*Nu chto zhe.*' (Oh, well.) . . .

I asked him if he intended to go to the Embassy on 27 November, and he asked whether I thought the date was known to the Soviet authorities. I said I was quite certain that it wasn't. It was known only

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to two or three diplomats at the Embassy, to a few civil servants in Stockholm, no doubt, as well as to me. I told him I could guarantee that it had not leaked out.

'Well, I won't be going. If they don't want to invite me and can't make the presentation there, then I have nothing to say to them', he said.

As though to demonstrate that he meant what he said, he suggested that we turn into a street leading away from the Embassy, which was then about half a mile away. He said that he couldn't care less where the Embassy was.

'It's a pity I won't be able to meet Gunnar [Jarring]. I had really been looking forward to meeting such a famous man. . . .

'All I want is to have my letter sent to the Nobel Foundation through the diplomatic bag along with the autobiography they've asked for in Stockholm.' And he asked me what I thought of the chances. I said that I could not be certain that the Embassy would agree to this, since it was very strict in its application of the rules regarding diplomatic mail. We then agreed that I would try to arrange it in the course of the coming week.

Next he spoke briefly about his Nobel lecture, which, he estimated, would take him about five months, and which he then wanted to send to Sweden. He had already asked the Swedish Academy to send him a few of the lectures given by earlier winners, so that he had something to work to as far as length and content were concerned. I do not know whether he had received them by then.

[*Hegge made a last effort to persuade Solzhenitsyn to come to the Embassy as planned, but Solzhenitsyn would only agree to meet him again on 26 November, the day before the proposed visit. Hegge also had to promise not to divulge Solzhenitsyn's decision not to go to Stockholm.*]

'Alexander Isayevich, you do at least realize what a heavy burden this is for a journalist to have to bear?'

He gave a friendly, sympathetic smile and said: 'But you can always write about it in your memoirs.'

I asked if I could inform the Swedish Embassy in confidence of his decision. To this he replied: 'No, they can read about it in the papers. . . .' With that he went.

Second Meeting (26 November)

That evening I met Solzhenitsyn again at the usual place, and we began to stroll through the streets. . . . I explained to him that things had looked very bad at the beginning of the week . . . , that subsequently—i.e. the day before—the cloud had lifted somewhat, and that the Swedish Embassy could take his letter under certain conditions. I was on the point of launching my attempt to persuade him when, to my great relief, he said that he had decided to go to the Embassy after all. He asked if I thought the time of the visit had leaked out, and if

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet authorities, for instance, could know if it. I regarded this as quite impossible. Nonetheless, he wanted to bring the meeting forward from 12 noon to 10 a.m., to make quite sure. This would place the Embassy in an altogether impossible situation. I told him that I had arranged to meet A. in Vorovsky Street at 10.30 a.m. and that I had to have a chance to report back to the Embassy. I was loath to do so by telephone, for obvious reasons. There was no need to explain these reasons to Solzhenitsyn, and he fixed the time at 10.40 a.m. It was impossible to extend it any further. . . .

I asked if it was true that he had made an application to the authorities for a visa. At this he gave a start and asked where I had heard this. I said I had heard it from one or two diplomats. 'It's incredible how such things get about', he said. 'I made a move but didn't get any satisfactory response from the other side.'

Again he branded as 'degrading' the procedure which a Soviet citizen must undergo in order to obtain an exit visa. From this I was able to infer that he had written directly to the Central Committee's Commission on Foreign Travel, which has the final decision in such matters. Later, in the course of a conversation with KGB agent Victor Louis, I came to hear how Solzhenitsyn had asked for guarantees that he would be allowed to return. Louis, who has himself travelled all round the world, said with a contemptuous snort that the degrading thing was that the Soviet government had been asked to give such a guarantee. 'I should think so', I replied.

Finally I asked Solzhenitsyn if he felt sad that he could not go to Stockholm. He thought for a while and replied: 'Not really. I'm not much of a person for festivities with white tie and tails, banquets and dinners. And now that I realize I don't have to go to Stockholm and that I'm the Nobel prize-winner regardless of that and can avoid this fuss and bother, then everything seems to be all right. Besides, I'd be putting the organizers in an utterly hopeless position anyway, because I wouldn't really be able to answer most of the questions that might be asked at the press conference, since I would want to come back to Russia. No, it's much simpler to stay here.'

So we parted, and I urged him once more to wait until nearer 10.45 a.m. the following day, so that I could manage to warn the Embassy before he arrived. He promised that he would. . . .

Solzhenitsyn's Visit to the Swedish Embassy (27 November)

As arranged, I met A. at 10.30 a.m. at the junction of Vorovsky and Pisemsky Streets and told him at once that Solzhenitsyn had brought the time of his visit forward and would now arrive at the Embassy in five minutes. I also briefly informed him of Solzhenitsyn's decision not to go to Stockholm and had the impression that A. had gathered that this would be the outcome. . . . There was no time for further discussion as A. had to get back and let Ambassador Jarring know that there were only minutes to go.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As I had agreed with Solzhenitsyn, I remained standing at the junction until I caught sight of him walking down Vorovsky Street. He turned into the wrong street, but came out again and passed me at a distance of about five yards. The arrangement was that we would not recognize one another. I watched him until he went into the Embassy door, some 150 yards away in Pisemsky Street, and was about to leave when I spotted two hefty, well-dressed men in Astrakhan hats walking in the same direction as Solzhenitsyn had taken. They had 'KGB' written all over them. In winter-time KGB agents can almost invariably be identified by their hats. This is because it is a hopeless task to try and get hold of one of the famous Russian fur hats in Moscow, even in the hard-currency shops. But KGB agents always have them. . . . The pair turned into Pisemsky Street, paused outside the Embassy building and read the sign, but then they went on. . . .

Subsequent Developments

[*On 30 November the Director of the Nobel Foundation, Nils K. Ståhle, told a press conference that it was not impossible that Solzhenitsyn might yet come to Stockholm at a later date.*]

I did not know it at the time, but later realized that in the course of their conversation Ambassador Jarring concluded that Solzhenitsyn did not rule out the possibility of being allowed to travel at a later date. I know for certain that Solzhenitsyn believes he said nothing which could give grounds for such an interpretation, but I have only a highly limited knowledge of what passed between them in the Swedish Embassy that day; nor do I think it proper to relate what little I do know. Petrov had obtained a detailed account through channels of his own and had only one comment: 'Jarring is an unfortunate man, and no mistake. First he tries to bring about peace between the Jews and the Arabs, and even while he's working on that he gets Alexander Isayevich on his back! . . .'

I have the distinct impression that in Stockholm they attached great importance to Jarring's interpretation of what Solzhenitsyn said, naturally enough. With Jarring's position as mediator in the Middle East it was his statements which must carry weight and not my unofficial reports, which, moreover, were smuggled out by the most diverse methods. Besides, Jarring had previously been Head of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Office and had thus worked with Director Ståhle on the preparations for earlier Nobel ceremonies.

But when I met Ivanov shortly before the day of the ceremony he told me that Solzhenitsyn had gone to the Embassy again on 4 December to ask them to convey a message of greetings to Stockholm Town Hall, where the banquet itself was to be given. He had been rather offended at the way he was received. One of the diplomats had accepted the message with the utmost reluctance, and he had been given the impression that he was not welcome at the Embassy. Nor did he know

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether the Embassy would comply with his wish and pass on the greeting. . . .

[*The message was, in fact, read out at the banquet, but without the final sentence: 'Let us, at this festive table, not forget the political prisoners who are today on hunger strike for the restitution of their limited rights, which have been so completely trampled underfoot.'*]

Some weeks later I told Ivanov that Dr Gierow, in consultation with Ståhle, had chosen to omit the last sentence. Ivanov said that this was a very prudent move on the part of the Nobel Foundation, although he did not expect that Solzhenitsyn would like it. However, the most active dissident circles in Moscow, which circulated copies of the message through *samizdat*, reacted sharply to the omission and felt, as one of them put it, that 'it wouldn't have spoilt the digestion of the guests in the Town Hall if they had thought for a moment about those who are unable to come to such a banquet'.

[*The belief that the Swedish Embassy in Moscow was, in fact, anxious to assist in presenting the prize persisted in some quarters and eventually Hegge was moved to write to one of his Swedish contacts:*]

'I don't know who in Stockholm is—with all due respect—feeding you, and presumably others too, this pack of lies about the Embassy's readiness to help with the presentation of the prize. Jarring told Swedish correspondents that the Embassy wants nothing more to do with the affair, and that he will suggest that in future the Foreign Office should have absolutely nothing to do with the Nobel Prize, as it is conceivable that even more delicate situations might eventually arise in other countries. With Jarring's authority, such a statement is tantamount to a decision, at least as far as the present case is concerned.'

[*On 9 February 1971 Hegge was notified of his expulsion from the Soviet Union. In the epilogue to his book he tells of an abortive attempt to organize an official joint protest by the governments of the three Scandinavian countries whose newspapers he represented. The attempt foundered after the Swedish Foreign Office's refusal either to protest against or to deplore the expulsion. It said: 'Hegge asked for it'. On 9 May 1972 the Swedish journal* Aftonbladet *revealed that before he began his diplomatic career, Ambassador Jarring was a member of* Sveriges Nationell Foerbund (*the Swedish Nationalist Federation*), *a party which represented in pre-war Sweden the Nazi ideology. Jarring was one of its candidates in the 1936 Swedish elections.*]

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New Russian Epic

Solzhenitsyn's 'August 1914'

Michael Glenny

THE Soviet Union has two living Nobel prizewinners for literature, born 14 years apart in time but geographically within a few miles of each other near the banks of the River Don. They are Mikhail Sholokhov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Sholokhov, who is 66, enjoys something like the status of the Kremlin's court buffoon: while no one takes him seriously any longer, he is always good for a laugh if your taste runs to slander and vulgar abuse. Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, whose writing career has been dedicated to the exposure of tyranny and injustice, is consigned to the opposite extreme of that Byzantine polity: banished to the provinces like Ovid, the laureate may not speak to his own people for fear that he may corrupt them.

To compound the irony, while Sholokhov has long been a spent writer, Solzhenitsyn is now, to judge by his latest book, at the zenith of his creativity. Behind him are two major novels, *The Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle*; the novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* which is probably the single most powerful and influential piece of Russian prose for half a century; several short stories; some prose poems, and a handful of plays: a respectable output by any standards, the bulk of which in the USSR is still officially non-existent.

Yet all of this, if we are to believe Solzhenitsyn himself, has been secondary to his chief intention as a writer, little more than an irritating distraction from the pursuit of a greater aim. For over 30 years he has, it appears, cherished the idea of a work very different in kind from those which have already earned him the Nobel prize. The first part of this work has now been published.

It is a long book—about 275,000 words in length. Whilst by the standards of most Soviet novels, including those of Solzhenitsyn himself, its formal structure is quite original and unconventional (though not obtrusively so), in essence this is a classic historical novel.

It is written on three levels. At *Level 1* Solzhenitsyn paints in the background to the main story, by giving us a picture of certain segments of Russian society on the eve of the first world war. *Level 2* is a series of vivid close-up sequences of the Russian army's disastrous East Prussian campaign of August 1914, seen through the eyes of the men who bore the brunt of the fighting—the subalterns and footsloggers in the ranks. This level in turn frequently merges with *Level 3*, a blend of fictional and documentary-based reconstruction of the actions of the Russian high command during that campaign, in particular of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commanders of the Russian Second Army, who in August 1914 bungled and lost the decisive battle of Tannenberg against superior German generalship.

The war narrative chiefly describes the advance of General Samsonov's Second Army from its bases in Poland northward into East Prussia, followed by the battle of Tannenberg and the headlong Russian retreat. The two final chapters describe the reactions at General Headquarters when the Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, and his staff receive the news of the appalling defeat.

THE story of how the Russians invaded East Prussia at the very outset of the war in order to relieve the pressure of the German onslaught against France, and were crushingly defeated by the Germans in two great battles—Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes—is well documented from both sides. The German archives are now available to scholars, although the main facts have long been known from the memoirs of Hindenburg, Ludendorff and their senior staff officer, Colonel (later General) Max Hoffmann, to mention only the main ones. In English historiography, for instance, Sir John Wheeler-Bennett drew on all these sources for his biographical study *Hindenburg: The Wooden Titan*, while General Sir Edmund Ironside wrote a classic analysis of the battle of Tannenberg, designed as a staff college textbook, in which he used not only the German sources but those of the Russian generals as well. There are also the first-hand memoirs of General Sir Alfred Knox, who as British Military Attaché to Russia attached himself to the headquarters of the ill-fated General Samsonov. Recently there has appeared General Evans' *Tannenberg*, a more popular book written purely from secondary sources and not wholly reliable, but which has by far the best maps of all the versions. The first half of General Evans' book deals with the other battle of Tannenberg, which took place almost exactly 500 years before, in 1410, when a vast army of Slavs defeated the forces of the Knights of the Teutonic Order. This juxtaposition of the accounts of the two battles is a useful reminder that for the Germans 'Tannenberg II' was a long-awaited révanche for their earlier defeat.

From internal evidence Solzhenitsyn appears to have used a good deal of this memoir literature, including Knox but apparently not Hoffmann, since he does not make use of one important and dramatic piece of evidence, which I cannot believe he would have missed using had he known of it, and for which Hoffmann is the primary source; this point will be referred to again later. Of the several Russian generals involved, the vital but absent figure is, of course, Samsonov, who could not defend himself because he died by suicide rather than face the Tsar after his failure at Tannenberg. It is Samsonov, the missing voice in the recorded story and the man on whom his fellow-generals heaped all the blame when he was safely dead, whom Solzhenitsyn chooses to re-create and whom he makes into the tragic hero of this first part of his epic work.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whilst fully aware of Samsonov's shortcomings as a tactician and organizer, Solzhenitsyn builds up a sympathetic case to show that of all the Russian senior officers who were jointly responsible for the defeat, Samsonov was in fact the least to blame. Although this aspect of the story is in essence fictional, and was clearly inspired by an artist's generous urge to rehabilitate a much maligned figure, the supporting evidence which Solzhenitsyn adduces is shrewdly used and clearly based on research, as is the main framework of the strictly historical side of the narrative. Since Tannenberg forms the heart of *August 1914*, and since to discuss the book without the story of the battle would be like the Iliad without the siege of Troy, an account of this historic engagement is essential at this point.

The story really begins as far back as 1892, when Obruchëv, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, signed a military convention with France; this was part and parcel of the shift in Russia's foreign policy from a German to a French orientation, culminating in 1897 with the announcement of the Franco-Russian alliance, which had been signed three years earlier. From then on talks took place between the French and Russian general staffs at fairly regular intervals as both Russia and France grew increasingly conscious of the military threat represented by the Central Powers. The final and most important staff talks were held in 1913, when the partners in the alliance drew up contingency plans to counter the two principal options open to Germany should she start an aggressive war: to make the first strike either eastward or westward. In the event of an opening attack in the west against France, Russia agreed to treat the Austrian threat as minimal, to put 700,000 men into the field against Germany alone and to invade German territory at its most exposed point—East Prussia—on the 20th day of mobilization.

Here, if anywhere, lay one of the chief causes of the subsequent Russian defeat. For the Russian general staff acceded to the French demand for an attack on the 20th day of mobilization in apparent disregard of the fact that, due to poor communications, Russia's mobilization plans were so slow that in 20 days she could only get *half* the necessary effectives to the front, and could only have her first-line formations up to strength after *30* days. In consequence, both the Russian armies facing East Prussia, First Army under Rennenkampf to the east and Second Army under Samsonov to the south, started the war seriously under strength; Samsonov in particular, was short of cavalry and—which was to prove an equally grave handicap—he was very badly under-equipped with horse-drawn transport: this in a region that had only one single-track north-south railway and only one metalled road in vast areas of almost trackless waste.

Russia began mobilizing on 28 July; war was declared on 1 August, and despite their unpreparedness both Russian armies began their advance on schedule on 16 August, thus keeping their pledge to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French, who were in a great state of alarm at the rapid German advance on Paris.

IT is at this point that Solzhenitsyn's narrative opens, the locale being General Samsonov's Second Army Headquarters at Ostrolenka in north-west Poland. In the opening phase, Samsonov's troops first had to slog their way through the sandy expanses of the frontier region, which as a matter of policy the Russian government had for years left roadless and virtually derelict as a defensive measure intended to delay a possible German invasion of Poland; by a cruel irony this very policy now proved a fatal hindrance to *Russian* troops marching into Germany. After crossing the frontier, Second Army pushed on for several days unopposed. This was because the main German forces in East Prussia—the Eighth Army, commanded by General von Prittwitz—were engaged in dealing with the Russian First Army under General Rennenkampf, who had already invaded the province from the east. After suffering a defeat by Rennenkampf at Gumbinnen, and alarmed at the prospect of Samsonov's Second Army also moving against him from Poland, von Prittwitz decided to break off the engagement altogether and pull the German Eighth Army back behind the Vistula, where he would hold off the Russians until reinforcements had been brought over from the Western front. (Throughout the East Prussian campaign the Germans were outnumbered by 2·7 to 1.) The German high command reacted to von Prittwitz' call for help by sacking him and replacing him by Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as Chief of Staff.

At once the plan was changed. Hindenburg and Ludendorff left a light screen of forces to hold off Rennenkampf, who had inexplicably come to a dead stop, and rapidly switched the bulk of the Eighth Army to oppose Samsonov. This was an incredibly dangerous move; had Rennenkampf continued his advance, the Germans would have been simply crushed between the upper and nether millstones of the two converging Russian armies. Fully aware of this (Ludendorff in his memoirs wrote: 'He [Rennenkampf] need only have closed with us and we should have been beaten'), the Germans gambled on there being no coordination between Rennenkampf and Samsonov—and the gamble paid off. This risky decision was taken to a great extent on the advice of Colonel Max Hoffmann (the same man who was to cross swords with Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk three and a half years later), who possessed a personal knowledge of Samsonov and Rennenkampf that was unique in the German Army. Nearly 10 years earlier, Major Hoffmann, as he was then, had been attached as an observer to the Russian army fighting the Japanese in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. Samsonov and Rennenkampf were then both divisional commanders, and at one point Samsonov suffered a humiliating defeat due to his colleague Rennenkampf's failure to despatch his cavalry to support the hard-pressed Samsonov at a critical moment. After the battle, by an unfortunate

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chance both generals happened to meet at a station on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Unable to restrain himself, Samsonov accused Rennenkampf of incompetence, cowardice and dishonourable conduct. Rennenkampf, an arrogant bull of a man, replied by striking Samsonov, and in a moment their staffs were watching in horror as the two commanders indulged in an unseemly fist-fight on the platform. They had to be dragged apart, and the affair was hushed up; but it had been witnessed by Major Hoffmann, who also knew that after it Rennenkampf and Samsonov never spoke to each other again.

When the moment came in August 1914 to make the crucial decision whether to disengage from Rennenkampf and turn to face Samsonov, in the hope that Rennenkampf would not move to help Samsonov, Colonel Hoffmann remembered that far-off scene on a Manchurian railway station and advised Ludendorff that the balance of probability was that Rennenkampf would not move. He did not, and the result was Tannenberg.

Here it should be added in parenthesis that Solzhenitsyn does not make use of this dramatic incident; this is probably due to his inability to obtain a copy of Max Hoffmann's memoirs in present-day Russia. This in itself throws a revealing light on the problems that face an historical novelist (not to mention an historian) in the USSR, of which Solzhenitsyn complains in his epilogue to *August 1914*. The probable reason why Max Hoffmann's memoirs are not available is that they contain a lengthy first-hand account of the central role played by Trotsky in the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.

However, Solzhenitsyn has clearly been able to find adequate sources on the battle of Tannenberg itself. Indeed, there is so much material that the real measure of his skill as a novelist is the way he selects, rejects, invents, emphasizes and clarifies just what is necessary for his purpose. In describing the complexities of the fighting, his aim is to bring out two themes: one is the stupidity, self-delusion and gross incompetence of the Russian high command; the other is the unbelievable endurance and bravery shown by the wretched Russian troops, flung unprepared into battle and led to destruction by their criminally inefficient commanders. He shows with devastating effect, for instance, how the Russian army signals service was so bad that field telephones were hopelessly inadequate, so that Samsonov and his generals either had to use despatch riders (who usually had no maps, and couldn't read them anyway) or wireless. Radio communication (when it worked) was actually worse than useless, because the Russian operators were unable to master the use of code and sent all their messages *en clair*. Ludendorff, for instance, describes how as he arrived in East Prussia to take over as Chief of Staff, the first document that was handed to him while he was driving to his headquarters was an intercepted Russian radio signal giving the entire disposition of Samsonov's army. As the other chief factor in the Russian defeat, Solzhenitsyn concentrates graphically on the disastrous

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inadequacy of their supply system, as one result of which the Russian troops had already consumed their emergency rations of hard-tack—indeed, had lived on nothing else for a week—before the German counter-attack even began.

HAVING set the scene of Samsonov's exhausted, hungry men plodding on into the eerily empty countryside of East Prussia, about midway through the book Solzhenitsyn then delivers the reader a punch in the solar plexus. This is a 20-page description of how the Russian infantry, in hastily dug trenches, are suddenly subjected to the totally new experience of a long, intensive artillery barrage delivered by the most modern, most technically advanced and efficient army in the world. The Germans have struck back. This passage, which is the turning-point of the narrative, is an incredible tour de force: it must be one of Solzhenitsyn's supreme achievements. From then on, nothing is the same. In a fashion which proves Solzhenitsyn a master, the reader passes through an experience equivalent to the shock which caused the first crucial breach in the Russian lines. After that, thanks to Rennenkampf's negligence and immobility on the right, von Mackensen's corps was able to outflank Second Army on its eastern flank, while von François' corps (which had delivered the artillery bombardment) punched its way through the over-extended western flank, and within five days had almost encircled Samsonov and cut off most of his army's line of retreat back to Poland. The Germans lacked the forces to deliver an equally hard blow at the Russian centre, but it was unnecessary: such was the demoralization and lack of control among the Russian corps in the centre that they were either captured or retreated headlong to get out of the fast-narrowing gap in the German encircling movement. Within ten days from crossing the frontier into East Prussia, Samsonov's army was destroyed. Himself cut off with the remnants of his staff, Samsonov walked alone to a clearing in the forest, knelt down and shot himself.

For several chapters after that, in fact until nearly the end of the book, Solzhenitsyn switches back to describe life in Russia. His main intention in reverting to 'Level 1' for seven chapters is presumably to stress the tragic contrast between complacent, stagnant, civilian Russia and the front line in East Prussia, where the tsarist regime is being delivered the first of a series of blows which simultaneously reveal and aggravate its stark incapacity to govern a state in the face of the cruel realities of the 20th century.

This fact is, indeed, the crux of the whole book, and Solzhenitsyn drives the point home in the two final chapters with a force and economy which compel one's admiration. The story culminates in a conference presided over by the Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, attended by all his staff and the generals involved in the débâcle of Tannenberg, at which the guilty men furiously justify themselves and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

throw the responsibility on the wretched, dead Samsonov. We know that a purge of the culprits will never be made, because they are all able to shield themselves by one means or another through influence and patronage at court. Incapable of admitting to the appalling implications of the East Prussian defeat, the conference ends in a mood of deluded euphoria on the arrival of a telegram from the Galician front announcing the capture of Lvov from the Austrians, blindly disregarding the fact that without the capture or destruction of the Austrian army (which escaped intact because the Russians were too incompetent to pursue the retreating enemy and round them up), Lvov is an empty prize. Unable even to make use of their victories, the dinosaurs blunder on.

HERE, perhaps, some comment should be made on Solzhenitsyn's technique. *August 1914* is not straight history: it is an interpretation of history by a great artist. In form it is a complex piece of fiction constructed with several narrative levels. Such a book can easily become so stratified that it does not cohere into a work of art but hardens into something more like a geological diagram. The solution that more than one historical novelist has chosen is a fictional character, or characters, who can plausibly inhabit *all* levels of the narrative and thereby knit them into an entity. For this purpose Tolstoy in *War and Peace* created Pierre Bezukhov. Solzhenitsyn's answer to the problem is a fictional person who moves easily and naturally between the highest military echelons of generals and staff (Level 3) and the lowest echelon—the troops and regimental officers (Level 2), and who also has his natural links with the home front (Level 1). Such a character has to be high enough in rank to have good reason for talking to generals, yet not too high to prevent him from mixing easily with the rank and file. He must also have a sound military excuse for being very mobile, so that he can move about to all sectors of the front. To meet these requirements Solzhenitsyn has invented his own 'Pierre Bezukhov': this is a character called Vorotyntsev. To fulfil the military considerations he is a colonel, a General Staff officer sent by the Grand Duke Nicholas from General Headquarters at Baranovichi as an independent liaison officer direct to General Samsonov at Second Army Headquarters, bypassing the intermediate commander, General Zhilinsky at North-Western Army Group Headquarters. With his rank, his General Staff status and the fact that he has a roving commission from the Commander-in-Chief himself, Vorotyntsev is perfectly equipped to move freely across all levels of the narrative.

It is through Vorotyntsev that Samsonov and his senior officers are brought to life; military problems are made real and concrete; each of Samsonov's corps commanders is shown with his strengths and weaknesses. Colonel Vorotyntsev is, in other words, the touchstone who reveals the base or fine metal in everyone with whom Solzhenitsyn brings him into contact. Being conveniently unattached to any one unit,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vorotyntsev can also be present at several of the more dramatic or decisive actions throughout the battle, and thus experiences at first hand the consequences of the poor decisions, bungled plans and communications failures which he had witnessed as they were being perpetrated at headquarters. Interestingly enough, in the descriptions of Vorotyntsev's appearance there is more than a hint of Solzhenitsyn's own looks, to judge by his photographs, and he is a character with whom the reader readily identifies—which is no doubt intentional on the author's part.

Vorotyntsev's great moment comes when he reports back to the Grand Duke Nicholas at General Headquarters for the post-mortem on Tannenberg. As Vorotyntsev is the only officer present who actually witnessed the defeat of the Second Army, the Commander-in-Chief allows him to address the emergency conference of generals. Vorotyntsev stoutly defends Samsonov, gives an unanswerable account of the high command's failures, and at the end, unable to restrain himself any longer, accuses Zhilinsky, Samsonov's immediate superior, of being the man whose incompetence was the real cause of the defeat. This direct arraignment of a senior officer is more than even the Grand Duke, who respects Vorotyntsev, can tolerate: Colonel Vorotyntsev is ordered to leave the conference. He clicks his heels, salutes and marches out of the room. With this the book ends.

AUGUST 1914 is such a big work in every sense that further comment must necessarily be all too condensed and summary. However, certain things stand out. This is the start—and only the start, provided Solzhenitsyn is able to finish it—of a novel at least on the scale of *War and Peace*. We know, too, that Solzhenitsyn regards it as his most important work so far. With it, therefore, there can be little doubt that he is making a claim to be ranked in the same league as Tolstoy. From his previous work (in particular *The Cancer Ward*) it is plain that Solzhenitsyn has been deeply influenced by Tolstoy.

Although one should not read too much into them because they are largely fortuitous, there are some interesting external parallels between the careers of the two writers and their relations to their respective historical novels. Both Tolstoy and Solzhenitsyn were artillery officers, who saw active service in the major war of their generation—Tolstoy in the Crimean War, Solzhenitsyn in the second world war. Yet for reasons which are obscure, neither of them chose to write their principal war novel about the war in which they had personally taken part—something which is rather puzzling, when one considers the tremendous impact on a writer's sensibility of the experience of war in the front line. True, Tolstoy did write his *Tales of Sevastopol*, but this is a relatively minor work, little more than a snippet of high-class journalism compared with *War and Peace*; and Solzhenitsyn has written virtually nothing at all about the second world war. Instead, both men, in looking for the subject-matter of their respective *chefs d'oeuvre* in the genre of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

historical novel, turned back to the great conflict of the generation which preceded their own; in the one case to the war of 1812–13, in the other to that of 1914–17.

Personally, I can scarcely even begin to speculate about this mystery. Perhaps each of them felt, though for different reasons, that the war they had fought in, 'their' war, was somehow too close to them, an experience too intense or too painful for them to achieve the necessary degree of objectivity in writing about it. It is not in the scope of this article to discuss Tolstoy's grounds for preferring to write about the war of 1812–13 rather than the Crimean War. But I think we do have at least one clue, although it is by no means the sole or even the most compelling reason, as to why Solzhenitsyn chose to deal with the first world war.

There are good grounds for believing that it is, in part, a conscious act of *pietas* towards the memory of his father. Solzhenitsyn never knew his father, who died before his son was born in 1918. One of the characters in the book, who appears destined for a big part in later volumes, is quite transparently based on Solzhenitsyn's father, who served as an army officer in the first world war (though not in the East Prussian campaign of August 1914; he was too young for that). He calls this character 'Isaakii Lazhenitsyn', a patently obvious approximation to his father's name of 'Isai Solzhenitsyn'. It seems to me a fair assumption that coupled with the author's wider impulse to re-examine this crucial period of recent Russian history is the desire to 'create' his own father, to give life as only a writer can to the man whose blood flows in his veins but whom fate removed before the son could ever know him. The world evoked in the novel is the world in which Isai Solzhenitsyn grew up and lived out his brief manhood. What is more, the inclusion of a chapter in *August 1914* in which the young Isaakii Lazhenitsyn goes to meet Tolstoy and question him about the meaning of life is a very significant pointer to the nature of the double act of homage which Solzhenitsyn is making in writing *this* book and not another: he is telling us that the book draws its inspiration from his desire to honour both his real father and his spiritual father, Tolstoy.

This notion is, of course, far from adequate to explain either the author's complex motivation or the thinking that lies behind this remarkable work. We have in this book the first (and already very substantial) part of an undertaking which is an epic, not merely because of its size, but because it answers to the classic definition of the epic: its material is history—real or legendary; its intention is to reveal a people to itself; and its significance is at the same time also universal.

RUSSIA has lived through such colossal upheavals in this century, has suffered so much, has so often been the battlefield of militant ideologies, has seen the noblest ideals perverted and debased, has forced so many tragically insoluble moral dilemmas upon her people, that no reasonably intelligent Russian can avoid going through life haunted by

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dread questions. What has it all been for? Need it have been like this? What can possibly justify the violent deaths of tens of millions of Russians in 50 years? Is there any sense in our history? Where did it all go wrong? Why are we, of all people, doomed to exchange one despotism for another in seemingly unbroken succession?

Like a few other brave and irrepressible Russian writers, Solzhenitsyn in his manner has dared to pose aloud those despairing questions which lurk in the minds of his fellow-countrymen. One of the most insistent of such questions is: when and how did our present nightmare begin? Solzhenitsyn clearly believes that this question can best be meaningfully resolved in the terms of Russian history itself, not in abstractions or in parables. Since the Soviet Russians' view of themselves is distorted by a systematically falsified view of the past, Solzhenitsyn clearly sees it as his vocation to challenge that falsification directly. He has therefore chosen to begin at what is, in terms of contemporary history, the beginning. Hence the title of this book.

Although to pin down a starting point in the chain of historical causality is by definition a hopeless task, there clearly are events whose sheer magnitude give them a claim to a certain causal autonomy. There cannot be much doubt that the first world war was such an event and that it, rather than the Russian revolution which was in a real sense caused by it, marked the true start of our fearful epoch. Solzhenitsyn seems to have come to this conclusion. Despite the insistent pressures of Soviet education he has managed to remain free of the myth that all Russian history from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was a steady, inexorable progress towards the inevitable triumph of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, with the cataclysm of the first world war diminished to the status of an adjunct to the main process, the culmination of which was Lenin's seizure of power. *August 1914* is, if nothing else, an implicit rejection of the Soviet Communist Party's view of history.

We must wait for the rest of this novel to be sure, but this first part indicates that Solzhenitsyn utterly denies the deterministic application of the word 'inevitable' to history, as implying an apotheosis of 'History' as a force independent of the sum of mankind; here he takes issue with the Hegelian element in Marxism. Instead, as far as can be deduced in the absence of any specific reference to the subject by Solzhenitsyn himself, he inclines at least in part to the Tolstoyan view of history as an infinitude of interlocking causal chains. But he has by no means swallowed Tolstoy whole: in *August 1914* he actually takes issue with Tolstoy over the latter's negative view of the role of the individual in history.

At the more pragmatic level it is clearly in Russia's involvement in the first world war, when she was hopelessly unfitted to wage a modern war and needed instead a prolonged period of peaceful development, that Solzhenitsyn sees the fatal error which precipitated the revolutions of 1917—whose results we know so well. In setting out to refute the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knowingly false Communist Party version of history and to reject the discredited historicism on which the present Soviet regime relies for its justification, Solzhenitsyn is aiming a blow not only at one of the ideological roots of the existing system but more generally at the organized perversion of consciousness which has been the result of treating humankind as a mere object, as no more than fuel for driving the locomotive of 'history' towards Communism—a terminus which recedes as fast as the drivers shovel on more coal.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

Invites You to Join its Ever Increasing Circle of Readers

THE MAY 1972 ISSUE WILL CONTAIN:

Statewsys versus Folkways Revisited: An Error in Prediction
James W. Prothro

Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts
Raymond E. Wolfinger

The Working Scientist as Political Participant
Arnett A. Elliott, Thomas C. Hood, and Jack E. Holmes

Explaining Comprehensive Governmental Consolidation: Toward a Preliminary Theory
Walter A. Rosenbaum and Thomas A. Henderson

From Gitlow to Near: Judicial "Amendment" by Absent-minded Incrementalism
Klaus H. Heberle

Civil Rights Voting by Southern Congressmen
Joe R. Feagin

Social and Political Dimensions of Campus Protest Activity
James W. Clarke and Joseph Egan

The Universities and Governments Under Canadian Federalism
R. Taylor Cole

Conceptions of Political Science in West Germany and The United States, 1960–1969
David Pfotenhauer

The Processes of a Systemicist
John J. Weltman

J. S. Mill's Religion of Humanity and the Second Justification for the Writing of "ON LIBERTY"
Allan D. Megill

RESEARCH NOTES

How Can an Index of Party Competition Best be Derived?
Paul T. David

Incremental Budget-Making in the American States: A Test of the Anton Model
Gerald E. Sullivan

A Non-Additive Model for State Policy Research
James C. Strouse and J. Oliver Williams

Published Quarterly by the
SOUTHERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Peabody Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32601
Subscription Rates: $8.00 U.S.A.; $9.00 Foreign; $5.00 Student

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documents: Soviet Union

We are publishing below the transcript of the trial of V. K. Bukovsky. Numerous protests and appeals were made against the savage sentence imposed on him: seven years of imprisonment, the first two to be spent in prison and the remaining five in a strict-regime labour camp, plus five years of exile. Notable among the appeals was the letter from Academician Sakharov to Brezhnev, a letter signed by 52 of Bukovsky's friends to the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, an open letter from 39 prominent British intellectuals, scholars, and public figures published in The Times *(31 January 1972), and a letter from 75 Swiss writers to Kosygin (reproduced in* Der Bund, *Berne, 20 January 1972). There were many other appeals from India, Australia, and various other countries. Nevertheless, the sentence was confirmed on 22 February 1972 by the Supreme Court of the RSFSR. Neither Bukovsky's friends nor foreign journalists were admitted to the court, only his mother was permitted to attend its session. Soon afterwards Bukovsky was sent to the prison in Vladimir. In view of its notoriously harsh discipline and Bukovsky's heart condition, his friends are concerned for his very survival.*

We also reproduce below another document, an open letter to his friends by the writer Grigori Svirsky explaining the reasons for his decision to emigrate to Israel. His speech made in 1965 to the meeting of Moscow writers, protesting against Soviet anti-semitism, was first published in Le Monde *(28–29 April 1968). It has also been published in English in Abraham Brumberg (ed.),* In Quest of Justice *(1970).*

The Case of Vladimir Bukovsky

THE trial of V. K. Bukovsky took place on 5 January 1972 in Moscow on the premises of the Luyblin District Court (Yegorevskaya U1.14).

The trial was conducted by the visiting session of Moscow City Court: Judge V. Lubentsova, prosecutor A. Bobrushko, lay assessors Kondakov and Shlykov, Advocate V. Ya. Shveisky, Secretary Osina.

The following witnesses were called for the prosecution:

1. G. Paipert
2. A. Waller
3. V. A. Shushpanov
4. A. E. Nikitinsky
5. Bychkov

It was later learned that no summonses were sent to these witnesses and in the preliminary investigation these witnesses testified in favour of Bukovsky.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. Tarasov
7. Bukovskaya N. I. (Before the trial N. Bukovskaya appealed several times to various departments requesting that she should not be called as a witness, as she did not know anything about her son's case and she wished to remain in the court during the whole course of the case. But her presence was just what the legal authorities did not desire.)

Indictment after preliminary investigation in the case of V. K. Bukovsky (born 1942, Russian, living in Moscow, U1. Furmanova 3/5, flat 59)

1. During 1970–71, citizen V. K. Bukovsky systematically disseminated libellous anti-Soviet materials, gave slanderous information to foreign correspondents, which maligned the state and social order, maintained that in the Soviet Union sane people are placed in prison type mental hospitals, where they are subjected to various tortures, and also kept in his flat various libellous anti-Soviet materials:

This is proved by:

(a) Cuttings from foreign papers *Washington Post, San Francisco Examiner* and *Daily News* which were found in Bukovsky's flat and which contained libellous articles, maligning the USSR state and social order and entitled: 'The Russian who is fighting the regime', 'A Soviet dissident speaks', and 'A Russian dissenter tells of the horrors of mental prisons for dissidents'.

(b) A film shown by the American television company CBS in a broadcast on 28 July 1970, entitled 'Voices of the Russian Underground', and comments on this film printed in various foreign newspapers ('secretly shot film shows that a fight within Russia is possible', etc), also radio broadcasts in Russian containing comments on this film by the radio stations Radio Liberty, The Voice of America, and the BBC.

(c) V. K. Bukovsky's notebook containing telephone numbers of foreign correspondents accredited to Moscow.

2. According to the testimony of V. A. Shushpanov, formerly on the staff of the Foreign Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, V. K. Bukovsky is charged with conducting anti-Soviet propaganda at their repeated meetings, maintaining that in the USSR sane people are placed in mental hospitals where they are subjected to inhuman treatment; maintaining that there is no individual freedom, or freedom of speech and press in the Soviet Union and also holding conversations with him in an attempt to induce Shushpanov to use his official journeys abroad for the illegal importation from abroad of a duplicator for the organization of an underground press and duplication of anti-Soviet materials in *samizdat*.

3. On the basis of the testimony of Arnold Eduardovich Nikitinsky, staff member of the special control and admission point in the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sheremetevo Airport, who used to be a school friend of V. K. Bukovsky —Bukovsky is charged with subjecting him to anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda maintaining that there is no individual freedom in the USSR, that here sane people are placed in mental hospitals for dissenting, and also with trying to induce Nikitinsky to use his official position to help him to import illegally into the USSR a portable press, avoiding customs inspection at the Sheremetevo Airport. Bukovsky's aim was to organize an underground press for the dissemination of anti-Soviet materials in *samizdat*. On the basis of Nikitinsky's testimony, Bukovsky is also charged with keeping illegally in his flat two numbers of the anti-Soviet journal *Possev*, which he showed to Nikitinsky (proofs: Nikitinsky's handwritten statement and a tape of his confrontation with Bukovsky).

(4) On the basis of the testimony given by Bychkov and Tarasov, Bukovsky is charged with . . . in February–March 1971, in a café at the Kursk Station, subjecting them to anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, maintaining that the USSR regime is not one which the Soviet people need, and also with giving them his telephone number and address and the telephone of the correspondent A. P. Astrachan, suggesting that Bychkov and Tarasov should use these numbers to give information. (Proof: Bukovsky's and Astrachan's telephone numbers in Bychkov's notebook, testimony by Bychkov and Tarasov.)

(5) V. K. Bukovsky is charged with having met, on 28 March 1971, at the flat of V. Chalidze, Hugo Sebreghts, a citizen of Belgium, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist on the instructions of the anti-Soviet Flemish Committee. Hugo Sebreghts was instructed to meet Bukovsky, to which end he was given Bukovsky's telephone number by the Flemish Committee, which he wrote down in his notebook using some pre-arranged signs. At a meeting at V. Chalidze's, V. Bukovsky gave Hugo Sebreghts two anti-Soviet documents of libellous content: *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 17, and 'Open Letter to the 24th Congress' by Yakir, which were found in Hugo Sebreghts' possession when he was searched. (Proof: the conclusion of the forensic lexico-stylistic examination which found that the documents found on Hugo Sebreghts and documents of identical content confiscated from Bukovsky during a search were typed on the same typewriter.)

Bukovsky's petitions to the court at the beginning of the trial

1. The first point of the indictment is not precise, i.e. it does not contain any indication of what type of anti-Soviet and libellous materials were disseminated and how; which of the materials found in the search of Bukovsky's flat were anti-Soviet and libellous. The case does not contain any documents confirming the allegation of the systematic dissemination of libellous material. No friends or acquaintances have been examined on this point. The claim that any material sent to the West can be considered either libellous or anti-Soviet has not been substantiated. In connexion with the above, I request the court to make

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the first point of the indictment more concrete if it can find sufficient basis for it in the material of the preliminary investigation, and if not, to remit the case for further investigation.

2. Should the first request be denied, I ask the court to call as witnesses the following persons who can confirm the truth of my statements to the Western correspondents, as contained in the interview given by me to the correspondents Holger and Hall, on the facts of illegal commitment and conditions of custody of sane people in mental hospitals. These are: Pisarev, Parkhunov, Petrov, Shults, Z. M. Grigorenko, Yakhimovich, Naritsa, A. Fainberg.

3. I declare that I cannot be incriminated by the comments on my interview enumerated in paragraph one of the indictment, as their authors are various Western correspondents and not myself, and as I cannot be responsible for the expressions used by these correspondents in their comments. For instance, in the indictment the word 'torture' was used, a word which I never used either orally or in writing.

In view of the above, I ask the court to exclude the commentaries indicated from the indictment.

4. I ask the court to exclude from the indictment the episode connected with the Belgian citizen Hugo Sebreghts, as the latter is no longer in the Soviet Union and cannot be summoned before the court as a witness, while his testimony at the preliminary investigation is rather contradictory. Thus, in the file on my case there are two records on H. Sebreghts' examination which contain contradictory testimony.

In one of them H. Sebreghts maintains that the two documents which were found in his possession during the search, *Chronicle of Current Events* and 'Open Letter to the 24th Congress', were given to him by an unknown person. In the other one he maintains that these documents were given to him by me. Both reports are written in Russian, which Sebreghts does not know. Both these documents are signed by him. Sebreghts and I did not confront each other face to face. In my view, therefore, the investigation authorities have no grounds for maintaining that I am guilty on this point.

5. If my petition No. 4 is not taken into consideration, I ask the court to call Volpin and Chalidze as witnesses, who, according to the second report of Sebreghts' interrogation, which bears a later date, are supposed to have been present when I gave him the two documents mentioned above.

6. As, according to Article 18, UPK [Code of Criminal Procedure] RSFSR, all hearings take place in open court, and my case does not fit the indications which give grounds for a hearing in a closed court, as defined in this article, I ask the court immediately to admit into the hall all my friends and acquaintances, and also all other citizens who wish to attend the court hearing.

7. In the course of interrogation, when the investigator of my case, citizen K. V. Korkach, committed a gross violation of Article 201, UPK RSFSR and I was not offered the services of an advocate, I

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

addressed a request to the Chairman of the College of Advocates, Apraksin, to appoint advocate D. I. Kaminskaya, in order to implement Article 201, UPK. This was declined with the resolution: ' Advocate D. I. Kaminskaya cannot be appointed as she has no permit to attend secret court proceedings '. This resolution was shown to me and I signed it. However, later this document was removed from the case and another was substituted, which was not shown to me by anyone and which does not carry my signature. This procedure verges on official forgery and I ask the court to return the document and enter it into my case.

8. During the investigation I addressed about 20 complaints to various departments (*enumerates departments and dates of dispatch*) 15 of which were left without reply and which are not included in the case. I ask the court to return these complaints and include them in the case.

The judge addresses the representatives of the prosecution and defence:

Do you consider the petitions well founded and demanding compliance?

Prosecutor: I consider Bukovsky's petitions are either without foundation, or are not directly relevant to the case.

Advocate: I support my client's petitions and in addition I have two petitions which I ask the court's permission to submit.

Judge: You can submit them.

Advocate: The first petition—I ask to call as a witness to give testimony on the point of character and personality of my client, comrade V. E. Maksimov, who employed Bukovsky recently as a literary secretary. Second petition—I ask that comrade G. Podyapolsky be called before the court as a witness, as this witness was examined at the preliminary investigation about the dissemination by Bukovsky of various materials and can give evidence on this matter, which is important for my client.

The court leaves for consultation.

Having consulted, the court reaches a decision: to deny all petitions submitted, except for one, Bukovsky's eighth petition, which it allows in part, resolving to include in the case seven of the 15 complaints enumerated by Bukovsky.

The judge declared:

The court cannot call as witnesses Petrov, Parkhunov, Pisarev, Naritsa, Yakhimovich, Shults, Z. M. Grigorenko, and A. Fainberg, since these are insane people and their testimony would be invalid.

The court considers that the first point of the indictment is sufficiently precise.

The court denies Bukovsky's petition to call as witnesses Chalidze and Volpin as they are not relevant to the case.

The court did not consider Bukovsky's petition about the open hearing, as the trial is open, there are people in the hall, therefore the petition is unsubstantiated.

The court does not consider it necessary to include in the case the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reply of the Chairman of the College of Advocates, Apraksin, as this document is not relevant to the case.

The court grants in part Bukovsky's petition that his complaints be included in the case, and directs that seven complaints be returned and included in the case.

The court denies the petition to call V. Maksimov as a witness because V. Bukovsky did not work for him much, and does not consider it necessary to call as witness G. S. Podyapolsky as he has no connexion with the case.

Examination of the defendant V. K. Bukovsky

The court commences the examination of the defendant.

Judge: Bukovsky, stand up. You are given the opportunity to make a statement on all points of the indictment.

Bukovsky: I have already stated here on the first point of the indictment that it is unproved, unconfirmed, and imprecise. The only concrete statement mentioned in this point—is the interview given by me to the Associated Press correspondent, Jensen Holger, and the CBS correspondent, William Cole, which was taken down by the first and filmed by the second. It is true that in this interview I gave these correspondents some facts of my biography, and also facts about other persons, who, while absolutely sane, were placed by legal authorities in mental hospitals without any medical or legal justification. In this interview I also talked about the conditions in which people are kept in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital. I inform the court that in spring 1963 I was arrested by the organs of the KGB. During my arrest, two incomplete photocopies of a book by M. Djilas, *The New Class*, were confiscated. The investigating authority sent me for a psychiatric examination to the Serbsky Institute. I was adjudged unfit to plead and the court sentenced me, in my absence, to compulsory treatment in the Leningrad Psychiatric Hospital. This hospital is a prison type building surrounded by rows of barbed wire. The attendants are criminals who serve their sentences for various social crimes. In the first section, where I was kept at the beginning, patients are kept in locked cells for two or three persons each. They are entitled to one hour's exercise a day and one 5 kg. parcel per month. In my cell there was a Ukrainian nationalist who had already been in detention for 17 years, several years of which were spent in Vladimir prison, where he lost his reason because of the conditions in which he was kept. In the hospital cell he shouted constantly and the attendants beat him up many times in my presence merely because they were tired of his shouts. In addition, in my cell there was a real madman who had killed his children, cut off his ears, and eaten them.

I maintain that in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital, in my presence, the doctors systematically prescribed a course of injections of aminazine and sulfazine preparations as a punishment, at the request of hospital attendants and service personnel. These preparations result in a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

high temperature, up to 40°, pain throughout the body, and severe mental depression. For instance, I know that in my presence, two patients, Rodichkin and Nosov, wrestled in a friendly way. They both fell and Rodichkin hurt himself against a steam radiator. This happened not in Section 1 but in Section 10, which is more lax, and where it is permitted to leave the cells during the day. Rodichkin cut his eyebrow, he bled and they asked a sister for some iodine. For this they were transferred into a section where they were kept in cells, put into separate cells, and prescribed a course of injections, while Nosov was subjected to '*ukrutka*' (*description of* 'ukrutka').[1] Altogether, in this hospital, the medicines sulfazine and aminazine and also '*ukrutka*' were so widely used as a punishment on complaints from hospital attendants and nurses, that everybody knew in advance that if one broke the rules in some way, or simply was rude to the doctor or to somebody of the service personnel, one would be prescribed, as a punishment one of the medical treatments mentioned above.

I maintain that at the time I was in this hospital, N. N. Samsonov was also there, a great scientist, Laureate of the Stalin Prize Third Degree, author of more than 10 scientific works on geophysics, an absolutely sane person, who was only committed because he wrote and sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU a letter demanding that Stalin's crimes, and those of others like him, be completely revealed, i.e. the continuation of what was begun at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. N. N. Samsonov remained in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital for seven years, merely because he refused to admit that he was insane and renounce his views. It must be said that this was an essential condition for discharge from the hospital. A person had to declare to a commission that his views were the result of illness and that he was now cured of them.

I maintain that at the same time there was in this hospital a Rumanian who had lived for a long time in France and who came to the USSR to see with his own eyes the construction of communism. His name was N. G. Prisacaru (a strike at a footwear factory—hence mental hospital).

In the same hospital there was also a Latvian, Pintan, who emigrated to Australia and then returned to his native country. He was committed to the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital because he wanted to return to Australia. This was refused on the pretext that he held a passport issued by bourgeois Latvia and, according to USSR law, he was a subject of Soviet Latvia—he also was a completely sane person. Doctors often prescribed for him a course of injections because he claimed that his commitment to the special mental hospital was unlawful.

I can inform the court about many instances of inhuman treatment of prisoners in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital. For instance,

[1] '*Ukrutka*' is a treatment of patients consisting of wet towels or wet sheets being wound round the body, which as they are drying contract, causing acute pain.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I know for a fact that the prisoner Anatoly Belyaev (by the way, he was committed to the mental hospital for telling jokes about Khrushchev) was brutally beaten up by the doctor's assistant, Viktor Valerianovich (I do not know his surname as prisoners are not told the surnames of doctors and other medical and service personnel), and by the attendants, only because he lay in bed reading after lights out. The following day, after the doctor's assistant complained about the alleged excited state of the patient, Belyaev was prescribed a course of sulfazine injections. I can mention other instances confirming the truth of what I say. For instance, in this hospital there was a fairly large number of people who were committed for attempting to enter foreign embassies. They were accused of an attempt to cross the frontier, but as in law there is no indication that entering a foreign embassy is equivalent to crossing the frontier, these people were declared insane and committed to the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital.

Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, it is unnecessary to speak in such detail about these examples. What is the purpose of these details?

Bukovsky: I am accused of slander and I want to prove that nothing I said in the interview is slander.

Judge: You speak about it in too great detail. Stick to the point. Talk about yourself.

Bukovsky: Well, if I speak about myself, there are also sufficient facts to prove that I am right. After I was discharged from the Leningrad mental hospital in February 1965, I was arrested in the street in December of the same year by KGB agents and placed in the district mental hospital No. 13, without being accused of anything and without any medical indications. The health centre with which I was registered and which supervised me from the moment of my discharge from the Leningrad hospital stated, in reply to an enquiry, that I showed no deviations from the normal psychological state. The same conclusion was reached by the doctors of hospital No. 13 and I was discharged. However, the organs of the KGB ordered me to be transferred to another mental hospital at Stolbovaya in the hope that the doctors there would turn out to be more obedient and would find some symptoms of insanity. When this did not happen, and the doctors in this mental hospital did not find any abnormality in my state, the KGB transferred me to the Serbsky Institute. In reply to my mother's questions, which she put to the supervisory procurator, Funtov, she was told that 'in their opinion' I had been discharged too early from the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital and would benefit from some more treatment. Does this not prove who is the real initiator of commitment to a mental hospital and who exercises a pressure on examining doctors in cases similar to mine, when there is no legal ground for bringing a person to trial? As a result, without being charged with anything and against the doctors' opinion, I remained in various mental hospitals for eight and a half months altogether on this occasion and was only released thanks to public

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

statements by the community in the West and the pressure of public opinion.

Judge: Is that all you have to say on the first section of the indictment?

Bukovsky: No, not all. In the indictment it is said: 'Kept in his flat various anti-Soviet materials of libellous content maligning Soviet state and society.' I do not know which documents are meant. They are not mentioned in the indictment. During the search a large quantity of various documents was confiscated, among them a cutting from the newspaper *Pravda*. Is that too an anti-Soviet document?

Judge: Who wants to question the defendant on the first section of the indictment?

Prosecutor: You said that an essential condition for the discharge from the special mental hospital was the renunciation by the patient of his views. Did you also renounce your views when discharged?

Bukovsky: I had to renounce them in order to be discharged.

Prosecutor: You admit that you gave an interview to the AP correspondent Jensen Holger?

Bukovsky: I admit it.

Prosecutor: How did it happen?

Bukovsky: We drove out of town for an outing. There were quite a few of us, foreigners and Russians, about 30. Conversation turned to me and to what I had had to live through in the last few years and I related all that is contained in the interview and Holger wrote it down. At the same time, Bill Cole, a CBS correspondent, took a film of me.

Prosecutor: Did you prepare yourself in advance for this interview?

Bukovsky: No, I did not prepare myself, but I understood that such questions might be put and was always ready to answer them.

Prosecutor: You knew that your statement would be published in the West and that the film would be shown there on television screens?

Bukovsky: Yes, I knew that.

Prosecutor: And had no objection to it?

Bukovsky: No, I did not object, I even asked them to do it.

Prosecutor: What was your purpose?

Bukovsky: I wished that the facts which I stated should be known to a wide public.

Prosecutor: Why did you want that, what was your purpose?

Bukovsky: My purpose is explained in the interview itself. It says there (*quotes*): 'Our aim is the struggle against fear which has fettered people from Stalin's time and thanks to which the system continues to exist, a system of dictatorship, oppression, and coercion. In this struggle, personal example, which we give to people, is very important.'

Prosecutor: Have you had any medical education?

Bukovsky: No, I have had no special medical education. I studied psychiatry in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital when I worked there in the book-binding shop. I read a great number of books on psychiatry.

Judge: Has the defence any questions?

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Advocate: Tell me, when giving an interview to the Western correspondents, did you have the aim of undermining or weakening the Soviet power and its political regime?
Bukovsky: Of course not. I thought about the people, my friends and others, who had succumbed to the same fate and who could perhaps be saved.
Prosecutor: Tell me, what was your purpose in keeping in your flat cuttings from the newspapers *Washington Post* and others, and how did you get them?
Bukovsky: I had two cuttings: one of them, from the newspaper *Washington Post* with my picture, was brought to me by Nikitinsky, and I kept it because it contained the text of my interview and my picture. I read it in order to check whether there were any inaccuracies and it was kept in my desk. I had no purpose in doing it.
Prosecutor: What was your purpose in keeping in your flat the photocopy of the criminal case (*surname*)?
Bukovsky: I was interested in this case. I had difficulty in getting hold of an incomplete photocopy of this case and I wanted to study it, but did not have time.
Prosecutor: What was your purpose in keeping in your flat the document entitled 'Open letter to the 24th Congress', and who is the author?
Bukovsky: The surname of the author is at the end of this document—it is P. Yakir. This document was accidentally left in my flat by an acquaintance.
Prosecutor: How did the draft of the document entitled 'Open Letter to the Congress' get to you and who is its author?
Bukovsky: The author of this letter is not known and I do not know how I got it.
Prosecutor: How did the document entitled 'An appeal by political prisoners declared to be insane because of their views' get to you and who is its author?
Bukovsky: The names of its authors are also at the end of this document—they are V. Fainberg and B. Borisov. It arrived by post.
Prosecutor: Do you know that after your first arrest in 1963, your mother initiated your psychiatric examination?
Bukovsky: This was a long time before my arrest. At the request of the military registration office, I was examined by psychologists and the KGB, knowing this, sent me for an expert examination.
Prosecutor: I have some petitions to the court.
He presents the petitions that the court should look through the cuttings from foreign newspapers with comments on Bukovsky's statements contained in the interview which he gave to Holger and foreign press comments about the television interview given by Bukovsky to the correspondent Cole. The Judge finds the relevant pages in the case and announces that the court has looked through the documents enumerated.
Prosecutor: I request that the film which was shown on American television on 28 July 1970 by the CBS company be shown.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The film is demonstrated. On the screen the picture of Bukovsky appears all the time on a background of trees. The text is given in English only. After the end of the viewing:

Prosecutor: Defendant Bukovsky, do you admit that you are pictured in this film at the moment when you gave the interview?

Bukovsky: Yes, I admit it.

Judge: Pass to the evidence on the second section of the indictment.

Bukovsky: I met the witness V. A. Shushpanov in the spring of 1970. We only met about four times at my flat. Once we called at the flat of some of my acquaintances. As regards our conversation, it was on religious topics (Shushpanov introduced himself as a believer) and possibly on some social problems. The indictment mentions that I told him what I had seen in the mental hospitals. It is possible. I might perhaps have told him what sort of infringements are allowed in this matter by legal authorities and by some doctors. As regards anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, to which I allegedly subjected him, I can only say that our talks were not one-sided. Shushpanov himself admits that at the time he shared my views and if in these conversations I talked to him about my convictions, in particular that, in my opinion, there is practically no freedom of speech or press in the Soviet Union, i.e. the rights of citizens guaranteed by the USSR constitution are infringed, I repeat, that it was not anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, since our conversations were not one-sided. I simply expressed my convictions to him. Shushpanov testified at the investigation that I had allegedly promised him help in transmitting abroad what he now calls his ' anti-Soviet ', novel, if he ever writes one. I remember this conversation. Shushpanov asked me how he should act, were he to write a novel and want to transmit it abroad. To which I replied that, if he duplicated and disseminated his novel here, then, sooner or later, this novel would find its way abroad, whether he wanted it or not. There was no question of my help in this business; furthermore Shushpanov only intended to write the novel.

As regards the duplicator which I am alleged to have asked Shushpanov to bring from abroad, I can say the following: as I remember, I did ask him whether, as he was in the habit of going abroad on business, he could bring back a duplicator, to which he replied that he had not been sent abroad for a long time and, therefore, he could not do it. This is all I can say on this episode.

Prosecutor: What was your purpose in asking Shushpanov to buy and bring you a duplicator?

Bukovsky: The question was not put that way, but I was interested in the possibility of having such a machine.

Prosecutor: What did you want with it?

Bukovsky: I might have needed it to duplicate some materials.

Prosecutor: What sort?

Bukovsky: I had no definite documents in mind at the time, but in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principle I might have wanted to duplicate some sort of document which contained an expression of my individual convictions. Every citizen of the USSR has this right according to the constitution. Perhaps some literary work which is difficult to get hold of, the poems of Mandelshtam or Akhmatova.

Prosecutor: Why should you want to duplicate these materials?

Bukovsky: For friends and those who are interested in them.

Prosecutor: I have no further questions.

Advocate: Neither do I.

Judge: Defendant, pass to the next section.

Bukovsky: The third section of the indictment is based on the testimony of Nikitinsky, my former schoolmate. After we finished school, we did not meet for many years. After an interval of many years we met for the first time after I came out of custody, probably in the spring of 1970. The meeting was accidental, in the street near my house. He was glad to see me, I invited him in, we came in and talked about our life and fortunes during those years. He told me that after finishing school, he served in the army near Moscow, then, during the conflict on the Sino-Russian frontier, was transferred there and included in the Taman division which was one of the five divisions sent there at the time. He said that these troops were put under the orders of the KGB. He gave me various pieces of information which he had come across in his capacity as an officer of the frontier service and, perhaps as proof of his words, he gave me a Russo-Chinese phrase book for the use of the services, which was allegedly issued to the whole officer corps of the troops stationed at the time on the Chinese frontier.

Nikitinsky said that because of illness (peptic ulcer) he has now been transferred to Moscow and works at the Sheremetevo Airport at an OKPP (*special control and admission point*) where the customs inspection of things carried by Aeroflot passengers either going abroad or coming from abroad takes place. Later we met several times, always in my flat. I told Nikitinsky that he should not visit me, that I was being watched, that he could get into trouble. He answered that he did not wish to serve in the army. Once he brought me a whole heap of various foreign journals allegedly confiscated from someone at the customs. During these meetings we talked. I told him what I had to go through. That which is called in the indictment 'slanderous inventions' was simply facts, which I experienced personally and which I observed during these years. I have already spoken about them here. What was called in the indictment anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda was simply the expression of my views and convictions which I am ready even now to explain to the court, if the court demands it.

During these meetings Nikitinsky told me many times that he could let through his OKPP some person, without his undergoing a customs examination, and offered me this opportunity to transmit some materials abroad in this way, or receive them from there. Having become interested in this possibility, I said to him that if I could find a person who would

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agree to bring me a duplicator from abroad, then I might possibly need his help. After this I talked with various people about it, but could find no one who would agree to do it. Nikitinsky was very willing to help me and asked at each meeting when I should need his help. This strange insistence made me wary. I thought, is Nikitinsky trying to provoke me, on the orders of the KGB (since the detachments in which Nikitinsky served were subordinated to it), to a rash action, and on 31 December 1970 at my house, and in the presence of my mother, I told him that I should not need his help, that this plan was too risky, nor were there any people who would be willing to bring me a duplicator. Nikitinsky was disappointed at my refusal and tried to convince me that this business was quite safe. However, I refused categorically. After this Nikitinsky suddenly turned cool towards me and we did not meet again.

Much is unclear in Nikitinsky's testimony at the preliminary investigation. Thus Nikitinsky maintains that when visiting my house he heard from me and from my friends expressions which deeply offended him as a member of the CPSU and an honest and convinced communist. That once in my house he heard a lampoon scoffing at the leaders, which made him indignant to the bottom of his heart and he had difficulty in preventing himself from 'pushing in the mug' of the reader who was allegedly some MGU (*Moscow University*) student. The question is, why did Nikitinsky restrain himself? Why did he not mention, even once, that our expressions offended him and that he did not agree with my views? Why, instead of all that, did he let out to me, in confidence, various 'official secrets', for instance that a certain Mikheev, who apparently tried to flee abroad in the guise of a Swiss citizen, had been taken into custody at the Sheremetevo Airport? Did he not keep his 'Party conscience' in check for such a long time because he did not want to frighten me, hoping to complete the provocation plotted in the KGB?

Finally, why did he, according to his own testimony, take part in working out, with me and some mythical 'Sasha', plans for the illegal importation through the OKPP, as he calls it, 'an underground press'? And even, as he maintains, hold a kind of rehearsal of this plot, having shown some young man how it could be done?

Nikitinsky testifies that on 13 October, in my flat and in the presence of a certain 'Sasha', said to be a member of a Moscow Concert company and to be preparing to go abroad in his official capacity, and who allegedly promised to bring back from abroad equipment for a press, he, Nikitinsky, talked this plan over with him. This 'Sasha', in his presence, is said to have drawn a plan showing the service entrances and exits of Sheremetevo Airport and the OKPP. I ask the court to note the absurdity of this contention. Really, how should Sasha, alleged to be a member of a Moscow Concert company, know the plan of airport office premises? It would be more logical to assume that Nikitinsky knew this plan. This is really what happened. At one of our

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meetings Nikitinsky brought me such a plan, drawn by himself. It lay about in my house for a long time, before it got lost. Moreover, I would ask the court to note the following illogicality in Nikitinsky's statements. He maintains: 'On 13 October I finally understood that they wished to use me in an anti-Soviet plot and decided to report this to my superiors, and wrote a statement for the KGB'. At the same time Nikitinsky states that on the following day he held some sort of rehearsal. Is this not strange—meanwhile his statement to the KGB, included in the case, is dated 8 February 1971. What forced an honest communist to keep quiet for nearly four months about an 'anti-Soviet' plot in the course of preparation and to hold a rehearsal of this plot, and what induced him to make a belated report? The assumption emerges that my refusal to take part in this measure is the reason why it was decided to use this failed provocateur as a witness, should the occasion arise.

The claim that I allegedly kept in my flat two numbers of the journal *Possev* and let somebody study it, is based, by the prosecution, on the testimony of the same witness. But at the preliminary investigation, Nikitinsky did not testify to this effect. His testimony says that in his presence I brought these two journals into my flat and took them away after five minutes, while Nikitinsky himself 'did not express a wish to study them'.

Judge: Is that all you have to say on this section?

Bukovsky: Yes, that is all.

Judge: Does anyone have any questions for the defendant?

No questions.

Bukovsky: On the section connected with the testimony of the servicemen Bychkov and Tarasov, I can say that in March 1971 I was indeed in a café near the Kursk station with a friend. The waitress showed us to a table which was already occupied by two men in uniform (as we now know they were Bychkov and Tarasov). I had not met these people before and never saw them again. Indeed we started talking sitting at a café table. It began, as far as I remember, with the events in Poland, as I understood from their conversation that they were eye-witnesses of these events or knew about them from their comrades. When we discussed these events, our opinions differed. I consider, and told them so, that armed suppression of speeches by representatives of the people struggling for their economic and political rights is an inadmissible measure, and that our army exists not to suppress popular movements, but for the defence of the country against external enemies. They considered that as servicemen they were obliged to execute any order of their commanders, including firing on the people, if the order should require it. I found such a readiness to shoot at anybody if ordered strange, and I again asked them: 'Imagine that the following situation were to arise: for instance, tomorrow in our country prices are increased and popular discontent is aroused. Imagine, for instance, that among the demonstrators you saw me, with whom you are now conversing

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peaceably and even amicably. Would you shoot me? 'Yes', they said. 'And kill?' I asked. 'Yes, and kill, if we were ordered', they said and then asked what I would have done in their place. To this I answered that had I found myself in such a situation, I would at least have tried to shoot over people's heads in order not to hit anybody. They asked me why I considered that I might find myself among the discontented. I replied that I had already been repeatedly persecuted for my convictions, told them that the public in the West knew about me and that I was acquainted with several Western correspondents.

They did not believe me and I then showed them my notebook at the page on which the telephone numbers of Western correspondents were written down. Bychkov wrote down one of them and then said jokingly that he would check it. I suggested that they should make a note of my telephone and name. Bychkov wrote them down. After that we parted and did not meet again.

Judge: What questions are there for Bukovsky?

Prosecutor: Did you tell these people that in our country sane persons are placed in mental hospitals?

Bukovsky: It is possible.

Prosecutor: Possible, or did you say it?

Bukovsky: Possibly I told them, but I don't remember exactly.

Prosecutor: Did you tell them that we have no individual freedom?

Bukovsky: As I have already said here, this is my conviction and it is possible that I explained my convictions to these persons. As regards the contention that I allegedly maintained that the regime in our country is not one that is needed, this belongs to the field of emotional generalizations. It is possible that this is how they understood me. But I never protested against the Soviet regime as a political form of government and could not say that to anybody.

Prosecutor: Why then did you give your telephone number and address to Bychkov and Tarasov?

Bukovsky: Why do people in general give each other their telephone numbers?

Judge (*rebukes Bukovsky*): Answer the question.

Bukovsky: They were interested in who I was, I gave my name and telephone number.

Prosecutor: What was your purpose in giving Bychkov and Tarasov the telephone numbers of foreign correspondents?

Bukovsky: I have already explained that during our conversation they did not believe that I knew foreign correspondents and I showed them these telephone numbers. Altogether, the conversation was conducted in a humorous vein.

Judge: Are there any further questions to the defendant?

No questions.

Judge: Defendant, pass on to the last section of the indictment.

Bukovsky: As regards this last section, I can say the following: On

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

28 March 1971, Chalidze rang me and asked me to call on him. I came. In his flat there was a citizen of Belgium, Hugo Sebreghts, whom I had not met before. This was my only meeting with him. In addition to him and Chalidze, there was also Volpin. Sebreghts and Chalidze talked about the activity of the 'Committee'. They needed me as an interpreter, as Chalidze does not know either English or French and Sebreghts did not know Russian. After the conversation was finished, I left. I did not give any documents to Sebreghts and to prove this I asked for the witnesses Volpin and Chalidze to be called, but the court refused to do so.

Judge: You have said everything?

Bukovsky: Yes, everything.

Judge: Questions?

Prosecutor: I request the court to read the last testimony of Hugo Sebreghts at the preliminary investigation (*gives references*).

Judge: *Reads the report which says that on 28 March 1971 in Chalidze's flat he, Sebreghts, received from Bukovsky, in the presence of Chalidze and Volpin, two typed documents,* Chronicle of Current Events, *No. 17, and 'An Open Letter to the 24th Congress' by P. Yakir. Bukovsky asked him to say, in case these documents were discovered in his possession, that he had received them from an unknown person in one of the Moscow museums.*

Judge: Who else wants to question the defendant about this episode?

Prosecutor: I ask the court to study the conclusion of a forensic handwriting expert that the documents found on H. Sebreghts are identical with the documents confiscated at Bukovsky's flat during the search and are written on the same typewriter.

Judge: The court has looked at these documents.

Recess

Examination of witnesses

Witness V. A. Shushpanov is called.

Judge: Witness Shushpanov, you are warned that according to Article 181 of the UPK RSFSR, you are held responsible for giving any false testimony. Sign the declaration.

Shushpanov signs.

Judge: Your surname, name, and patronymic.

Shushpanov: Shushpanov, Vladimir Alexandrovich.

Judge: Where did you work when you knew Bukovsky?

Shushpanov: On the staff of the Foreign Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Judge: Where do you work now?

Shushpanov: Teacher of English lexicology in a higher educational establishment.

Judge: What are your relations with the defendant?

Shushpanov: Normal.

Judge: At the preliminary investigation you testified about V. K.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bukovsky's case. Will you tell the court what you know about this case.
Shushpanov: I should prefer to answer questions.
Judge: You must tell everything you know and then you will be asked questions.
Shushpanov: I got to know Vladimir Konstantinovich in the following way. An acquaintance asked me to find some sort of work translating from English to earn some money. I could do this, and this acquaintance asked me to ring Bukovsky's number. I rang, Bukovsky and I met, and I gave him a text to translate. He did this work rather well.
Judge: Go on, continue, Shushpanov.
Shushpanov: Actually that is all.
Judge: How many times did you meet Bukovsky and where?
Shushpanov: Not many, several times at his flat. Once we visited his acquaintances, I do not remember their name and address.
Judge: What were the subjects of your conversations with Bukovsky?
Shushpanov: I cannot remember what we talked about, it was very long ago, nearly three years have passed.
Prosecutor: You met in the spring of 1970, so that three years have not passed, moreover you gave testimony at the preliminary investigation in August 1971. Try to remember what Bukovsky told you at your meetings.
Shushpanov: Well, he told me that he had been committed to mental hospitals for something.
Prosecutor: Did he tell you that he, or others who were there, were treated inhumanly?
Shushpanov: He said that they were given injections of some medicines, I do not remember which.
Prosecutor: And what was the purpose of these injections? Did not Bukovsky tell you?
Shushpanov: Well, I think it was part of the medical treatment.
Prosecutor: Did Bukovsky tell you that he did not like this regime?
Shushpanov: He said that he is a supporter of a 'balanced society'.
Prosecutor: What does it mean, how did he explain it?
Shushpanov: I understood that he meant a multi-party system.
Prosecutor: Did Bukovsky ask you to use your official trip abroad to obtain a duplicator?
Shushpanov: I think this conversation took place, but my recollection is that I initiated it.
Judge: What do you mean, you initiated it? What course did the conversation take?
Shushpanov: I think the conversation was about *samizdat*. I asked Bukovsky: is it possible that literary *samizdat* is (*copied*) on typewriters only? Bukovsky said yes, on typewriters only. I enquired, why not use some better duplicating device, something like a printing press. To which Bukovsky answered that such a device cannot be got in our country, that it can only be bought freely abroad. I asked why they did not get a machine sent from abroad, where, apparently, they have some

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

connexions. Bukovsky answered, I do not go abroad and have no such possibility, but you do and might try to bring such a machine from there.
Judge: So the conversation remained merely a conversation.
Shushpanov: Yes.
Prosecutor: What did Bukovsky tell you about the lack of individual freedom here in the USSR?
Shushpanov: Where? When we visited those acquaintances of his?
Prosecutor: Well, perhaps there.
Shushpanov: He did not speak much, it was mainly the others.
Prosecutor: What precisely?
Shushpanov: Well, as I understood it, they are generally discontented, protesting perhaps.
Prosecutor: Tell me, Shushpanov, did you, at the time you knew Bukovsky, share his anti-Soviet views?
Shushpanov: Yes, I did share them.
Prosecutor: You intended to write an anti-Soviet novel?
Shushpanov: Yes.
Prosecutor: Did Bukovsky promise to help you transmit this novel abroad?
Shushpanov: Bukovsky said that if I disseminated this novel, it would, sooner or later, whether I wanted it or not, find its way abroad.
Prosecutor: Did Bukovsky give you any materials to study?
Shushpanov: At my request, he gave me to read Solzhenitsyn's works *Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle.*
Judge: Where were these books published?
Shushpanov: I think by the publishers 'Possev'.
Judge: Who wants to question the witness?
No questions.
Judge: Witness Shushpanov, you can go.
Witness Nikitinsky A. E. is called.
Judge: *Warns the witness about responsibility for perjury according to Article 181, UPK RSFSR. The witness signs.*
Judge: Witness, tell the court your name, patronymic, and place of work.
Nikitinsky: Nikitinsky, Arnold Eduardovich. I work at the special control and admission point of the Sheremetevo Airport.
Judge: On what terms are you with the defendant?
Nikitinsky: I think on normal terms.
Judge: Relate what you know about the case.
Nikitinsky: Bukovsky and I have been acquainted since the eighth form at school. He was transferred to us from another school. From the first days at our school, Bukovsky showed that he was a very able and well-read lad, a very good comrade, everybody was attracted to him and loved him. He was always willing to help his comrades. In particular, I found difficulty with English and Bukovsky helped me to find a tutor. When I lost some library books, Bukovsky immediately took some books from his personal library and gave them to me. I visited

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his house more than once. He was hospitable towards everybody and offered tea. In the 10th form at school, Bukovsky, with other lads, brought out a magazine called *The Martyr*. Half of this magazine was devoted to school affairs, the other half . . . (*finds difficulty in explaining*). Well, they might have expressed some sort of discontent. The school Komsomol condemned this magazine. Bukovsky was expelled and since then I had not seen him for many years. We met again in 1970, in the winter or spring in the street near his house. He asked me to come in. We started talking. He said that he had been committed to mental hospitals, although he is sane, that he had been under arrest. Talked about himself generally. After this I used to visit him; he always received me very well, we played chess, drank coffee, talked. Having found out that I work at an OKPP at Sheremetevo Airport, Bukovsky asked me to arrange matters so as to let through unnoticed somebody who would bring him a portable press from abroad. I thought that this was a joke and did not believe that he really intended to do it. Many people visited Bukovsky's house. They came, showed him something, he corrected something and they went away. As I understood it, he was a sort of proof reader for them. Once a student of MGU came and read, in my presence, a lampoon describing how some sort of tramp mocks our leaders and V. I. Lenin. I found it very unpleasant listening and I realised that I was among people inimical to me. Later Bukovsky introduced me to a certain 'Sasha', working at the Mosconcert. He said that Sasha was going abroad and would bring back a press and I had to help him to avoid customs inspection. In my presence, this Sasha drew a plan of the airport, the position of service exits and the OKPP. I understood that I was being drawn into a dangerous conspiracy and decided to inform the proper authorities about it. The following day, some young man came to the airport from Bukovsky, with whom I held a rehearsal, i.e. showed him how to pass through a back entrance and showed him round the airport.

Judge: Is that all?

Nikitinsky: I think so.

Judge: Questions to the witness?

Prosecutor: Did Bukovsky tell you that in our country sane persons are put into mental hospitals for their convictions?

Nikitinsky: Yes, he said that he had been committed several times to mental hospitals, although he is sane.

Prosecutor: What other anti-Soviet expressions did you hear from Bukovsky?

Nikitinsky: There was a lot of talk.

Prosecutor: And what did Bukovsky himself talk about?

Nikitinsky: He mostly kept silent, the others mostly talked.

Judge: Are there any further questions to the witness?

Advocate: Tell us, Nikitinsky, when did you meet Bukovsky last?

Nikitinsky: 31 December 1970. I remember because a fir tree was being arranged in the flat at the time.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Advocate: At this meeting, did Bukovsky announce to you that he had given up the plan which you mentioned here?
Nikitinsky: No, he made no such announcement.
Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, have you any questions for the witness?
Bukovsky: Yes, I have. (*Addressing Nikitinsky:*) You maintain that at my flat you repeatedly heard anti-Soviet remarks, which you did not like, which made you indignant and you had difficulty in restraining yourself from being rude. You say you understood that you found yourself among hostile people, but continued to visit me. Why did you not once tell me your opinion? Why did you not tell me that, as an honest communist, you do not approve of my remarks and my actions, and they make you indignant? Why did you keep silent? Why did you restrain yourself?
Nikitinsky is silent.
Judge: Nikitinsky, answer the question.
Nikitinsky: Well, I told him: 'Chuck it, Volodya, stop beating your head against a brick wall.'
(*laughter in court*)
Bukovsky: What sort of anti-Soviet remarks did you hear from me personally?
Nikitinsky: I don't remember exactly.
Prosecutor: At the preliminary investigation you testified that Bukovsky told you of the infringement of citizens' rights in our country, of the absence of individual liberty. Is that right?
Nikitinsky: Yes, he said something about there being no freedom of speech or press. But it is no use telling me that, I am a communist. It is all fuss and bother.
(*laughter in court*)
Judge (*rebukes advocate Shveisky*): There is no place for smiles in court proceedings.
Advocate: I am not smiling, you are mistaken. I consider that there is no cause for smiles in what the witness says.
Judge: Exactly. Are there more questions to the witness?
Bukovsky: Tell me, did I say to you that I had given up the plan for the importation of a portable press, as it seemed risky to me and, moreover, I had found nobody who would agree to bring it from abroad?
Nikitinsky: Yes, you said there was nobody. For the present there was not, is how I understood it.
Bukovsky: Tell me why, having understood on 13 October 1970 that an anti-Soviet conspiracy was in the course of preparation, you did not inform your superiors about it immediately, and instead, as you maintain, held some sort of rehearsal?
Nikitinsky: I did not believe that it was in earnest. It was like a dream. I thought it was a joke.
Bukovsky: What happened in the time which elapsed between our meeting on 13 October 1970 and 8 February, i.e. nearly four months,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when you finally decided to inform about all this? When did you realise that it was no joke?
Nikitinsky: I was horrified by the lampoon which I heard in your house. My eyes were opened.
Bukovsky: When did this happen? You maintain that we met for the last time on 31 December 1970.
Nikitinsky: I don't remember.
Bukovsky: Tell me, what was your purpose in bringing to my house various foreign journals?
Nikitinsky: I did not bring any, I did not have the opportunity.
Bukovsky: Why did you bring me a cutting from the *Washington Post* with the article and my picture?
Nikitinsky: I did not bring it.
Bukovsky: What was your purpose in telling me about events on the Soviet-Chinese frontier?
Judge: The court rules that this question be disregarded.
Bukovsky: What was your purpose in bringing me a Russo-Chinese phrase book for service use?
Judge: The court rules that this question be disregarded.
Bukovsky: What was your purpose in telling me about the arrest at the Sheremetevo airport of citizen Mikheev, who . . .
Judge: The court rules that this question be disregarded.
Bukovsky: In what circumstances did you see in my house the 'Possev' journals?
Nikitinsky: I was at your place once. You asked me to wait and left the house yourself. In your absence Sasha arrived. I opened the door to him. Then you came and brought two journals.
Bukovsky: What journals were they?
Nikitinsky: There was a stamp with 'Possev' on it.
Bukovsky: The publishers of 'Possev' publish all sorts of publications, were these journals entitled 'Possev'?
Nikitinsky: I don't know exactly. You said something about 'Possev'.
Judge: Did Bukovsky give you these journals to study?
Nikitinsky: I was not interested in that and did not ask to see them.
Bukovsky: What happened to these journals next?
Nikitinsky: I think he gave them to Sasha.
Bukovsky: That means that Sasha took them away?
Nikitinsky: I don't know that.
Bukovsky: At the investigation you said that I myself took them away after five minutes.
Nikitinsky: I don't remember now how it happened.
Bukovsky: Tell me, which department do you directly come under? KGB?
Judge: The court rules that this question be disregarded.
Advocate: I have a question. Tell me, Nikitinsky, your statement of 8 February, did you write it yourself?
Nikitinsky: Yes, myself.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Advocate: Where did you write it?
Nikitinsky: Where? Not in my house.
Advocate: I ask, *where* did you write it?
Nikitinsky: I can't remember where I wrote it.
Advocate: Then tell us this, you arrived there, where you handed in this statement, with the statement already written; or did you write it there?
Nikitinsky: I arrived with the statement already written.
Advocate: Tell me then, do you know the contents of Article 180, UK RSFSR?
Nikitinsky: I don't understand.
Judge: The court rules that this question be disregarded.
Advocate: I want to explain why I put this question to the witness Nikitinsky. Nikitinsky maintains that he wrote the statement himself, but it contains a reference to Article 180, UK RSFSR. I want to find out whether he knows the contents of this article.
Judge: The court rules that this question be disregarded.
No more questions.
Judge: Witness Nikitinsky, you can go.
Witness Bychkov is called.
Judge: *Warns about responsibility under Article 181, UK. Bychkov signs. He is asked about his place of work.*
Bychkov: I serve in the army.
Judge: Relate what you know about the case.
Bychkov: In March 1971, Tarasov and I were in a café at the Kursk station. We were going on leave to Tarasov's home and were waiting for a train. The waitress put two strangers at our table.
Judge: Do you recognise the defendant as one of them?
Bychkov: Yes, that is he.
Judge: On what terms are you with him, normal or bad?
Bychkov: Normal.
Judge: Continue.
Bychkov: Bukovsky's friend went off to dance. Tarasov also danced at first, and Bukovsky and I started talking.
Judge: What did you talk about?
Bychkov: Bukovsky said that in our country there is no freedom of speech or of the press. That he was kept in mental hospitals for his convictions. Said that he proposed to organize a demonstration for the 24th Congress and that if we were there and were ordered to shoot at the demonstrators, we ought not to shoot. Also Bukovsky said that he was acquainted with foreign correspondents. Showed us a notebook with their telephone numbers. I took note of one number—the correspondent Astrachan. Bukovsky also gave us his telephone number and address.
Judge: For what purpose did Bukovsky give you his telephone number and those of the correspondents?
Bychkov: He said that if we had any information, we could pass it to these numbers.
Judge: Does anyone have any questions to the witness?

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prosecutor: Did Bukovsky tell you that the regime in our country is not one which is needed by the Soviet people?
Bychkov: Yes, he said that.
Judge: Are there any further questions to the witness?
Bukovsky: Witness Bychkov, cast your mind back to our conversation. Are you sure that we talked about the 24th Congress and not about Poland?
Bychkov: Yes, I am sure.
No further questions. Bychkov is requested to stay in the courtroom for the time being.
Witness Tarasov is called.
Judge: *Warns about responsibility under Article 181, UK. Tarasov signs. He is asked about his place of work.*
Tarasov: I serve in the army.
Judge: Are you on normal terms with the defendant?
Tarasov: Yes.
Judge: Relate what you know about this case.
Tarasov: In March 1971, in a café at the Kursk station, I was with Bychkov, going on leave, waited for the train. The waitress put Bukovsky and his friend at our table. They started to talk. I did not hear the beginning of the conversation as I was dancing. When I returned to the table, conversation had already started. Bukovsky was saying something about foreign correspondents, that he was acquainted with them, and showed telephone numbers. Bychkov wrote down one of these numbers and also that of Bukovsky. Bukovsky said that he was put in mental hospitals for protesting because we have no freedom of speech here. That is all.
Judge: Did Bukovsky tell you that the regime in our country is not one that the Soviet people need?
Tarasov: It seems to me that this was the expression he used.
Prosecutor: What else did Bukovsky tell you?
Tarasov: I don't remember.
Judge: What did Bukovsky tell you about the 24th Congress?
Tarasov: He said that he would probably be imprisoned for the Congress.
Judge: Witness Bychkov, repeat what you told the court about this.
Bychkov: *Repeats about the demonstration, about not shooting.*
Judge: Tarasov, you confirm that Bukovsky said it?
Tarasov: I don't remember this. He said that he would be imprisoned for the 24th Congress. I remember that.
There are no further questions. The witness can go.
A recess is announced. After the recess Bukovskaya, Nina Ivanovna, is called as witness.
Judge: Witness Bukovskaya, you are warned that according to Article 181, UK RSFSR, you are responsible for perjury. Will you sign that you will tell the truth.
Bukovskaya signs.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Judge: Witness Bukovskaya, how is the defendant related to you?
Bukovskaya: He is my son.
Judge: What terms are you on?
Bukovskaya: Good, although my son did not confide his affairs to me.
Judge: Tell me, when did Bukovsky finish school?
Bukovskaya: In 1959.
Judge: How did he study?
Bukovskaya: Well, he is very able.
Judge: What did he do after he left school?
Bukovskaya: He went to a university for one year and then worked.
Judge: Where did he work last year?
Bukovskaya: With the woman writer Baumvol as a literary secretary. In the summer he joined a geological expedition, later worked as a literary secretary with another writer, Maksimov.
Judge: Has your son any qualifications?
Bukovskaya: No, he did not have time to get any qualifications.
Judge: What sort of wages did he get when he worked as a literary secretary?
Bukovskaya: Low, 50 rubles a month.
Judge: Did he try to find other work?
Bukovskaya: Yes, he tried, but nobody would take him as he had returned from places of confinement.
Prosecutor: Tell us, Bukovskaya, did you receive money remittances in currency certificates from Oslo and Rome?
Bukovskaya: Does this concern my son's case?
Judge: Witnesses have no right to put questions.
Advocate: I protest. This does not concern my client's case.
Bukovsky: This is disgusting! It has no connexion with my case!
Judge: Bukovsky, be quiet, keep yourself in check (*to the witness*)— Yes, it has a connexion with the case, continue with your reply.
Bukovskaya: Yes, I received these remittances. They were sent to me in 1969 when my son was serving his term of punishment in a labour camp. People learned from the newspapers about my sorrow and sent me small sums with very nice, warm letters. I still keep these letters.
Judge: You did not receive this money for two years?
Bukovskaya: No. I did not get it for two years, it stayed in the bank. Only this year, when I was sacked from work because of my son, I became a pensioner and took this money.
Prosecutor: How much money altogether did you receive in certified rubles, what sum?
Bukovskaya: I don't remember exactly, probably about 100 rubles.
Prosecutor: Here is an official certificate from the External Bank, USSR; Bukovskaya was paid in currency certificates 101 rubles. I request that the certificate be added to the case.
Gives the certificate to the Judge.
Bukovskaya: Tell me, does the certificate say that the remittances were sent in 1969?

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Judge: Yes, it does.
Advocate: Tell us, witness, do you know a Nikitinsky, officer in the frontier troops?
Bukovskaya: Of course I know him, he was my son's school friend.
Advocate: Has he visited your home?
Bukovskaya: Yes, he has.
Advocate: Did you ever hear a conversation between your son and Nikitinsky about the importation from abroad of an underground press?
Bukovskaya: Yes, I did. I remember it was at the end of December last year, on New Year's Eve. We were decorating the fir tree at the house. My daughter was there too. Nikitinsky arrived.
Judge: Were you in the same room as your son and Nikitinsky?
Bukovskaya: Yes, I came into the room, decorated the tree, went out to the next room, came back again and heard the conversation.
Advocate: What sort of conversation did you hear?
Bukovskaya: I heard Nikitinsky insistently persuading my son to import from abroad equipment for an underground press. He promised his help, said that he worked at the customs inspection department at the Sheremetevo Airport and would be able to help to get this equipment through. I also heard my son energetically declining both Nikitinsky's help and the very idea of importing and organizing the press.
Bukovsky: Tell me please, what did you do with the *Playboy* magazines which Nikitinsky brought me and which were in my desk when I left for the expedition?
Bukovskaya: Yes, I remember: Nikitinsky brought to our house some filth—a heap of *Playboy* magazines, which were full of photographs of naked women and scabrous drawings. But my son does not like such literature, and I even less. Moreover, such photos and drawings are considered here to be pornography and one can be tried for that. I burnt these magazines.
Bukovsky: Tell me please, did you approach any departments in 1966, when I was kept eight months in mental hospitals and transferred from one to another, without any trial or investigation and without being charged, and also against medical evidence.
Bukovskaya: I remember it well, I approached many departments at that time. First of all the Moscow city procurator in charge of supervision of the organs of state security—Funtov. He replied: 'Let him stay in a bit.' I applied to General Svetlichny, who was then head of UKGB [Criminal Committee for State Security] for Moscow and the provinces. He also answered: 'Let him stay in a bit.' Three times I wrote letters about it to the Central Committee of the CPSU and after the third letter you were let out.
Bukovsky: Do you remember the occasion when I introduced to you in the street a member of the KGB who persecuted me and threatened me with a service pistol?
Bukovskaya: Of course I remember. Before the revolution these people were called '*shpiki*', I don't know what they are called now. This man

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

walked at my son's heels and my son introduced him to me, saying that he had been persecuting him for a long time in a trolleybus and in the street and had threatened him with a service pistol.

Judge: This man did not deny your son's contention?

Bukovskaya: No, he did not deny it, and I explained to him that he was exceeding his authority and had no right to threaten my son with weapons.

Judge: Enough, Bukovskaya, you can go; you can sit down.

Advocate: I ask the court to return to the discussion of the question of calling witnesses D. Paipert and A. Waller. I ask that these witnesses be called.

Judge: The court considers that these witnesses are irrelevant to the case. Apart from that, the court examination is at an end.

The speech of the state prosecutor Mrs A. Bobrushko [2]

THE court hearing in the case of the accused Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky, born 1942, Russian, is completed.

The acts of the accused Bukovsky are described by the indictment as crimes specified under Article 70 Part 1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. But first and foremost I shall permit myself to characterize the situation which has evolved in the world arena at the present time, while this case is being heard.

The stormy growth of the material and spiritual forces of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the successes of the World Communist and Workers' Movement, have led to an unprecedented propagation of the great ideas of communism on our planet. There is no force which can restrain their revolutionizing influence on the destinies of mankind.

The course of the world revolutionary process evokes deep alarm amidst the imperialist reactionaries, and they permit themselves any means of struggle against the forces of social and national liberation, and against the world of socialism. The creative labour of Soviet people and of the workers of fraternal socialist countries serves as an inspiring example for the peoples of all continents. Bourgeois propaganda is conducting a fierce struggle against the ideas of socialism, striving above all to defame the Soviet order and slander the historic achievements of our people. One slander campaign comes after another, critics and 'oracles' are replaced by others, but the essence of anti-communism remains unchanged as the chief direction of the policies and ideology of imperialist reaction. You see before you a routine stunt in the whipping up of anti-Sovietism.

At the same time the imperialist gentlemen and their lackeys are not abashed to undertake any tricks—from inventions about 'aggressive communism' and 'the Soviet military threat', the fabrication of legends

[2] The translations of the speeches by A. Bobrushko and V. Y. Shveisky are printed here by kind permission of *The Times*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the 'absence of freedom' or the 'persecution of the Jews' in the Soviet Union, and other such rubbish, to the most impertinent and cynical subversive acts, in whose intrigues are mixed up the agents of imperialist intelligence services, venerable professors of disinformation, and mercenary scribblers of the bourgeois press.

But however zealously the anti-Soviet gentlemen pursue their aims —subverting the people's faith in the ideas of socialism and communism —it is beyond their power, it is unattainable. And it is no coincidence that in the very camp of the imperialists voices are heard more and more frequently which admit the failures of anti-Communist propaganda. The American weekly *Time* admits through clenched teeth: 'Marxism is one third of humanity . . . the attractiveness of the Marxist vision of the world will be retained until modern bourgeois society finds more effective means than hitherto of explaining to the masses its essence and its direction.'

In recent times the activation of slander and disinformation has been observed on the part of Western ideological saboteurs, who have been given the task of compromising Soviet reality in every way, distorting the external and internal policies of the USSR, and slandering the Soviet people and the Communist Party. Even the commentator of *The New York Times,* Salisbury, who could hardly be suspected of sympathy for the USSR, referring to canards published in the Western press about Soviet reality, virtually admits that these materials of disinformation have been cooked up in one of the Western centres of anti-Soviet falsifications.

How can the apologists of imperialism cover up this 'image of the free world', which has already been lynched and shot dead? Not having a single positive ideal or constructive programme to their name, they clutch, as a drowning man clutches at a straw, at the poisonous weapon of anti-communism. The activation of anti-communist, and in the first place anti-Soviet, propaganda is clearly aimed at darkening and fogging the consciousness of the alarmed public of the countries of the West, at trying to divert them from the attractive ideas of progress and freedom, and force them to reconcile themselves to the leaden abominations of imperialism.

Such are the aims of our enemies. What are their means? Entire groups of pseudo-scientific 'Sovietologists' 'compose' 'works', full of 'schemes' and 'models' for the destruction of socialism. The lackeys of imperialist propaganda are mobilized to assist them. In close cooperation with the intelligence services, their propaganda persistently seeks in our country fodder for slander against the socialist order. It is a thankless task and obviously beyond their powers. Imperialism and all its intrigues are opposed by the monolithic Soviet people, proud of its achievements, its unity, and its confidence in the triumph of the high ideals which it defends. The enemies of the Soviet people have only one way left: to rummage in garbage, seeking loot amidst corrupt individuals who are prepared to sell everything for a foreign mess of pottage.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One of the bosses of American propaganda, the chairman of the 'committee for political information', General Jackson, stated with a kind of cynical frankness the sort of sources to which the anti-communists resort: 'in the ideological struggle with communism we do not need truth, but subversive acts: in such a war one needs all the cut-throats and gangsters whom we can collect in one way or another'. As you can see, the cause of the opponents of communism is in such a pathetic state that they have had to resort to criminal elements in their hunt for an anti-Soviet faction, to various renegades, good-for-nothings, rogues and scoundrels, and even people who are of interest only to the psychiatrist.

For lack of suitable 'material', Western propaganda long dwelt on the name of Tarsis and people like him, representing their untalented, anti-Soviet scribblings as 'treasures of Russian literature'. Having received no recognition in their homeland, these slanderers readily sent their libels against the Soviet people to capitalist countries, where they were printed.

The British reactionary press tried to create a sensation around the appearance of Tarsis in London. 'Sovietologists' warmly recommended him to the British public as a 'persecuted Soviet writer'. Very soon the sensation died down, because after two raving appearances by Tarsis on television and in the press, his patrons confessed with embarrassment that before them was not a writer, but a candidate for a psychiatric hospital.

The bosses of the professional anti-communists demand from them an uninterrupted flow of materials for the compiling of disinformation. For some years past attempts have been made to persuade the readers of a number of Western newspapers and magazines that 'in scientific and literary circles in Moscow' there exist certain 'dissident intellectuals', who at the same time appear as 'reliable sources', systematically informing certain foreign correspondents about Soviet reality. Dispatches from Moscow, regularly published in newspapers like the *Washington Post*, are frequently accompanied by references to these 'sources'.

The unsophisticated reader does not realize that the term 'scientists and writers who are at odds with the system' conceals mercenary ignoramuses.

Let us take for example a certain A. Amalrik, whom the *Washington Post* glorifies as a historian and the author of 'gripping, brilliant' works. In fact, he is not so much a devotee of history as of scandalous, criminal episodes. In 1961 he was expelled from Moscow University for failure to attend classes and to pass examinations. Thus the 'academic career' of Amalrik ended: he did not want either to study or to work. Beginning with the sale of his father's library, he soon became an accomplished good-for-nothing. He became acquainted with the organs of Soviet justice, and was obliged, in his own words, to make 'an involuntary journey'. Having returned to Moscow, Amalrik decided to begin to earn his living . . . at the offices of certain Western periodicals. Almost

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

every day, Amalrik haunted the thresholds of foreign journalists' offices, offering the occupants dirty rumours and slanders. Out of these were fabricated 'reliable dispatches'.

The renegades who beg for whisky and cigarettes in exchange for dirty inventions are a pathetic handful. Even their benefactors are forced to admit this. Thus Holger Jensen, correspondent of the Associated Press, noted that 'they are a tiny minority'. The former correspondent of *The New York Times* in Moscow, Henry Kamm, acknowledges that for every renegade there are 100,000 devoted Soviet patriots. None the less, day after day the imperialist propaganda keeps in the public eye not the vast and astonishing life of a great people, but a minute handful of mercenaries. Well, there is a certain logic in this. A liking for the fabrication of falsehoods and forgeries, an inclination towards the outcasts of society, has long been second nature for militant anti-communists.

Suffering a fiasco with such rogues and schizophrenics, the heralds of anti-communism decided to resort to a provocation on a bigger scale, and to raise a fuss around the name of A. Solzhenitsyn, with his tacit consent. A. Solzhenitsyn's lampoons on the Soviet people, blackening the exploits and achievements of our homeland and the dignity of Soviet people, were suitable material for the routine, anti-Soviet campaign blown up in the West.

Inwardly a spiritual emigrant, alien and hostile to the whole life of the Soviet people, Solzhenitsyn was invested by imperialist propaganda with the robes of a 'great' Russian writer, and recently he was awarded the Nobel Prize. The Nobel Committee was led by the bridle by anti-Socialist speculators, who raised Solzhenitsyn up not for his 'talent', but merely because he had defamed Soviet reality. The falsifications and underhand insinuations of individual renegades are the propaganda weapons used by our ideological opponents.

Now yet another slanderer and vicious anti-Soviet element, Bukovsky, has appeared before the court. His Western patrons are trying to represent Bukovsky as an authority on Soviet life. But, in real life, this rather impudent young man knows with authority only the porches of the houses where Western correspondents live in Moscow. A failed student, expelled from his university for failing to pass his exams, he was reckoned a worker, but he only had one kind of work—loitering in the apartments of foreign correspondents, trading anti-Soviet trash for cheap little presents.

Trying to do his bit for his Western patrons, Bukovsky invented a slanderous tale, to the effect that representatives of the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union, on account of their 'democratic' views, are sent to psychiatric hospitals without a court hearing, and that there inhumane treatment is applied to them. In order to distribute these anti-Soviet inventions, Bukovsky, as he himself has admitted to the court, gave an interview to the head of the Moscow Bureau of the television company CBS, William Cole, who was recently expelled from the confines of our

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country for activity incompatible with the title of journalist, and also the AP correspondent, Holger Jensen.

Further, as had been intended, the slander was seized on by foreign newspapers of anti-Soviet inclination, such as *The Washington Post, The Daily News*, and others, and also by the radio stations, Radio Liberty, BBC, and Voice of America, which are famous for their naked anti-Communism. The court has viewed the commentaries on Bukovsky's interviews, which were printed in these newspapers and broadcast by these radio stations. What, in reality, is discussed in these interviews and the commentaries on them? People who have committed socially dangerous acts, for which they were not answerable on account of their frame of mind, or who fell ill during the period of investigation or trial with mental illnesses which deprived them of the ability to understand their own actions, are discussed. In accordance with existing laws, such people, on the basis of the decision of competent experts in forensic psychiatry, and on the instructions of a court, are subject to transfer for treatment in a psychiatric hospital, either of the general or the special type.

Bukovsky, the failed student, absolutely ignorant of medicine, does not even notice what an absurd position he is putting himself in: after all, he is taking it upon himself to instruct and contradict medical specialists, representatives of the Soviet School of Psychiatry which has won respect and recognition in the whole world. The famous Soviet scientist, director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, academician A. V. Snezhnevsky, in an interview with the correspondent of *Izvestia*, K. Bryantsev, said: 'Soviet psychiatry has always been distinguished by a high degree of humanism and the desire to help the sick person not to feel himself as being outside society. So the absurd reports that in the USSR sane people are put in psychiatric hospitals are just a wild invention which cannot but evoke feelings of deep indignation.'

During the court proceedings, all episodes of the indictment prepared on the basis of the pre-trial investigation have been studied as carefully as possible. The court has been presented with irrefutable proofs of the guilt of the accused, Bukovsky, on all counts of the indictment.

I ask the court to give its attention to the personality of the accused person. Bukovsky has previously been tried under Article 190 (3) of the criminal code of the RSFSR. After serving his three-year sentence, he continued his anti-Soviet activity and systematically distributed slanderous materials denigrating the Soviet state and social order, regardless of the frequent warnings given him by the organs of the prosecutor's office.

I ask the court to give its attention also to the question of who made it possible for the crime to be committed. It was the accused's mother, Nina Ivanovna Bukovskaya. It was she who created in her home a situation favourable to the reception of foreign correspondents, encouraging the criminal activity of her son. For this Bukovskaya

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

received from her son's Western masters 100 rubles in hard currency certificates. One hundred rubles—that was how much the Western anti-Soviet elements considered their zealous assistant to be worth.

At the investigation, Bukovsky conducted himself in a challenging manner, and refused to cooperate. Taking all the foregoing into account, I ask the court to sentence Bukovsky to the measure of punishment foreseen by Article 70, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code—deprivation of freedom for a term of seven years, to be served in a corrective labour camp with strict regime, the first two years to be served in a prison, the sentence to be followed by five years' exile.

The speech of the defence counsel V. Y. Shveisky

At the start of his speech, defence counsel V. Y. Shveisky noted that Article 70 of the criminal code, under which Bukovsky was tried, could be applied only on condition that he had made it his aim to subvert or weaken Soviet power.

He said: I contest the assertion that Vladimir Bukovsky pursued precisely this aim. But before expounding my arguments, I consider it necessary to draw the attention of the court to a very important contradiction in the case for the prosecution. As can be seen from the materials of the case, Bukovsky was sent as long ago as 1963 to the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital. He was diagnosed as suffering from a 'psychiatric disorder of the paranoiac type'. It is true that he was not subjected to any psychiatric treatment, as can be seen from the expert testimony. But if one starts from the premise that during this period he was really mentally ill, then clearly everything he recounts now about his impressions during the time when he was in the Special Psychiatric Hospital consists of impressions which he received at a time when he was ill, and which have been kept in his consciousness since that time.

Thus, if the prosecution considers that Bukovsky was mentally ill during the time when he was in the hospital, then everything he recounts about the situation in the psychiatric hospitals must be explained not by his desire to subvert or weaken Soviet power, but as the consequence of an incorrect understanding of the facts which he observed at that time. The position of the prosecution on this question is obviously inconsistent.

I say this only in order to show the contradictory nature of the prosecution's own position. In the opinion of the defence, the prosecution has not produced convincing proofs that Bukovsky aimed at subverting or weakening Soviet power. In the television interview which Bukovsky gave to William Cole, and in the conversation with the American correspondent Holger Jensen, Bukovsky recounted facts which, as he asserts, he observed while he was in the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital. With the aim of confirming these facts, Bukovsky petitioned to be allowed to call a number of witnesses, but you refused

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him this. The interview and the conversation contained no pronouncements on the Soviet order, or on the political and economic foundations of Soviet power, which could be regarded as aimed at subverting or weakening Soviet power.

There were no such pronouncements by Bukovsky in conversations either with Nikitinsky or Shushpanov. Thus the witness Shushpanov did not confirm that Bukovsky conducted anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda with him, or promised him to help in getting his anti-Soviet novel abroad.

He also showed that the conversation incriminating Bukovsky, about a duplicating machine, occurred at his, Shushpanov's, initiative, and remained no more than a conversation. The accusation of intending to organize an underground press cannot be regarded as proved, as there is no evidence that Bukovsky was preparing to spread materials with an anti-Soviet slanderous content.

I propose that the evidence of Bychkov and Tarasov, in particular the phrase incriminating Bukovsky, 'in the USSR there does not exist the order needed by the Soviet people', should be relegated to the sphere of personal generalizations by Bukovsky's interlocutors, though it was derived from Bukovsky's own statements to these witnesses.

Confirmation that the peculiarities of their individual observations affected their evidence can be found in the contradiction in their testimony, and to this, of course, the court's attention has been drawn.

Bukovsky himself has categorically denied that he gave materials to Sebreghts (the Belgian student). V. Chalidze and A. Volpin, in whose presence the handing over of these materials allegedly took place, have not been questioned during the investigation. Bukovsky's application to have them called into court has also been turned down. Therefore the stated episode has not been verified in essence. All this leads me to the conviction that the court has not established proof that Bukovsky really wished to undermine or weaken the Soviet system. Under the circumstances, Bukovsky cannot bear criminal responsibility under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Therefore I ask that he be found not guilty.

The Final Speech of Vladimir Bukovsky

I WILL not touch on the juridical side of the indictment, because I have already fully proved to the court its lack of substance. My lawyer in his speech has also proved the complete lack of substance of the indictment, and I agree with him on all the points of his defence.

I will say something else: the repression of myself has been prepared for a long time, and I have known about this. On 9 June [1970] I was summoned by Procurator Vankovich and threatened with being repressed; then there appeared the article in the paper *Pravda* [17 December 1970] under the heading 'The Poverty of Anti-Communism', which the procurator has quoted almost in full in her speech. The article contained the charge that I, supposedly in return for small hand-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outs, was 'selling slanderous information to foreign correspondents in entrance-ways'.

And finally, in the journal *Political Self-Education* (No. 2, 1971), there was an article by [first] deputy chairman of the KGB, S. Tsvigun, in which it was also stated that I occupied myself with anti-Soviet activities. So it is quite understandable that the low-level investigator investigating my case could not go against his boss, and was forced at whatever cost to try to prove my guilt.

Prior to my arrest I was under constant surveillance. I was harassed, threatened with murder, and one of the men who followed me went so far as to threaten me with his service pistol. When I was already under investigation I petitioned for a criminal case to be initiated against these people. I even indicated the number of the official car in which these people had followed me, and provided other facts which made it quite possible for them to be found. However I received no answer to this petition from the bodies to which I had sent it. Instead, the following quite eloquent reply was received from my investigator: 'The behaviour of Bukovsky under investigation gives ground for ordering an investigation into his mental condition.

The investigation was carried out with innumerable procedural infringements. One could say that not a single article of the Code of Criminal Procedure remained uninfringed. The investigators even took such a shameful step as to put an agent in the cell with me, a certain Trofimov, who admitted to me himself that he had been ordered to conduct provocational anti-Soviet conversations with me, the aim being to provoke me into making similar statements. In return for doing this he had been promised an early release. As you see, what I have been incriminated with as a crime is permitted to some people, if this is required in 'the interests of the case'.

I sent complaints about this to various bodies and I have now demanded that the court attach them to the case; but the court 'has been too busy to do this'.

As regards the investigator, instead of examining my complaint and giving me an answer, he sent me for an in-patient medical examination to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry.

The investigation department of the [Moscow] directorate of the KGB very much wanted me to be ruled insane. How convenient! After all, there was no case against me, the prosecution had nothing on which to build, but if such a ruling could be made it would not be necessary to prove the commission of any crime, there would simply be a person who was ill, mad. . . .

And that's how everything would have gone. There would have been no need for this trial, and there would have been no final speech by me: I would have been sentenced in my absence, *if* . . . the intense involvement of public opinion had not had its effect. For after the first period of examination—in the middle of September—the medical commission discovered an ominous lack of clarity in its clinical picture of me, and,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the questions of the doctors who dealt with me after this, I understood that they were preparing to rule me insane. Only on 5 November, after the pressure exerted by public opinion, a new medical commission ruled me healthy. Here is reliable proof of my assertions (which here in this court are called slanderous) that the psychiatric repression of dissenters is carried out on the orders of the KGB.

I have yet another proof of this. In 1966 I was interned in psychiatric hospitals for eight months, without trial or investigation, and was transferred, as different doctors discharged me, from one hospital to another.

Anyway, on 5 November I was ruled sane, was once again locked up in prison, and the procedural infringements continued. The execution of Article 201 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure at the end of the investigation was a crude example. I demanded that the defence lawyer chosen by me should be provided. But the investigator refused me this and signed Article 201 by himself [without the statutory signature of the defence counsel], even writing in addition that I had refused to acquaint myself with the case.

In accordance with my right to a defence, assured by Article 48 of the Procedural Code, I demanded that lawyer Dina Isaakovna Kaminskaya be invited to the court for my defence. I made this request to the Chairman of the Moscow Collegium of Lawyers and later received his refusal, which included this statement: 'Lawyer Kaminskaya cannot be appointed for the defence, as she does not possess a security pass for secret proceedings.' One asks what 'secret proceedings' can be involved, when I am being tried for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda? And in any case, where, in which Soviet laws, is there any mention of this famous 'security pass'? Nowhere. So, a lawyer was not provided for me. Moreover, the above-mentioned reply from the Collegium of Lawyers, which I was shown, and on which there is my signature, was removed from the case-file and returned to the Collegium of Lawyers, about which there is a note in the case-file. The document was then replaced by another, more innocent reply from the Chairman of the Collegium, which I was not shown. How is this to be evaluated? Simply as official fraudulence.

It necessitated my 12-day hunger-strike, a complaint to the USSR Procurator-General, the USSR Ministry of Justice, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and also a new and active intervention by public opinion, for my legal right to a defence to be, at last, recognized, and I was provided with the lawyer Shveisky, who had been engaged by my mother.[3]

Today's trial has also been held with numerous procedural infringements. The indictment, in which the word 'libellous' is used 33 times and the word 'anti-Soviet' 18 times, does not contain any concrete

[3] Bukovsky's hunger-strike lasted from 9 to 21 December, and on 22 December his mother saw him for the first time in nine months and found him pale and haggard.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indications as to precisely which facts out of those communicated by me to the Western correspondents are slanderous, nor as to precisely which materials out of those confiscated from me during a search and, allegedly, circulated by me, are anti-Soviet.

Of the nine petitions which I made at the beginning of the trial, and which were supported by my lawyer, eight were rejected. Not one of the witnesses requested by me, who could have refuted various points of the indictment, was summoned by the court.

I am charged, in particular, with the handing of anti-Soviet materials to the Fleming Hugo Sebreghts, who had come to Moscow. These materials were, allegedly, handed by me to him in the presence of [Alexander] Volpin and [Valery] Chalidze. However, my request that these two people be summoned as witnesses was not granted. Nor was even one of the eight people who could have confirmed the truthfulness of my assertions regarding the facts about the internment and living conditions of people in the special psychiatric hospitals summoned to court.[4] The court rejected my petition to summon these witnesses, on the grounds that they are mentally ill people and cannot give evidence. However, among these people there are two—Z. M. Grigorenko [wife of Pyotr] and A. A. Fainberg [mother of Victor]—who have never been interned in special psychiatric hospitals, and have visited these hospitals only as the relatives of internees: they could have confirmed my evidence about the conditions of imprisonment in these hospitals.

Only those witnesses were summoned to court whom the prosecution asked for. But what sort of witnesses were they? Before my arrest there was sent to me, in all probability by officials of the KGB, a member of the State security forces, presently working in the customs inspection department at Sheremetevo Airport, my former school comrade, a certain Nikitinsky, who had been instructed to provoke me into a crime—organizing the import from abroad of equipment for an underground printing press. But the ill-starred provocateur did not succeed in this. Subsequently the investigators, and now also this court, have tried to turn him into a witness in connexion with this charge in the indictment. We have seen here that Nikitinsky failed in this task too.

What were all these provocations and crude procedural infringements necessary for, this stream of slander and of false, unproven charges? Simply in order to punish one person?

No, there is here a 'principle', a sort of 'philosophy'. Behind the stated charges stands another, unstated. In condemning me, the authorities are pursuing the aim of concealing their own crimes—the psychiatric repression of dissenters.

By the repression of myself they wish to frighten those people who try to tell the whole world of their crimes. They do not want 'to wash

[4] In addition, in a letter to the Moscow City Court Academician Sakharov had asked that three such people, ex-inmates, be summoned to testify, as documents written by them showed that Bukovsky had publicized 'not defamatory inventions but true facts'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our dirty linen in public', so that they may appear on the world scene as unblemished defenders of the oppressed!

Our society is still sick. It is sick with the fear which has remained with us from the time of Stalinism. But the process of the gaining of spiritual insight by society has already begun, and it is impossible to stop it. Society already understands that the criminal is not he who washes our dirty linen in public, but he who dirties the linen. However long I may have to spend in prison, I will never renounce my beliefs. I will express them, exercising the right given to me by Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution, to all who wish to listen to me. I will fight for legality and justice.

And I regret only this: that in the short period—one year, two months and three days—which I have spent in freedom, I succeeded in doing too little to this end.

Verdict

THE court has attentively studied the materials in the case of the accused Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky, born 1942, Russian, resident in Moscow, 3–5 Furmanov Street, Apt. 59. In the course of the judicial examination the court has interrogated witnesses and the accused himself, and has established that V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of the following:

1. During the years 1970 and 1971 V. K. Bukovsky engaged in the systematic dissemination of anti-Soviet materials of libellous content, discrediting the Soviet state and social structure; gave slanderous information to foreign correspondents; asserted that in the Soviet Union healthy people are confined in psychiatric hospitals of the prison type, where they are subjected to various tortures; and also harboured in his apartment various anti-Soviet materials of libellous content.

The following have served as proof:

A. Cuttings from foreign newspapers (*Washington Post*, *San Francisco Examiner* and *Daily News*) being articles of libellous content discrediting the Soviet state and social structure, entitled 'The Russian who is fighting the regime', 'A Soviet dissident speaks', 'A Russian dissenter tells of the horrors of mental prisons for dissidents'.

B. A film shown by the American television company CBS on 28 July 1970 entitled 'Voices of the Russian Underground', and commentaries on the subject of this film which appeared in various foreign papers and also in programmes broadcast by Radio Liberty, The Voice of America, and the BBC.

C. Anti-Soviet materials of libellous content confiscated during a search of Bukovsky's apartment as follows: *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 17; 'Open Letter to the 24th Congress' by P. Yakir; 'Appeal by political prisoners declared insane' by Fainberg and Borisov; draft manuscript entitled 'Open Letter to the 24th Congress' by an anonymous author.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

D. Notebook of V. K. Bukovsky confiscated during a search of his apartment, containing telephone numbers of foreign correspondents.

2. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having, during the course of frequent meetings with citizen V. A. Shushpanov, a former employee of the Department of Foreign Relations in the Moscow Patriarchate, conducted with him anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, alleging that healthy people in the USSR are confined in psychiatric hospitals where they are subjected to inhuman methods of treatment; of having asserted that in the Soviet Union there is no freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or of assembly; and of having held conversations with Shushpanov with the aim of inducing him to use a business trip abroad illegally to import a duplicating machine for the purpose of organizing an underground press and duplicating anti-Soviet materials in *samizdat*. Evidence given by V. A. Shushpanov at the preliminary investigation and in court has served as proof of this.

3. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having, in the course of meetings with Arnold Eduardovich Nikitinsky, an employee at Sheremetevo Airport, conducted with him anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, declaring that in the Soviet Union there is no freedom of the individual, that in our country healthy people are confined in psychiatric hospitals because of their dissident opinions: and also of having attempted to induce Nikitinsky to make use of his official position and help him to organize the illegal import into the USSR of a portable printing press, bypassing the Customs inspection at Sheremetevo Airport. V. K. Bukovsky's aim in doing this was to set up an underground press for the dissemination of anti-Soviet materials of libellous content.

V. K. Bukovsky is also guilty of having illegally harboured in his apartment two issues of the anti-Soviet journal *Possev* with which he also acquainted Nikitinsky.

The following serve as proof of this: testimony written by Nikitinsky himself at the preliminary investigation, a tape-recording of a meeting with Bukovsky, and evidence given by Nikitinsky at the trial.

4. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having, in the course of a meeting in a café in the Kursk station with the soldiers Bychkov and Tarasov, with whom he was previously unacquainted, conducted with them anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, declaring that in the USSR the system was not the one that the Soviet people needed; and also of having given them his telephone number and address and the telephone numbe of the Associated Press correspondent, Astrachan; and of having suggested that Bychkov and Tarasov should use those telephone numbers to reveal slanderous information.

The following have served as proof of this: the telephone numbers of V. K. Bukovsky and Astrachan discovered in a notebook of Bychkov's, and evidence given by Bychkov and Tarasov during the preliminary investigation and in court.

5. V. K. Bukovsky is guilty of having on 28 March 1971, at the apartment of V. N. Chalidze, had a rendezvous with a Belgian citizen,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hugo Sebreghts, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist on the instructions of the anti-Soviet Flemish Committee. Hugo Sebreghts had been instructed to arrange a meeting with V. K. Bukovsky, and to this end the Flemish Committee had given him Bukovsky's telephone number, which he had written in his notebook using some pre-arranged signs. At his meeting with Sebreghts in Chalidze's apartment, V. K. Bukovsky gave Sebreghts two anti-Soviet documents of libellous content: *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 17, and 'Open Letter to the 24th Congress' by P. Yakir; these were later confiscated during a personal search of Sebreghts.

The following serve as proof of this: the findings of a panel of forensic experts, who established that the documents confiscated from Sebreghts and the documents of identical content confiscated during a search of Bukovsky's apartment had been typed on the same typewriter; the evidence given by Sebreghts during the preliminary investigation.

V. K. Bukovsky is found guilty of having committed a crime under Article 70 Part I of the RSFSR Criminal Code. In passing sentence, the court has taken into account the fact that V. K. Bukovsky, previously convicted under Article 190–3 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, continued to engage in criminal activity after serving a sentence of three years in a corrective labour camp, in spite of repeated warnings by the organs of the Procuracy; it has also borne in mind that during the investigation V. K. Bukovsky conducted himself in an aggressive manner, refused to cooperate with the enquiry and refused to admit his guilt both during the preliminary investigation and in court.

In the name of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Bukovsky, Vladimir Konstantinovich, born 1942 . . . *is hereby sentenced to:* deprivation of freedom for a term of seven years to be served in corrective labour camps, the first two years to be served in a prison; to be followed by exile for a term of five years. The court has also ordered V. K. Bukovsky to pay legal costs to the amount of 100 rubles.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why?

Grigori Svirsky

I AM making an application for permission to take up residence in Israel. Perhaps it is not necessary to give any explanations: the law is on my side. The law about the reunification of families.

But my friends remain in Russia and they have the right to hear not only about my relatives in Israel. Besides, the OVIR UMVD USSR and other official bodies are interested, so I have heard, not only in the personal details which are required on official questionnaires. They are concerned about the explosion of national feeling among the Jews.

I hope that my documents, as well as my explanation, will be read not only by those who have received the novels of Ivan Shevtsov with such acclaim, or clerks who, to use the words of the Russian classic, have 'teeth above their heads' [i.e. are predatory but not intelligent].

I will try to restrain myself.

What are the additional causes (let's call them so), which compelled me, a man of Russian culture, more than that, a Russian writer and a specialist in Russian literature, to become conscious of being a Jew and to decide irrevocably to emigrate together with my family to Israel?

I will bring forward first the most important and indisputable testimony, which is understandable to all, but which is closest to those for whom language is a profession.

Linguistic innovations, neologisms, which spontaneously become part of everyday conversation, demonstrate a phenomenon more precisely and irrefutably than any documents. Language is, I think, the only historical document which nobody has yet succeeded in falsifying. Not even the most ingenious craftsmen.

A new verbal construction, incomprehensible at first, has become widespread in the Russian language: 'THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH'. It would seem that there is nothing particular about this bureaucratic term: *the fifth paragraph* on the long-established personal questionnaire concerns nationality. But who is unaware of the implications of the expression: 'He is with the fifth paragraph' or 'He has the fifth paragraph'; if he is referred to in these terms nobody asks again what this means. Not the Russians, nor the Ukrainians, nor the Armenians. They all get the message.

Oh, the great Russian language! It knows no fear, or bigotry, or self-interest. But murder will always out. . . .

'The fifth paragraph' . . . I made many efforts, mental and physical, in order to change the circumstances about which the Russian language testifies so calmly, and to my mind incontrovertibly.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I tried to use the Word.
They answered me with a DEED.
Here are the documents:

'To the Secretariat of the Moscow Section of the RSFSR Writers' Union
From Grigori Svirsky

STARTING in 1965, after my speech at a writers' meeting (a speech against anti-semitism—G. S.), the publication of my books, which had already been planned, began to be postponed from year to year.

In 1968 the publication of my books, stories, and scripts, was stopped in all the publishing houses, journals, and the Mosfilm studio at one and the same time.

Somewhat earlier, the publishing house 'Soviet Writer' dispersed the type of my novel *State Examination* (40 author's pages), which had been passed for publication by all departments including the Central Literary Board (16 January 1968).

The Military Publishing House even postponed the publication in Leipzig of a collection, in order to extract from it four little pages of my story.

Since 1964, for seven years, not a word of mine has been published. I am, in fact, crossed off the list of living writers.

There is hardly one leading member of the Writers' Union who has not attempted to help me. . . .

Hate, alas, is more active than good-will. . . .

One would like to hope that the Secretariat of the Writers' Union will protest at their meeting against the slow but consistent murder of a member of the Writers' Union, Grigori Svirsky. Prevent this murder.

28 April 1970

THIS was followed by two immediate and categorical resolutions by the Secretariats of the USSR Writers' Union and the Moscow section of the RSFSR Writers' Union (dated 29 April 1970 and 30 April 1970).

'Request . . . to give assistance to comrade Svirsky G. Ts.' (in concluding a contract for a new novel—G. S.).

'Instruct the Secretariat of Moscow writers' organization to assist in obtaining staff appointment. . . .'

'Instruct . . . assist . . . request. . . .'

Hate, alas, is more active than good-will.

Half a year later, the leaders of the Writers' Union, writers S. Mikhalkov and S. Narovchatov, had another letter on their tables:

> . . . Nothing has been done. The resolution of the Writers' Union has been completely ignored by those working in publishing, to whom it was addressed . . . (there follows an enumeration of the majority of leading members of the Writers' Union—G. S.).
>
> I do not wish to make use of alms from the Literary Fund.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I am not an invalid, but a healthy writer, full of strength and creative plans.

. . . If you, the leaders of SP, are powerless to change anything, well then, say so frankly.

Grigori Svirsky
10 December 1970

Another document addressed at the request of the Writers' Union to the creative society of prose writers of the Moscow Section of the RSFSR WU:

In answer to your inquiry. . . .
Applications by the Writers' Union were fruitless.
I do not know how I will continue to exist. . . .

Grigori Svirsky
12 November 1971

PERHAPS, enough documents. All the more because they evoked a reaction directly contrary to the one which I intended. Somebody saw to it that my name was even thrown out of the sixth volume of *Literary Encyclopaedia* just issued. So that there was no smell of Svirsky in Russian prose! Is it necessary to add anything?

In Stalin's time there was a practice—to deprive the unwanted writer of 'fire and water'. For a minimum of a year or two. So that he could meditate on an empty stomach.

I was 'segregated' from the reader, as we see, not for a year or two. The blockade is already in its *seventh year*.

Its seventh year, but it is no longer a blockade. It is a cynical extra-judicial persecution. In full daylight. To the death!

Each anti-Zionist campaign, which was understood by some as anti-semitic, poured oil onto the fire.

This made my fellow-writers indignant. But it did not surprise them. . . .

Indeed, as the publishers took the liberty of publishing three times within the last few years the 'pogrom' novels of Ivan Shevtsov, which were officially condemned or, for instance, the verse of the young Ivan Lystsov, such as the following: '. . . And somebody wishes to rule the soul/funnily lisping on the word "Russ"'[1]; or a book by the philosopher V. Mishin, *Social Progress*,[2] in which he welcomes a significant reduction (by one-third) in the proportion of Jews among the specialists with higher education, and considers as an ideal an even smaller percentage norm than that obtaining at the time of Alexander III.

If the publishers took this liberty, it is not difficult to imagine their attitude to some Jewish authors and even more to Jews who protest against anti-semitic literature.

If even my name cannot appear in the paper—I had finally to say recently to the Chief Editor of the *Literary Gazette*, when, after a call

[1] Ivan Lystsov, 'The Fate', *Moscow Worker*, 1969, p. 93, with an enthusiastic introduction by A. Yugov.
[2] V. I. Mishin, *Social Progress* (Volgo-Vyatka publ. Gorky, 1970)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from someone, two of my special articles on the scientists of Norilsk were excluded from columns which were already finished and passed for publication—if even my name is under the strictest interdict, and this has been going on for seven years, there can be no doubt *I am being killed or pushed out of the country*. . . .

Candidate member of CC CPSU, Secretary of the Writers' Union, Alexander Chakovsky made, figuratively speaking, a helpless gesture.

As before him, Secretary of WU RSFSR S. Mikhalkov.

And before that, Secretary of WU USSR S. Sartakov.

And previous to that, Secretary of the Moscow Section of WU RSFSR V. Ilin, etc., etc.

I AM BEING KILLED OR PUSHED OUT OF THE COUNTRY!

I choose the second.

But perhaps I exaggerate? Have I the right to call the seven-year blockade of an author—murder?

Murder is murder.

Have I the right, say, to approach the Procurator General of the USSR, or the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, accusing such-and-such people of murder? Moreover of first degree, premeditated? To demand an investigation. . . . After all, they did not manage to kill!

This is true. But everybody knows recent precedents when people were tried for *intention*. And condemned.

What can be done? Demand a trial on the basis of precedent? Year after year? Or, at least, a recognition that I had the right to talk about anti-semites?

But nobody contradicted me. . . .

The highest control organization of the CPSU, the Committee of Party Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU, under the chairmanship of Politburo member Comrade Pelshe, officially confirmed that I had a full right publicly to call the Chief Editor of the journal *Friendship of the Peoples*, V. Smirnov, a chauvinist and anti-semite.

Previous to that, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for ideological matters, Comrade Demichev, announced (27 October 1965), in the presence of more than 1,000 Moscow writers, that Grigori Svirky had raised the question of anti-semitism in good time.

. . . The first who could not bear the persecution lasting many years was my wife, lately the bread-winner of the family; exhausted by the intensity of the persecution, by lack of money and of necessities, she fell gravely ill.

There was bitterness in the eyes of our 16 year old son. His father was being given short shrift under his very eyes. . . . I do not wish to explain, or complain any more. I have no more to say to the bureaucratic well-wishers from the Writers' Union: the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

To foist one's love on those who reject one, what can be more

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

insulting! One cannot be loved by force, according to the wisdom of the Russian people.

No, I have not altered my convictions: have not stopped loving the land for which I spilled my blood, my friends, the spontaneous Russian language, which became my life and my fate.

I—a former Russian soldier, who was for four years constantly in battle—wrote in my notebook for '41, where I noted the battle missions of my old 'SB', the lines of the fallen poet Pavel Kogan, and felt them as my own: 'I love the Russian air, the Russian land!'

In those days, my relatives were shot in the back of the head because they were Jews.

Yobs from the 'Free Ukraine' brought the policemen to the hut where 14 year old Fima, my wife's brother, was hiding. And the boy was thrown into Igul quarry—after his father and mother, grandfather and grandmother. Yobs from the 'Free Ukraine' ran after the waggon which took Fima and my wife's parents away to their death and yelled: 'They have another daughter in Moscow! Member of the Komsomol she is!'

Now my son is called Fima.

I was a Russian writer, I was sure of it. I was accepted into the Union of Writers as a Russian writer. But in 1965, when I started protesting against the anti-semitism of the Chief Editor of the journal *Friendship of the Peoples*, V. Smirnov, respectable elderly ladies of the official commission flew into a rage, losing the remnants of their respectability:

'How is it possible that a Russian writer is a Jew?'[3]

Thus the dear ladies exclaimed in the open, in the presence of a representative of the writers' Party commission. Why should one be shy in one's own fatherland! . . .

After the first 'investigation', I remember, I rushed out of town, further away from people, and a drunk in the tram suddenly took his irritation out on me: 'Taking up room as if you were at home in Israel! Hitler did not finish killing you!'

I had already taken people like him six times to the police station and six times the officers on duty asked me: 'How shall we put it down? . . . Anti-semitism?! There is none of that here! Let us write down "insulting behaviour" or "importuning"—that is a certainty for the courts. . . .'

I am a Russian. I believed so for many years. I had grounds for that: I was not alone in defending Russia. My ancestor, grandfather Girsh, a cantor, a soldier of Nicholas, was wounded nearly 130 years ago at the first siege of Sebastopol. He served in the Russian army for 25 years and I was named in his honour.

I considered myself a native Russian. But cold, estranged, and mocking eyes looked at me, for instance those of 'cultural manager'

[3] Shorthand report of the general meeting of Moscow writers dated 20 December 1966.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Solovyeva, who announced, to be heard by all, that she 'shared V. Smirnov's views',[4] and I saw in them who I am. . . .

Enough. Every person has his limit of endurance. Mine has been reached. Recently, on 29 September 1971, I reached the age of 50. It is time to stop living feeling like a boy in a crush in a bus. The boy's nose is on elbow-level. Whoever moves an elbow, the boy gets a bloody nose. . . .

I do not wish to be the tallest among equals, nor the shortest among equals.

I want to be equal.

And I have had enough of literary Black Hundred brigaders with their blatant books of pronouncements.

I hoped that the militant anti-semites would disappear together with the generation of the submissive.

I could wait longer than the Lystsevs.

I have had enough of drunk tram hooligans with their saying: 'Hitler did not kill you off' and 'Clear off to your Israel!'

Let them be an insignificant part of the people, one could even say that they are untypical. It does not make it any easier for a man if somebody untypical spits at him. The spit is typical.

I no longer want to see their self-satisfied faces full of superiority. I do not want to kill either my own or other people's time for them.

But in this case one ought to be consistent. . . .

'Clear off to your Israel!' the drunks shouted and shout at me.

'Clear off to your Israel!'—I saw it in the eyes of people who exclaimed: 'How it is possible, a Russian writer and a Jew?!'

'Clear off to your Israel!'—I heard it like an echo in the offices of polite Chief Editors, who, for seven years could not, as they put it, 'defend' my books, scripts, articles, stories. 'Clear off to your Israel!' I seem to hear at times in their respectfully sad good-bye.

'Clear off!'?—Thank you, my dear sirs, I am ready.

But why then was the invitation necessary for departure hidden and postponed?

The invitation sent to my 70 year old mother (dated 9 July 1971) was received (No. 11600/71). True, not at once, and in a torn envelope with a hole in the middle; with a feasible excuse from the local post office: 'This letter arrived damaged'.

The invitation sent to me, my wife, and my son on the same day, was delayed more than three months.

I had to ask for invitations again and again, the dispatch of which was confirmed officially by my brother every time.

Why, for what purpose, were the invitations delayed?

The classic of Jewish literature, Sholom Aleichem, has some lines about a dog caught in the door. The dog is booted, hit with a stick,

[4] Stenographic record of the general meeting of Moscow writers dated 20 December 1966.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shouted at, so that it should leave the door like a bullet. . . . And at the same time it is squeezed by the door so that it cannot get away from the beatings. The stronger the kicks, the tighter is its crippled body squeezed in the door.

Sholom Aleichem compared the dog squeezed in the door with Russian Jews. In my youth the comparison did not seem exact to me: in his time anybody who wanted to leave could get a passport. At the nearest police station. What did the writer mean by the pressing door? Destitution? The Pale of Settlement?

Did the classical writer foresee the future?

The poor dog which has not found favour is given the boot. Other people from a department, push the door harder. So that it cannot escape. In order to beat and shout, shout and beat, under the ribs, so that the blood flows and to squeeze and squeeze in an iron door.

What great humanism!

Naturally, like any deed it has its name, patronymic, and surname. History will see to that.

As far as I am concerned, I want to become an Israeli writer. To understand the sources of moral health in a nation persecuted for centuries. To submerge myself into the midst of life, which cannot be passed over in silence, nor lied about, nor destroyed.

That is why it is unnecessary now to persuade me by hunger and persecution to 'clear off to your Israel!' The hint is taken.

Even if I know no Hebrew, and possibly will never master it to the extent of being able to write books in it, even if I remain for ever a man of Russian culture, with all the symptoms of nostalgia which are known to civilization, all the same, before the sharp elbows of sanctioned baseness I will say, no, I will shout, if human dignity is not dead in me: I am a Jew!

I will remain one even if the writers who attempted murder change their anger to mercy.

The Russian classics teach: let us avoid, worse than any sorrow, masters' anger and masters' love.

But enough of metaphors. I will attempt to be very precise in expressing my views: I no longer *believe* in the assimilation of Jews in Russia. At least, a considerable section of Jews.

The reasons for that I give as: '*fifth paragraph*'. How many times have I been branded by it!

Is the assimilation of the branded possible? !

Mimicry is possible. Mimicry is not for me.

I am a Jew.

And having decided this for myself, finally and irrevocably, I want, I have the right to live, in the same way as each one of you, Russians, Ukrainians, etc.—without the 'fifth paragraph'. Among my national majority.

This is my right sanctified by the Soviet Constitution, which only racism can oppose.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documents: Poland and Czechoslovakia

Antoni Slonimski, the Grand Old Man of Polish literature, has recently been permitted to resume publication. In the article published in the Catholic weekly, Tygodnik Powszechny (5 *December* 1971), *he belatedly answered the accusations hurled at him during and after the events of March* 1968. *He dedicated his article to the late Pawel Jasienica, who was then also the target of attacks.*

The second document published below appeared in the Czechoslovak Communist Party weekly, Tribuna (1 *December* 1971), *as a letter to the editor. This recantation of a former follower of Dubcek praising life in a Czechoslovak prison provides a fitting contrast with the first document.*

The Drawer

Antoni Slonimski

IN the course of a pre-Christmas cleaning, I tidied up my room and my desk. In its drawer, I found some unfinished polemical articles, rectifications, bits and pieces of other articles, some notes made in 1968. All this was rather chaotic, unconvincing, sorrowful, and tinged with bitterness. I reread all this material with a composed and critical attitude. A beautiful saying from Stravinsky's essay, 'On Poetry in Music', came to my mind: 'the lava attains a shape only when it is cooled and hardened'.

Because the lava of my rancour has cooled down, I suddenly wished to exercise the right to defend myself and to reply objectively to some of the accusations and questions then made and asked.

On the strength of the texts written by me almost half a century ago, I have been stuck with the horrifying label of cosmopolitan. However, this accusation possessed a certain gentlemanly accent. An author of this accusation admitted that he does not know what my present attitude towards being Polish (*polskosc*) is and that only I myself can define this attitude. I was offered an outright invitation to make an expiatory public statement. I was offered the role of a penitent sinner, I was invited to climb onto the platform and sing 'Bogurodzica' (an ancient church hymn to the Virgin Mary which, in ancient Poland, became almost a national anthem—trans.) and 'Rota' (another patriotic song—

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trans.), or at least to perform the Kujawiak dance (a popular Polish folk dance—trans.). However, this repertory was not to my taste, therefore I did not accept that invitation. Now, the person who asked that particular question does not represent the authorities. Therefore, I can now give my answer without submissiveness and without the embarrassing necessity to prove my Polish patriotic attitude. Now I can reply in a dignified manner, that is, courteously. Now I feel free to claim bonds with our genuine Polish culture. In 1826, that is, before the November Uprising, my great-grandfather, who was a member of the Royal (Scientific) Society—to which he had been introduced by Staszic—was invited to the Berlin Academy. I quote below what he wrote about this invitation:

> . . . allow me to mention only that when, after the discovery of my invention, I was nominated and asked to come abroad, where I was promised lavish prizes and a betterment of my fortune, I would not dream of leaving my native country. I would even admit here that, filled with—let me say—noble pride, I hoped that God would allow me to win fame which would enable me to increase the glory of my compatriots' name, on whose soil I, too, was born.

On the strength of Szymon Lastik's book, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz quotes this in his work, *Talks About Books*, page 59. On that occasion, he commented favourably upon the style and the beautiful Polish language of my great-grandfather, stressing his subtle differentiation of the words: 'fame' and 'glory'. I resisted the temptation at the time (of the accusations) to call upon the patriotic virtues of my forefathers. For it would be an unworthy trick. Today, I stress with full force that, if I had been a descendant of Jewish bankers or rag-pickers, I would still have just as much right to consider myself a Pole as my adversary of that time. However, as everybody is a bit snobbish on the subject of his family traditions, I prefer, of course, that my great-grandfather, grandfather, father, brother, and nephew were and are people of learning, rather than vendors of suspenders, for instance. I can safely assure my adversary that I am a Pole, but at the same time, alas, I must admit that he was not mistaken when he called me a cosmopolitan. What is more, I am less of a cosmopolitan than I would wish to be, because I have always been too passionately absorbed in, and tormented by, our own local problems. Brought up in the tradition of a struggle for independence, I took the rise of sovereign Poland as the happy ending of a beautiful book written for young people. The natural consequence of such an attitude was disenchantment, produced by the first years of freedom when contrasted with my youthful idealization of it.

Later, I realized how much exaggeration and impatience lay in those disappointments. I have in mind especially naive radicalism and provocatively proclaimed antipatriotism.

Regarding the questions of national pride and sentiments embracing the whole of mankind, I wrote at length in *New Poland*, a monthly which

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I edited in London during the war (the second world war—trans.). In that article, I recalled the words of Mickiewicz: 'He who speaks about the interests of only one nation is an enemy of freedom.' In the footnotes to that article, when it was reprinted in *One Side of the Coin*—according to the fashion of that time—I added a quotation from Lévi-Strauss:

> Neither is an individual alone in his group, nor is any society lonely among other societies. The more so is a man not alone in the universe. The rainbow of human cultures will finally disintegrate into a vacuum, which will be the result of a new madness. As long as we live and the world exists, this so-called arch, which unites us with the unattainable, will remain, pointing the way to defence against slavery (*Tristes Tropiques*).

It was the judgment of fate that, in this rainbow, the combination of two particular colours moves me more than other hues. Strengthens pride or increases bitterness and rebellion. I speak about this reluctantly and I would very likely omit this confession if it were not for my pre-Christmas cleaning and those old papers which I found in my desk. With this small incident, I close this matter. And the drawer in my desk.

My Little Confession

J.S.

I RECENTLY returned from the prison in which I served the term to which I was sentenced. I was charged with having made a derogatory remark about one of the members of the present party leadership. This happened at the time when, like many others, I erred; by the time I was sentenced and went to prison I had already begun to understand. I thought most highly of Dubcek's leadership and expected a great deal from it; naturally I was later disappointed, but I could not do an about-face immediately as some others did; I did not want to believe that I had been cheated. I have never been against socialism—that wouldn't have been easy anyway. My father and my grandfather are old party members. I come from a worker's family and grew up in the Pioneer organization. There were often party meetings in our home, and we children used to sing at public meetings. I was also in the Youth Union.

I often ask myself how it was possible for me to behave as I did only two or three years ago. At that time I used to read *Literarni Listy*, *Reporter*, watch television, etc. But even then there were people in leading positions who called themselves communists, and they were educated people, too. Today I know whom I have to thank for the formation of my former views and for the consequences. For over two years I have been walking around with my eyes wide open, and what I

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

write to you now is not the result of my prison sentence. It is simply the result of clear thinking. Although I was not guilty of much, I am ashamed of what I did, I am angry with myself, and I should like to make amends for my wrongdoing.

A great deal has been written abroad about our prisons and 'concentration camps', and during the time of 'rebirth' our own newspapermen added their bit to this defamation. I was in one of these prisons—and rightly so. For what I did I would be prosecuted in any country and under any system. I was an ordinary prisoner, not a prominent personality, and I can only smile at what foreign and our own former journalists imagine Czech 'concentration camps' are like. The fact is, all we were asked to do was to work eight hours a day. When they were free, many of those who were there with me had never had the cultural opportunities they had in prison. Daily television, movies twice a week, lectures, courses for those whose knowledge of reading and writing was deficient, etc.

I should like to say to our present journalists and to all honest people: Do not ever admit that anyone can again make fools of honest people.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Farewell to an Incorrigible Girl

Tadeusz Nowakowski

A PICTURESQUE figure has disappeared from the not-so-picturesque cultural landscape of the German Federal Republic: Wanda Bronska-Pampuch died recently in Munich. She was a journalist, an essayist, and the author of an autobiographical novel *Ohne Mass und Ende* (the title comes from an old revolutionary song: 'Die Macht, die ohne Mass und Ende uns niederzwingt in Not und Fron'), as well as of a book about the 'Polish October': *Poland zwischen Hoffnung und Verzweiflung*.

Who was she? Was she Polish? She spoke Polish and wrote about Poland. She translated contemporary Polish authors. She often used to say: 'My education was based not only on the classics of Marxism but also on Zeromski [an oustanding Polish novelist].'

Was she German? She went to school in Berlin before Radek took her as a voluntary helper to a Moscow editorial office. She wrote in German.

But perhaps the daughter of the economist Mieczyslaw Bronski (a prominent member of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania who took part in the October Revolution in Russia) was Swiss? She was born in Zurich. Her parents were Polish *emigrés*, former prisoners of Okhrana, who were preparing in Switzerland the fall of Tsarism. 'Lenin used to peer into little Wanda's cradle', remarked the author of the obituary published in *Die Zeit*.

Was she perhaps Russian? If not by birth certificate, then from choice? 'I am properly domesticated only in Russian literature', she confessed in one of the symposia on Dostoyevsky. She had a long and unhappy love affair with Russia. Some of the sons and grandsons of old Bolsheviks, the victims of Stalinism, knew about that. When a young lyric poet from Leningrad came to Munich recently he asked his host: 'I would like to see the Pinakotek, the beautiful churches, and the Olympic Stadium, but first I would like to meet Wanda Bronska-Pampuch. My uncle visited the shores of the Okhotsk Sea with her. . . .'

The obtuse host could not have been more surprised. *Na, so was!* To be so eager to meet somebody unknown simply because many years ago somebody from the family met her on a sightseeing trip! He didn't understand the specific understatement in the reference; the health resort in question was of course the hell of Magadan.

WHO then was this Polish German? Passports, birth certificates, identity cards, and similar documents do not tell us much about a person. I think that she was first of all a relic of an epoch which has

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gone with the wind. She was the last Mohican in this reservation of ideas, which were so close to Rosa Luxemburg, but which Polish workers, who opted for an independent state rather than the illusion of the brotherhood of oppressed classes and peoples, would not entertain. She sprang from this ideological circle, in which supranational ties and internationalist ideas were upheld not so much by the proletariat as by the impoverished part of the Polish-Jewish intelligentsia. Its members based their belief in social revolution on the illusion that the Moscow of tomorrow would no longer be simply the capital of Russia but would somehow become the capital of the Left, and that after the fall of one Tsarism another one would not arise.

'What? You are friendly with her?' one of the prominent personalities of People's Poland asked me, expressing his surprise. 'Do you know who she is? She is . . . a communist!'

Indeed: she was an extraordinary person, this comrade Wanda! She was the embodiment of political inconsistency. On odd days an oldfashioned communist would suddenly come to life in her, on even days quite contrary passions moved her. Freud would describe it as a love-hate relationship. The police to the east of the Elbe branded her as a 'deserter' and a 'renegade'. The police in the West scratched their heads. Eight years in the slave labour camps, Kolyma and Magadan, the deaths of her father and mother, who perished in the dungeons of the NKVD where they were thrown, on the personal recommendation of Stalin, as 'Trotskyites', the loss of a child who disappeared in some Soviet orphanage, such and similar painful personal experiences couldn't somehow cure her of her illusions. If only Stalin, this regrettable freak of history, had not spoilt pure communism. . . . She was not the only one among the victims who thought against all the empirical evidence that communism is no more responsible for the 'excesses' of Stalinism than the Catholic Church for the 'distortions' of the Inquisition. Utopia 'as such' deserves, despite everything, eternal loyalty. . . .

But is it necessary to share the views of our fellow-pilgrims in this vale of tears in order to lament over the ashes? What after all is this alleged omnipotence of politics in comparison with the authentic existential problems of a person? Ever since her youth, from the stormy time when the only daughter of the Bronski couple, the pride of 'Spartacus' was smuggling arms and revolutionary literature as a courier between Berlin, Prague, and Moscow, from this epoch of conspiracy and later from her experience in prisons and concentration camps, what remained in her was a permanent hunger for friendship and a very impartial habit of personal kindness. Her impulse was always the same: to help, to give a bed for the night and a meal, to slip an envelope with money and addresses into the person's pocket and to send him on his way. Times have changed but the habit still remained in a different epoch and was no less effective in the new political geography than it was in the years of conspiracy.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

She couldn't go to Moscow or to Warsaw after she had 'chosen freedom', leaving her job in the Polish Military Mission in West Berlin. The road back was barred to her. What is more, she 'was interfering in the internal affairs of socialist countries' by writing on such achievements of the most progressive ideology in the world as the Poznan massacre, the Hungarian Revolution, the Berlin Wall, the March 1968 pogrom of liberal intellectuals and Jews in Poland, the December 1970 shooting of Polish workers on the Baltic coast, the persecution of dissidents in the Soviet Union. If she had only been wise enough to maintain a discrete silence or to translate writers who are particularly favoured by the apparatus of repression, perhaps the Prodigal Daughter might have received an entry visa. But she preferred to write about Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn rather than about Sholokhov or Kochetov. Among Polish authors she translated such 'heretical' writers as Leszek Kolakowski, Stefan Kisielewski, and Wiktor Woroszylski.

'I didn't betray the revolution', she said once to Evtushenko—'it was the revolution which betrayed me. . . .'

A few weeks ago at a meeting of Russian and German writers in Bonn, the following dialogue took place: 'This is Wanda Bronska-Pampuch', somebody whispered into the Soviet Ambassador's ear, 'the one who writes about Russia. . . .'

'Does she say good or bad things?' asked the Ambassador.

'I praise good things and I criticize bad things', said the ex-comrade.

'And how can you know, living in Germany, what is good and what is bad in our country?' remarked His Excellency.

'My conscience tells me!' came the answer.

'The conscience can be capitalist or it can be socialist!' snapped the Ambassador.

'It can simply be human!' she said, her voice slightly too loud.

The embarrassed host quickly changed the subject.

WE bade farewell to Wanda on 12 February in the Munich *Ostfriedhof*. Immanuel Birnbaum said farewell on behalf of *Suddeutscher Zeitung*, to which she was a regular contributor. Speeches were made by the president of the German Writers' Union, Dieter Lattmann, by Professor Ossip Flechtheim from the University of Berlin, and by myself. Having described (in German) her merits in the dissemination of Polish cultural achievements abroad, I said a few words in Polish as she wanted me to do and quoted her beloved Zeromski. Then, at the end of the ceremony, to the great surprise of all present, we suddenly heard from the loudspeaker a Russian revolutionary song.

'She's incorrigible', whispered into my ear an elderly gentleman in a threadbare overcoat, 'even after her death she can't give up her revolution.'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was an old communist who had lost all his illusions a long time ago (he spent eight years in the Nazi camp in Buchenwald and 12 years in the Soviet camp in Vorkuta), and who, once upon a time, let the 16 year old schoolgirl talk from the platform at a workers' meeting in Berlin in 1927. Forty-five years later he travelled from Hamburg to Munich to put a few red carnations on her grave.

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems

Recent numbers include articles on:

US Trade policy in the 1970s: the Report of the Williams Commission	*Caroline Miles*
The Indian subcontinent after the war	*W. Klatt*
Thailand—yet another coup	*Astri Suhrke and Charles E. Morrison*
Egypt's conflict of alliances	*Shlomo Slonim*
Pentagon Papers: the dialectics of intervention	*J. L. S. Girling*

Annual Subscription: £3·25 post free (U.S.A. and Canada $10)
28p per copy

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, NW10 0DD (Tel. 01-450 8080)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Merle Fainsod 1907-72

Paul Cocks

EVERY field has its own giants—its outstanding intellectual leaders whose scholarly contributions leave an indelible imprint on our understanding and knowledge, its dedicated academic statesmen who by their untiring vitality and organizational activity promote and sustain professional interest and support, and its devoted and great teachers who inspire and train new generations of students and specialists. Certainly the tallest of the giants in the field of Soviet politics was Merle Fainsod, who achieved pre-eminent stature in all three of the above areas of endeavour and distinction. His *How Russia Is Ruled* (1953, revised in 1963) has served as the standard general text on Soviet government for nearly two decades. His *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (1958), on the other hand, has become a classic as a local case study. In terms of richness and mastery of detail, it has no equal, nor is it likely to have for many years to come—if ever. These two works alone established Fainsod as America's foremost authority on the Soviet Union. Yet they by no means exhaust the impressive list of monographs and learned articles that he wrote on Soviet affairs, not to mention his scholarly achievements in other areas and subjects, such as American government, economic development, and public administration. Indeed here, too, he excelled and earned the mutual respect and world-wide acclaim of historians and economists as well as political scientists.

Perhaps no man contributed more—and was more unsparing with his time and attention—to the development of Soviet studies in the United States after the second world war than Merle Fainsod. His guiding, though never imposing, hand as an outstanding administrator and organizer was constantly sought and always given. One of the original founders of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, he served as its Director from 1959 to 1964. From 1964 until his sudden death in February 1972 he directed the Harvard University Library, augmenting and consolidating in the process its voluminous and valuable Russian holdings. In 1968 he was elected President of the American Political Science Association.

But it was as a teacher, above all, that Merle acquired his greatest renown and the lasting affection of countless students and colleagues. In his more than 40 years of teaching at Harvard, he became an integral part, indeed an institution, of that university. His basic introductory lecture course on Soviet government was always one of the most popular and respected courses among the undergraduate community. Similarly, graduate students regarded his research seminar on Soviet politics as perhaps the most rigorous but rewarding exercise of their graduate experience. All those who had the opportunity and privilege of studying with Professor Fainsod are keenly aware how much their own lives and work have been influenced and enriched by him, by the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

very substance and style of his scholarship. A model of both scholarly excellence and intellectual integrity, he was in every sense of the word the scholar's scholar. Much like Russian dissident writers who, eschewing faddism and doctrinairism, write 'for the drawer' and the court of history, his students wrote and will continue to write essentially 'for Fainsod', trying to achieve the quality and perfection that he himself never formally demanded but constantly inspired. Few doctoral dissertations written under his direction were ever immediately turned into books. There was always, it seemed, that extra effort and final polishing that one felt was required to earn his final 'stamp of approval' on a job well done. What greater accomplishment and success could a teacher achieve than to have his pupils internalize and try to emulate his own system of values and virtues? In this sense, though we will miss deeply his physical presence, he will always be with us, looking over our shoulder, so to speak, guiding and checking our work.

In whatever capacity, however, Merle Fainsod served—as scholar, administrator, or professor—the human dimension of the man and his heart always transcended and loomed larger than his official role. A gentleman and gentle man, he was always unobtrusively dignified and impeccably decent in all his undertakings and relationships. He always demanded and gave more of himself than he ever asked of others. Beneath his quiet exterior burned an unending passion for his work and deep, selfless concern for his students, friends, and others. For all those who knew and loved him, Merle Fainsod indeed became the subject of 'a cult of personality'.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letters to the Editor

Sir,

I regret to have to take exception to Mr Tucker's way of misinterpreting insidiously a few words of mine about the young Stalin, in order to depreciate a book which apparently displeased him. I did not write what he ascribed to me.

The sentence in question is in chapter IV: for the first time, in 1913, appeared the signature 'Stalin'. I wrote in French: 'Staline n'attendit personne pour faire sonner le métal dans son nom de guerre.' It was translated in the English version as follows: 'Stalin did not wait for anybody to confer his metallic pseudonym.' The point was to underscore a significant element in the youthful Stalin's self-characterization. That has nothing in common with Mr Tucker's misinterpretation.

Mr Tucker did not notice that chapter IV is followed by chapter V, then by chapters VI, VII, VIII, IX, X. . . . All along the biography, the author had to take account of the various and successive features of the character who is not exactly the same in 1913 as in 1940. A first remark relating to the year 1913 is not a conclusion *summing up* everything in 1940.

A fortiori, if I were to bring the book up to date, I would take into account what all of us have learned during the forties, fifties and sixties about the 'marvellous Georgian'. Lenin himself does not characterize Stalin in the same way at different periods.

Sincerely yours,
B. Souvarine

Professor Robert C. Tucker replies:

In 'Several Stalins' I said that Stalin deluded some of his biographers into believing that the pseudonym Stalin was not simply his wish for himself or pose but a true summation of his personality. Mr Souvarine was mentioned in a footnote as one case in point. This was based on a passage appearing on page 134 of the English translation of *Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism.* Since I merely referred to the passage, only part of which is reproduced in Mr Souvarine's letter. I shall quote it here: 'Having become a politician on the Russian scale, Koba adopted, with secret satisfaction, a name with a Russian ending which expresses his master quality—hard as steel. Rupert called Cromwell's men "Ironsides". Augustin Robespierre drew his brother Maximilian's attention to the young Bonaparte as "an iron soldier." Stalin did not wait for anybody to confer his metallic pseudonym.' That seemed unequivocal.

Mr Souvarine is mistaken in saying that his book did not please me. Whatever my reservations on a few particular points, such as this one, I consider it, as I indicated in 'Several Stalins', one of the classic biographies of Stalin and a work of large and enduring value.

Sincerely,
Robert C. Tucker

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Contributors

PAUL COCKS, Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University, was a student of Professor Merle Fainsod, who was a contributor to and a friend of *Survey*.

MICHAEL GLENNY, Lecturer in Russian at the University of Birmingham and Senior Associate Member of St. Antony's College, Oxford, is the translator of over 30 books and plays from German and Russian, including Solzhenitsyn's 'August 1914'.

PER EGIL HEGGE, a Norwegian journalist, went to Moscow in June 1969 as correspondent for three Scandinavian newspapers. When Solzhenitsyn was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in October 1970, Hegge found himself deeply involved in the ensuing negotiations and his book *Go-Between in Moscow*, from which we publish extracts in this issue, is based on detailed notes made at the time and subsequently smuggled out of the Soviet Union.

PHILIP J. JAFFE is an author and editor, long concerned with problems of communism. His last publication in *Survey* (No. 53) was his article 'The Strange Case of Anna Louise Strong'.

ALI A. MAZRUI, Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Makerere University, is the author of *Towards a Pax Africana*, *Violence and Thought*, *The Trial of Christopher Okigbo* (a novel), *Protest and Power* (edited with Robert I. Rotberg) and other works.

MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV, a Yugoslav literary critic and specialist on Dostoyevsky, was University Lecturer in Slavic Languages and Literatures at Zagreb University but was arrested on 4 March 1965 and served two terms of imprisonment for sending critical articles abroad. Released from prison in February 1970, he was imprisoned again in 1972 for the same offence.

TADEUSZ NOWAKOWSKI is a Polish writer living in Germany. He is the author of *Polonaise Allerheiligen* and many other books. Wanda Bronska-Pampuch was a contributor to and a friend of *Survey*.

P. J. VATIKIOTIS is Professor of Politics with reference to the Near and Middle East in the University of London. His works include *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (1961), *The Modern History of Egypt* (1969) and *Conflict in the Middle East* (1971).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Spring 1972 Volume XXVI, No. 1

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: USSR/USA

THE SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: DOES IT EXIST?
Vernon V. Aspaturian

THE MERCHANTS OF DEATH, THEN AND NOW
Robert H. Ferrell

INDUSTRY, ARMS, AND THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP
William T. Lee

STRATEGIC ELITES AND POLITICS OF SUPERPOWERS
Roman Kolkowicz

Other contributors will include:

Walter C. Clemens — Walter Darnell Jacobs
Robert L. Hoffman
James T. Crown — Jan Triska

Subscriptions: Single current issue, $2.25; Single back issue, $2.50; One year, $4.50; Two years, $8.50; Thee years, $12.50. Plus 50 cents per issue for foreign postage and handling.

Offices: 420 West 118th Street, New York, New York, 10027.

SURVEY

BACK ISSUES

Back issues and volumes of *Survey* from 1956 to 1968 are obtainable from:

Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd

Back issues Department

Cannon House

Telephone **Park Farm Road**

Folkestone (0303) 57421 **Folkestone, Kent**

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

osteuropa

Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens

Gegründet 1925 in Berlin von Professor Dr. Otto Hoetzsch
Herausgegeben von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde
Redigiert von Professor Dr. Klaus Mehnert
Seit 1969 mit OSTEUROPA-ARCHIV

OSTEUROPA ist mit über 1800 Seiten pro Jahrgang die umfang- und materialreichste unter den vergleichbaren Zeitschriften der Welt.

OSTEUROPA behandelt alle Fragen der kommunistischen Welt, vorwiegend der Sowjetunion und osteuropäischer Länder, aber auch anderer kommunistisch regierter Staaten sowie des Weltkommunismus insgesamt.

OSTEUROPA analysiert, informiert und dokumentiert.

OSTEUROPA brachte vor kurzem unter anderem Beiträge von
Oskar Anweiler (über die " Ostpädagogik ")
Werner Gumpel (über Integration und Integrationskritieren im RGW)
Peter Hübner (über die Zensur in der Sowjetunion)
Harald Laeuen (über Moczars Entmachtung)
Alvin Z. Rubinstein (über die sowjetische Politik gegenüber den Entwicklungsländern)
A. L. Unger (über die mündliche Information in der UdSSR)
Andreas von Weiss (über Moskau und die Neue Linke)
17 bekannten Autoren über die Sowjetunion 1971 (im August/September-Doppelheft 1971, 272 S.)

OSTEUROPA brachte soeben (im Februar-Heft) Beiträge von
Robert Stupperich, Eugen Voss, Baymirza Hayit, Karl Hartmann und **Gerhard Simon** über Probleme von Kirche – Religion – Staat
OSTEUROPA bringt in Kürze unter anderem Aufsätze von
Arnold Buchholz (über die wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution und den Wettbewerb der Systeme)
Dieter Burrack (über die Sowjetunion und die Militärregime Schwarzafrikas)
Frank Golczewski (über die jüdische Autonome Provinz in Sowjet-Fernost)
Aloys Hastrich (über die Rechtsanwaltschaft in der UdSSR)
Wolfgang Kasack (über neue Wege der sowjetischen Wissenschaftsplanung)
Gotthold Rhode (über den Warschauer Parteitag)
Walter Schilling (über die Sowjetpolitik im Nahen Osten)

OSTEUROPA erscheint monatlich. Jahresabonnement DM 48,– = $13.10 = sfr. 58.60 zuzüglich Porto; für Studenten, Schulen und ähnliche Institutionen im Abbonnement jährlich DM 32,– zuzüglich Porto.

Bestellung durch den Buchhandel oder direkt beim Verlag. Probehefte kostenlos bei der

Deutschen Verlags-Anstalt, 7 Stuttgart 1, Postfach 209

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

A Quarterly Review Published by the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), the Russian Philosophical Studies Program at Boston College, and the Seminar for Political Theory and Philosophy at the University of Munich

Editors: Joseph M. Bocheński, Thomas J. Blakeley, Nikolaus Lobkowicz
Consulting Editors: Karl G. Ballestrem, Notre Dame; Arnold Buchholz, Stuttgart; David D. Comey, Ithaca; Helmut Dahm, Bonn; Richard DeGeorge, Lawrence, Kansas; Helmut Fleischer, Berlin; Zbigniew A. Jordan, Ottawa; George L. Kline, Bryn Mawr; Gustav A. Wetter, Rome; Karl A. Wittfogel, New York.

Managing Editors: James O'Rourke, Manchester, U.S.A.; T.R. Payne, Oxford.

Contents of Volume 11, No. 3

Michael Gagern/The Puzzling Pattern of the Marxist Critique of Feuerbach.—Helmut Dahm/Zur sowjetischen Rezeption der Phänomenologie Schelers.

Discussion: Science and Its Metaphysical Interpretations (P. Kirschenmann)

Notes and Comments:
On Marcuse—The Old and the New—Degeneration (T. J. Blakeley)

Reviews: George L. Kline, Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia (Mary-Barbara Zeldin)
Pierre Tschaadaev, Letters philosophiques adressées à une dame (Mary-Barbara Zeldin)
Kenneth A. Megill, The New Democratic Theory (Frederick J. Adelmann)

Bibliography: Wei-Shung Chang/The Impact of Soviet Dialectical Materialism on China Through Translations.—Wei-Shung Chang/Chinese Translations of Soviet Philosophical Works, 1949–1963. I.—Books Received.—From the Profession.

Subscription price per volume of four issues Dfl. 70 (U.S. $20.70) including postage. One volume is published yearly.
Personal subscription price on request.

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY P.O. Box 17. DORDRECHT-HOLLAND

ASIAN SURVEY

Leading American monthly devoted to current developments in Asia. Coverage of political, economic and social trends in such societies as Communist China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Burma.

Recent articles have analyzed such topics as the "May 16 Group's ultraleft conspiracy" in China, the "Che Guevarist" uprising in Ceylon, the Naga issue in India, the "Burmese Way to Socialism," the role of the military in the Chinese economy, and U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia.

Symposiums on the 1971 elections in India and the planning process in several Asian countries have been scheduled. In addition, as a regular feature, two structured issues are published in January and February surveying major trends for the previous year in eighteen Asian countries.

Rates: $10 per year for 12 issues ($11 for overseas subscribers).
Special student rate: $5 per year ($6 overseas).

ASIAN SURVEY
University of California Press
Berkeley, California 94720

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comparative Studies in Society and History

Volume 14 Number 2 March 1972

EDITORIAL FOREWORD

Marx and Weber Today

RICHARD ASHCRAFT Marx and Weber on Liberalism as Bourgeois Ideology

Charisma

WALTER P. ZENNER Aqiili Agha: The Strongman in the Ethnic Relations of the Ottoman Galilee

DAVID GUTMANN Comment

R. H. DEKMEJIAN and M. J. WYSZOMIRSKI Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahdi of the Sudan

Elites

EUL-SOO PANG and RON L. SECKINGER The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil

BOOKS RECEIVED

£2·00 net in U.K.; $5·00 in U.S.A.

Subscription price £5·00 net in U.K.; $14·00 in U.S.A.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London NW1 2 DB

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

APRIL–JUNE 1972 ISSUE NO. 50

Edgar Snow: Some Personal Reminiscences — *John S. Service*

On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961–1969 — *James C. Thomson Jr.*

Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons — *Jonathan Pollack*

China and Indian Communism — *Bhabani Sen Gupta*

Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Incomplete Autobiography — *Richard Kagan*

Rural Industry—A Traveller's View — *Jon Sigurdson*

Impressions of Language in China — *Beverly Hong Fincher*

COMMENT BOOK REVIEWS

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office: 24 FITZROY SQUARE, LONDON, W.1.

Subscription Agents:
RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS LTD., VICTORIA HALL,
EAST GREENWICH, LONDON SE10 0RF

Subscription Rates: £4 or U.S. $10.00 a year
For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00 a year
Individual copies: £1 or U.S. $2.50

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press, Ltd., London and Reading

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED